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 This study examines why minority groups choose to employ or not to employ 
militant strategies when dealing with the state. It examines four cases in Europe: the 
Corsicans in France, the Basques in Spain and the Russian speaking minorities in 
Estonia and Latvia. While it is generally assumed that minority groups who are 
accommodated by the state remain peaceful and groups who face discrimination are 
more likely to use violence, these cases were chosen specifically for the reason that 
they have chosen the opposite path.  
Through the use of primary elite interviews, survey data and secondary 
sources four hypotheses are tested. The role of economic discrepancy, the 
international community, culture and the institutionalization of culture are examined. 
The institutionalization of culture is further broken down into three parts: the impact 
of geographic isolation, time and repertoires.  
The study finds that while economics appears to be a sufficient condition for a 
group choosing violence, it is not a necessary one. The international community, 
however, appears to be extremely important. When the international community is 
 
engaged in a country the minority group sees it as an ‘ombudsmen’ and remains 
quiet. Conversely, groups ignored by the international community feel isolated and 
seek to bring attention to their cause. Culture also plays an important role. The culture 
of some groups is more accepting of violence than others. Groups with cultures that 
do not accept violence are much less prone to use it than groups who see violence as 
an acceptable strategy. Geographic isolation appears to be a way for culture to be 
institutionalized. Groups who must interact with other groups are less likely to use 
violence than those who remain physically distant. While time appears to have some 
role, the more important factor appears to be the time period when the group is in 
conflict with the state. Certain ideologies are acceptable at different times in history, 
this impacts the groups available choices.  Finally, the use of repertoires also appears 
to be a factor. Once violence is used it is difficult to stop. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
 
 What do we know about ethnic conflict? More importantly, what do we not 
know? The term itself conjures images of war, genocide and oppression. The 
Twentieth Century will long be remembered not only as a bloody century of 
international conflict but also internal ethnic conflict as well. There were severe 
ethnic conflicts on every continent and some form of ethnic conflict in the majority of 
all countries. One continent that saw more than its fair share of ethnic conflict was 
and continues to be Europe. Ranging in degree from low level discrimination against 
minorities in most countries to open discrimination in such cases as the Turk 
population in Germany, to open terrorism in Northern Ireland to protracted civil war 
in the former Yugoslavia very few areas were immune from some form of conflict. 
Ethnic issues remain unresolved today throughout Europe. For example there has 
been an ongoing open conflict in Moldova, continuing discrimination in a variety of 
European states directed against the Roma population1 and there has been growing 
resentment in countries such as Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands against new 
minorities. While the world now must face the new 21st Century threat to peace and 
stability that is international terrorism it still must deal with leftover problems from 
the last century with ethnic conflict being near or at the top of that list. 
 While problems remain and there is more worldwide awareness of the 
problems of ethnic conflict the situation may not be as bleak as it appears. While 
                                                
1   For a full account of the current and past discrimination against the Roma 
population in Europe see the European Roma Rights Centre’s website, 
http://www.errc.org. 
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some individual ethnic conflicts have gained world attention, such as the conflicts in 
Rwanda, Burundi, Kosovo and Northern Ireland in reality the number of active large-
scale ethnic conflicts has been decreasing in the past years. Gurr’s analysis indicate 
that since the middle of the 1990’s the overall level of ethnic conflict around the 
world has begun to decrease after a steady increase over the period of the cold war 
and its immediate aftermath.2 The end of the cold war brought a spike in the levels of 
ethnic conflict in Europe mainly due to the tragedy of Yugoslavia. Is it possible that 
with the advent of 24 hour news reporting that the world has been led to think that 
ethnic conflict is now worse than it ever was but in reality it is the opposite?  
 While the answer may be yes that does not mean all of the work is done. 
Gurr’s analysis concentrates on large scale rebellion. There are many shades of 
conflict below large scale rebellion that can disrupt a society in its present form and 
also manifest itself into something larger at a later point. While the levels of conflict 
may be decreasing, the possibility for things to get worse is also present.3 It is 
therefore important to remain vigilant and continue to try to understand ethnic 
conflict, how it manifests itself, where it is most likely and if possible, how to prevent 
it.  
The one generally accepted ‘rule of thumb’ of predicting where ethnic conflict 
is most likely concerns the treatment of the minority group by the state. This is the 
                                                
2  Ted Robert Gurr (2000) Peoples Versus States (Washington DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press), p.30. 
  
3  For a list of current and potential ethnic conflicts as of 2002 see Barbara Harff and 
Ted Robert Gurr (2004) Ethnic Conflicts in World Politics (Boulder CO: Westview 
Press), Appendix pp.198-204. 
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belief that states which actively try to include their minority groups into the political 
and social process of a state are most effective in finding peaceful solutions to their 
ethnic problems. Conversely, states which actively exclude minority groups, or  
oppress these groups are more like to encounter a more militant response by the 
minority group. This general belief is rooted in both history and common sense. It 
makes sense that groups who feel welcomed by the state, whose needs and demands 
are respected and who generally feel safe within a particular state have little reason to 
become more militant. Groups who feel excluded or even threatened are likely to see 
some form of violent opposition as their only way to ensure that their needs will be 
considered. Much of the basis for current risk assessment is based on this principle as 
scholars look for groups who are being excluded, who are being repressed or who are 
having rights denied them and concentrate their attention on those cases. 
While many cases can be explained using this model, there are some cases 
that it cannot explain. There are ethnic groups who have members engaged in militant 
activity4 despite the state’s active attempt at finding political solutions to the concerns 
of the minority. Conversely, there are also ethnic groups who have not been fully 
included in the society. They are either fully or partially denied access to elements of 
the political or economic spheres of society and any efforts at inclusion by the state 
are considered unsatisfactory. Despite this unequal treatment, these groups not only 
actively shun violence but they continue to try to work within a political system that 
                                                
4  In this study militant activity will be defined as any collective action that is outside 
of the legal system. This includes street violence, severe vandalism, assassinations 
and other terrorist activities. It is not necessary for the majority of the group to be 
involved in these activities, only an active segment.  
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is not welcoming to them. This study is an attempt to understand why these groups 
have chosen their particular paths to improve their position within the state. Why do 
some groups resort to violence when it would appear not to be in their best interest to 
do so? Conversely, what can make a group continue to try to find political solutions 
when the use of violence by at least a segment of the population, while not justified 
would be understandable? Specifically the research question for this project is: 
What factors are or are not present that can cause an ethnic group to choose 
militant strategies within a state that is attempting to accommodate them or 
conversely cause a group that appears to be neglected or worse to continue to 
attempt to work within the traditional political system?        
The Cases to be Examined 
 What cases can be classified as being outside of the accepted theory on ethnic 
conflict? While there are several, this study will concentrate on four cases in Europe. 
Two of the cases are groups who have segments of their nationalist movements that 
employ violence as a strategy to achieve their goals despite attempts by the state to 
incorporate them into the political system. The other two groups have avoided the use 
of violence despite the fact that the state has made little or insufficient overtures to 
them to work within the political system. The Corsicans in France and the Basques in 
Spain represent the former category and the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia 
and Latvia the latter.5 
                                                
5  Chapter 3 will provide full histories of each group, this chapter will only provide a 
cursory description.  
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 Corsica is a small island in the Mediterranean Sea. It has been a part of France 
since the 18th Century. Due to its strategic location it has been under outside control 
for almost all of its history. Those who conquered Corsica were more interested in its 
geo-political importance rather than its people and therefore the Corsicans were 
historically left alone. As a result the Corsican culture and language have survived. 
Since the 18th Century there have been elements of a Corsican nationalist movement 
but the current problems started after the Second World War. The end of the colonial 
period brought an end to a main source of employment for many Corsicans as 
military and civil workers in the French empire. It also brought a large number of 
French settlers from Algeria, known as the pieds noirs after France’s withdrawal from 
Algeria. These settlers were given the prime farming land by the French government. 
Their arrival not only threatened the Corsicans economic future they also disrupted 
Corsican society and threatened culture and language. The nationalist movement 
opposed to France’s actions became violent during the 1970’s with the creation of the 
Frontu Di Liberazione Naziunalista Corsu, or FLNC. The actions of the FLNC and 
the growth in the Corsican nationalist movement led the French government to try to 
find a political solution. The first attempt occurred in 1982 which gave the Corsicans 
some control over economic interests and Corsican culture. It also gave the two 
national assemblies (Corsican is artificially divided into a north and south region) 
special status not given to other regional assemblies. The violence did not cease and 
another attempt at a political solution came in 1991. More power was given to the 
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island to promote tourism, the local environment and Corsican language education 
but again the violence did not end. The most recent attempt by the French 
government was in the summer of 2003 when a referendum was held on the island 
which would have radically altered the relationship between France and Corsica. The 
two regions would have been merged into one national assembly which would have 
had more rights and responsibilities than any other region in unitary France. The 
referendum question was defeated by less than 1% of the total vote. While the 
majority of Corsicans do not support either the nationalists or the radical FLNC, 
political violence has continued on the island for over 30 years. All attempts by the 
French government to appease the population have failed and it is unclear what can 
now be done to end the conflict. 
 The Basques occupy the land in the north of Spain and the south of France. 
There are four Basque provinces in Spain and three more in France. The Spanish 
Basques have used the resources found in the region and their geographic proximity 
to the rest of Europe to their economic advantage. The region industrialized early and 
has remained one of the economically advantaged regions in all of Spain. As with the 
Corsicans, the Basques also have a long history of being under foreign control. Also 
as with the Corsicans they were left alone linguistically and culturally for a long 
period despite this foreign influence. Even under early Spanish rule the Basques had a 
unique set of agreements known as fueros that excluded them from military service 
and created a unique taxation arrangement. The fueros were eliminated in 1841 after 
the Basques supported the losing side in the Carlist wars. By the end of the 19th 
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Century disapproval of Spain’s treatment of the Basques led to the creation of the 
Basque Nationalist Party, or PNV. The PNV immediately began to gain support 
particularly in the rural areas of the region. During the 1930’s the Basques once again 
found themselves on the losing side of a civil war. Under the rule of Franco the 
Basques suffered severe repression. Franco tried to exterminate the Basque language 
and culture. Dissatisfied with the PNV’s response to this repression a group of young, 
radical, left-wing Basques broke away and formed the radical Euskadi ta Askatasuna 
(Basque Homeland and Liberty, known as the ETA). The ETA advocated a violent 
response to Franco and were immediately seen as heroes to many Basques. After the 
death of Franco, Spain tried to incorporate the new Basques regime into its new and 
democratic society. Many of the fueros were re-established and the Basque 
government was given substantial responsibilities. Despite these concessions the 
ETA’s activities did not end. The government in Madrid, there has made attempts to 
both appease the Basques, negotiate with the ETA and at times crack down on the 
terrorists. While there have been periodic cease fires by the ETA, they remain active 
and must be negotiate with if any lasting peace is to be found. 
 Until 1992 the Estonians and Latvians had a history comparable to the 
Corsicans and the Basques.6 Apart from the interwar period when they enjoyed a brief 
brush with independence they had been under foreign control. From 1940 when they 
were annexed to 1992 when they managed to break away they were under the control 
of the Soviet Union. During that time many Estonians and Latvians were forcibly 
                                                
6  In this study at times the Estonian and Latvian cases will be examined together. 
When appropriate the differences between the two countries will be examined.  
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moved to other areas of the country and non-Estonians and Latvians moved into the 
region. While both the Estonian and Latvian language were protected, Russian was 
the lingua franca for the country and the demographic shift threatened both groups’ 
cultural survival. Once they obtained their independence their first order of business 
was to ensure that their language and culture could never be threatened again. One 
way to protect their culture was to exclude those who did not share it. Many Russian-
speakers7 who had moved to the region when it was a part of the Soviet Union in 
search of better jobs now found that they did not have citizenship. Many could not 
speak the titular language and could not pass the stringent citizenship tests set out in 
both countries. The Estonians and Latvians had hoped that many of the Russians 
would simply return to Russian. It became clear early on that this was not to be and 
under pressure by the international community the citizenship laws were loosened. 
Despite the easing of restrictions many Russians remain totally outside of the political 
process. They have not integrated and cannot speak the language and lacking 
citizenship they lack the ability to vote, hold certain jobs and own land. There is 
growing dissatisfaction among the Russians in the two Baltic countries over the right 
to Russian language education and the Russian community is also economically 
disadvantaged in both countries.  
                                                
 
7  Throughout this study the term Russians and Russian-speakers will be used 
interchangeably. The majority of the non-Latvians and Estonians in these countries 
are ethnic Russians, however there are also Ukrainians, Belorussians and others who 
speak Russian. The integration policies of both countries do not make a distinction 
between those who speak Russian and those who are ethnically Russian, so both 
terms will be used here.   
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While both the Corsicans and Basques have turned to violence, the Russian 
communities in both Estonia and Latvia remain peaceful. In fact there has been very 
little mobilization by the group in any way. They continue to try to work in the 
political system in the hopes that they will eventually reach equal status with the 
Estonians and Latvians with whom they have lived with their entire lives. In future 
versions of this study additional cases will be examined including possibly Northern 
Ireland and cases in Eastern Europe such as Romania or Moldova. 
What Cases are not Included? 
  Due to the cases that have been chosen for this study the questions can be 
asked: What groups are not included and why? There are three cases whose exclusion 
needs to be explained. Most studies on the Baltic states include all three countries: 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Russians in Lithuania are noticeably absent from 
this study. The reason for their exclusion is simply that Lithuania has done a much 
better job of integrating their Russian-speaking population than the other two 
countries.8 The Russian minority moved into the Baltic states due to the 
industrialization of the region during the Soviet period but Lithuania was never 
industrialized to the same level as its Baltic neighbors. As a result the size of the 
Russian minority is also considerably smaller in Lithuania than in Estonia and 
Latvia.9 From the outset of independence in 1991 the Lithuanian government has 
                                                
8  It should be noted that Lithuania also has a large Polish minority who after some 
initial difficulties also have integrated in Lithuanian society. 
 
9  See Thomas Lane (2002) Lithuania: Stepping Westward (London: Routledge 
Press).  
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approached their minority issues in a very different way compared to the other two. 
Due to their small size the Lithuanians were more comfortable giving the Russian 
minority more rights and greater access to the political system. All the Russians were 
given citizenship as long as they “applied for it, took a loyalty oath, and showed proof 
of having renounced any other citizenship”.10 This law was amended in 1995 to be 
even more open and by the end of the 1990’s over 90% of the minority community in 
Lithuanian had received citizenship.11 Clearly the peace and stability in Lithuania 
should not be surprising. Therefore while the three Baltic states are linked throughout 
history and by geography, Lithuania will be severed from this analysis and only the 
Russian communities in Estonia and Latvia will be considered. 
 As discussed above for Basque nationalists the Basque country consists of 
four provinces in Spain and three provinces in France. While the importance of the 
Basque territory in France will be discussed, the actual Basques in France will not be 
included in this analysis.12 While there has been some co-operation between the 
Basques on both sides of the border it has mostly involved Spanish Basques hiding 
from the authorities after a terrorist attack or hiding weapons on the French side to be 
used in a future attack.13 The Basques in France are considerably poorer than their 
                                                                                                                                      
 
10   Walter C. Clemens (2001) The Baltic Transformed (Lanham MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Press), p.118. 
 
11  Ibid. 
 
12  For a description of the Basques in France please see the analytic summary for the 
group on the Minorities at Risk Project webpage, http://www.minoritiesatrisk.com. 
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Spanish cousins. The land where they live lacks the natural resources found in the 
south and there are very few of them. While there are over 2.6 million Basques in the 
Spanish provinces, the French Basques number a mere 250 000, representing only 
0.4% of the total French population.14 Due to their extremely small size, lack of 
political mobilization and their history of avoiding violence (on French soil) the 
French Basques are not appropriate for this analysis. 
 The final case that some would question their lack of inclusion is the Catalans 
in Spain. Like the Basques the Catalans are one of the traditional autonomous regions 
in Spain. They have had a long history both within and outside Spanish rule. They 
have their own language and culture and they have also had in the past nationalist 
organizations who have resorted to violence. The most famous of these groups was 
Terra Lliure (Free Land in Catalan) which was active in the 1970’s and 1980’s.15 The 
level of violence attributed to this group was never as high as the radical Basque 
groups and it has not been active since 1992. While the Catalans have concerns over 
the protection of their language and culture they have chosen more peaceful political 
strategies to express them. In turn, the Spanish state has been more open to 
negotiating with the Catalans. There have been efforts by political leaders to use the 
Catalan language while in the region (a courtesy not given to the Basques in recent 
                                                                                                                                      
13  See for example Reuters (2004) “Two ETA Suspects Held; Arms Cache Found in 
France” Washington Post 4 April 2004. 
  
14  Luis Núñez Astrain (1997) The Basques: Their Struggle for Independence 
(Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press), p.3. 
 
15  Minorities at Risk Website. 
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years) and the state has helped improve the Catalan education programs. In short, the 
Catalans are not included in this study because their nationalism is not viewed as the 
same type of threat as Basque nationalism by the Spanish state. As a result the 
treatment of the Catalans has been historically better than that of the Basques. The 
relationship between the Catalans and the rest of Spain is more civil with higher 
levels of trust and co-operation. Most importantly, there is a lack of violence 
associated with Catalan nationalism. Their behavior can be predicted using the 
generally accepted theory on ethnic conflict. However, since the Basque movement 
falls outside of the theory they are included in the study while the Catalans are not.   
Importance to the Discipline 
 Some may question what can be learned by studying the behavior of four 
small ethnic groups in the far Northeast and Southwest of Europe. Others may 
question the benefit this knowledge would serve. While the cases are intrinsically 
interesting, the study serves a much larger purpose. There have been many studies on 
ethnic conflict and many theories put forward trying to explain and more importantly 
predict when it will occur.16 The four cases in this study do not fit nicely into any of 
those theories’ explanations. As discussed above, these groups have followed paths 
that other groups in similar circumstances have not taken. They have remained 
outside the general pattern of behavior. By providing an explanation for the behavior 
of these cases a better understanding of the causes and prevention of ethnic conflict 
can be developed. Existing theories can be re-tested incorporating the findings of this 
                                                
16  The most important of these theories are discussed in Chapter Two. 
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study and issues that may not have been considered or not emphasized in other 
studies may be introduced or re-introduced with greater weight assigned to them. 
What is learned from the four cases in this study can be the foundation on which other 
cases can then be tested. The explanations provided in this study can be applied to 
other cases, both those who fall into the traditional explanations and those that do not.  
 Regardless of what is discovered about the decision-making of these groups 
specifically, there are larger issues to consider. This study is an attempt at explaining 
what factors can lead a group to choose violence or to avoid it. By better 
understanding this decision making the discipline as a whole is better prepared to 
create risk assessment models. With better models the possibility of identifying 
potential ‘hot spots’ is improved and greater attention can be given those cases by the 
international community. Potential pre-emptive solutions to these conflicts can be 
developed and less people will face the possibility of encounter ethnic conflict. If any 
improvement in the current risk assessment models is gained through an analysis of 
these four small groups then this study is more than justified to be undertaken.  
Research Methods 
 To answer the questions asked in this study several sources of information 
will be utilized. Due to the small number of cases studied it would be inappropriate to 
use large quantitative models. This study will therefore rely heavily on qualitative 
analysis. By testing the four cases across a variety of hypotheses it is possible to gain 
a great wealth of information and be confident in the predictions and explanations 
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that result from the analysis.17 This study relies heavily on secondary sources for both 
theoretical and historical analyses. While this study is grounded in the social science 
tradition it is impossible to understand the groups today without understanding their 
history. For each of the cases the vast majority of understanding and interpretations of 
historical events come from secondary sources. The study takes the opinions and 
interpretations from these sources and synthesizes them into a new understanding of 
this topic. There does not appear to be any previous single study which has attempted 
to an answer these questions but there have been many who touch on these issues. By 
taking the relevant information from past work it is possible to find explanations for 
each group’s behavior. 
 Secondary sources are insufficient alone to understand questions that are so 
complex and at times emotional. It is also necessary to understand the opinions and 
thought processes of those actually involved in decision making. To compliment and 
periodically refute the analyses from the secondary sources, this study also relies on 
elite interviews. The interviews for this study were conducted primarily in person 
throughout Europe. When an in-person interview was impossible, the interview was 
conducted over the telephone. While it is acknowledged those telephone interviews 
are not ideal18, periodically they were a necessity due to either time or budgetary 
restraints. The information gained in speaking to these particular elites more than 
                                                
17  This technique of increasing the number of events studied qualitatively is 
discussed in Gary King et al. (1994) Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press).   
 
18  Sharon Werning Rivera et al. (2002) “Interviewing Political Elites: Lessons from 
Russia” Political Science and Politics Vol.35 No.4, p.685. 
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compensated for what was lost in not meeting face to face. Access to the elites 
interviewed was gained through contacts with the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe’s High Commissioner on National Minorities and his staff. While 
all interviewees were asked some common questions, the actual wording of the 
questions and the additional questions asked were based on the individual. It was not 
practical or beneficial to present each individual with a set questionnaire. The reasons 
for this are two fold. As Aberbach and Rockman note “[i]n elite interviewing, as in 
social science generally, the maxim for the best way to design and conduct a study is 
‘purpose, purpose, purpose’”.19 Each elite interview had particular expertise and it 
was those issues that formed the basis of the interview. There was no point in asking 
questions that they could not answer with any authority. The second reason the 
interviews were free-flowing is that “[e]lites especially- but other highly educated 
people as well- do not like being put in the straightjacket of close-ended questions”.20 
It became clear that the interviewees were more comfortable discussing some issues 
rather than others. If the interview questions had been closed the information gathered 
would have been less and the interviewee may have ended the interview prematurely. 
Using the open-ended, conversational method put the elites more at ease and allowed 
them to respond in a manner they were more comfortable with. See the Appendix for 
a sample question sheet. 
                                                
19  Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman (2002) “Conducting and Coding Elite 
Interviews” Political  Science and Politics Vol.35 No.4, p.673. 
 
20  Ibid, p.674. 
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 To compliment further the primary and secondary data and to account for 
biases in both the secondary data and the information provided be the interviewees21, 
available public opinion results were included in the analysis. There has been a great 
deal of public opinion gathered in both Latvia and Estonia and this information has 
been broken down by ethnic group and therefore provides an interesting look at the 
opinions of not just the elites’ views but the general public at large. Similarly, the 
Basque government has carried out its own public opinion surveys and this data has 
been incorporated as well. 
 Unlike the other regions, there has been little or no public opinion sampling 
done on the island of Corsica. While there was polling done in the run up to the 2003 
referendum, there have been no other attempts to survey other political and social 
issues. Since the French government does not recognize a difference between Corsica 
and the other regions, survey data is not collected on the island independently.22 This 
is indicative of the larger problem of studying Corsica. It proved difficult to arrange 
interviews with the vast majority of Corsican elites. This is not a problem isolated to 
this study however. The Corsican elites are hesitant to speak with non-Corsicans and 
                                                
21  As noted by Berry “Interviewers must always keep in mind that it is not the 
obligation of a subject to be objective and to tell the truth”. Jeffery M. Berry (2002) 
“Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing” Political Science and Politics 
Vol.35 No.4, p.680. In this study, while it is acknowledged that some subjects may 
have strong biases they were also often very open and provided answers that would 
not benefit them politically or socially and should be assumed to be their truthful 
opinion. 
 
22   It is possible that other researchers have carried out their own polling on Corsica. 
This information has not been made public. It was outside the scope of this study to 
carry out such studies. 
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many Corsican nationalists are reluctant to be interviewed in a language other than 
Corsican.23 Of the four cases, Corsica proved the most difficult in data collection and 
analysis. While critics may point to the lack of data on Corsica as a flaw in this study, 
based on the interviews that were carried out and the secondary sources collected it 
was still possible to include Corsica in the study and provide an explanation as to 
their decision making. The lack of information available on Corsica may indicate that 
the discipline has ignored this particular case and any analysis on their behavior, as 
this study provides, is a positive beginning.               
Progression of the Rest of the Chapters 
 In order to fully examine this issue and to test the relevant hypotheses this 
study is comprised of seven further chapters. Chapter two is an examination of the 
relevant literature and sets out the hypotheses to be tested. A project of this scope 
touches on many issues in this discipline. It is necessary to understand how the 
discipline has developed, where it came from and where it is going to understand 
where this project fits. The chapter begins with a review of the main texts in the more 
abstract issues of ethnic conflict and nationalism. This review helps shape the issues 
to be discussed. The chapter then sets out the hypotheses to be tested and provides a 
summary of the relevant literature that led to these hypotheses being chosen. The key 
literature concerning economic deprivation and discrimination, international 
                                                
23  Dr. John Loughlin, a professor at Cardiff University is one of the few scholars who 
has managed to meet with many Corsican elites. He re-iterated the problems in 
finding willing subjects to speak with. To compensate, Loughlin himself was 
interviewed and he provided invaluable insight into the mindset of the Corsicans he 
met with. Telephone interview, February 19, 2004.  
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intervention, culture and the institutionalization of culture are therefore considered.24 
Each of these hypotheses will be the basis for subsequent chapters in the study. 
 Chapter three is a thorough review of the histories of the four groups to be 
used as case studies. Each of these groups has had an extraordinary past and their 
unique histories help explain their actions today. Without understanding the 
development of a group it is not possible to fully comprehend why their decision 
making today or make predictions concerning their future decisions, particularly in 
regards to the use of violence. This chapter looks into the Corsicans’ history of 
foreign occupation, their unique relationship with the French state and the 
introduction onto the island of a large number of outsiders. These outsiders 
represented a clear danger to the Corsican language and culture and are partly 
responsible for the changes to the Corsican nationalist movement. The chapter also 
traces the road towards the creation of not only the Corsican nationalist movement, 
but the militant wing of that movement which has been engaged in a continuing 
struggle against the French mainland. The chapter’s discussion of the Corsicans ends 
with the failed referendum of the summer of 2003 which was seen, if successful, as a 
potential peaceful political solution to the Corsican conflict. The history of the 
Basques begins with their long history of foreign invasion as well. It documents how 
until the 19th Century despite foreign control the Basques enjoyed relative autonomy. 
How the Basques lost that autonomy is discussed as well as the creation of the first 
                                                
24  As this study is concerned with minority issues, the literature review concentrates 
on work associated with ethnic conflict. Some of the work discussed falls outside of 
that general field but when appropriate the majority of works cited will relate to 
minority groups. 
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Basque nationalist movement. For the Basques the darkest period in their history was 
the rise of Franco to power after the Spanish Civil War and in order to understand 
who the Basques are today it is necessary to understand the levels of repression they 
faced during this time. The rise of the Basque terrorist group the ETA is discussed as 
is the various attempts at resolving the Basque conflict through the political process. 
In order to understand the situation in the two Baltic countries it is necessary to 
understand both the history of the Russian speakers and the history of the Baltic 
Republics as well. The chapter provides an understanding into the mindset of the 
Latvians and Estonians who like the Corsicans and Basques had faced a long history 
of foreign occupation. Many of the problems faced by the Russians today are due to 
the Estonian and Latvian efforts to protect themselves from repeating that history. 
While the Latvians and Estonians represented the oppressed communities prior to 
1991, after that point it is the Russian community who felt persecuted. Their 
treatment from the point of Baltic independence through to today is examined to 
conclude this chapter. 
 Chapters four through seven are devoted to testing the hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter two. Chapter four examines the role of economics in explaining ethnic 
conflict. The level of deprivation between each group and the titular communities is 
examined. While the Corsicans and Russians in both Baltic countries are considerably 
poorer than then their French, Estonian and Latvian counterparts, the Basques 
represent a minority group that is economically better off than the rest of the country. 
The chapter tests the assumption that changes in economic well-being will lead to 
 20
militant activity. The chapter finds that discrepancies in economics may be sufficient 
in some cases to lead to a militant movement; it is not a necessary condition. It does 
not appear to be enough to maintain a militant movement after it provides the catalyst 
for that movement to develop. The chapter provides some evidence that the ethnic 
division of labor may be a potential factor in the prevention of ethnic conflict based 
on the Estonian and Latvian cases. 
 Chapter five is a discussion of the role of the international community in 
preventing conflict. The cases examined provide an interesting dichotomy for 
analysis. There are few states in the world who have received more international 
attention in regards to their minority groups than Estonia and Latvia. Almost from the 
moment they became independent (and particularly when there was still a large 
Soviet and then Russian military presence in the region) the various European 
institutions began to monitor their situation and provide recommendations for 
changes in their minority laws. When the two countries began the accession process 
to the European Union this intervention became even more intrusive. This chapter 
concentrates on the role of two European institutions in the Baltic cases, the European 
Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 
In particular the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities has had an 
enormous influence on the laws of both countries and so this chapter allots 
considerable space to an analysis of his impact. The level of international 
involvement in Corsica and the Basque conflict is the polar opposite to the Baltic. 
Neither country has been open to the idea of foreign mediators nor outside assistance 
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and as a result both conflicts have existed in a relative vacuum. Both the Corsican and 
the Basque nationalists aim at gaining international attention for their causes. One 
way to raise attention is through terrorist activities. This has resulted in a cycle where 
these groups have become pariahs in Europe and the possibility of international 
intervention becomes less likely. 
 Chapter six provides an analysis of the role of culture in allowing for or 
repressing violence in a society. This may be the most controversial chapter in the 
study. In this chapter a description of each group’s culture is developed through an 
analysis of its history, secondary source assessments of its culture and from elite 
interviews. In each case how this culture views and accepts or rejects violence is then 
determined. While some may question the validity of these findings, the evidence is 
compelling. In particular the elite interviews provide an insight into the mindset of the 
leaders of these groups and the titular communities. While there is obviously some 
bias in their statements about their culture, their candor in discussing how their 
culture dictates their view of violence is remarkable. In the case of the Corsicans the 
concept of a vendetta culture is discussed. This culture, rooted in the particular clan 
system found on the island dictates that violence is a normal aspect of Corsican life. 
In the political arena this manifests itself not necessarily into the use of violence by 
the entire population but rather a lack of abhorrence in regard to violent acts carried 
out by Corsican nationalists. While the Corsican culture has remained fairly constant 
for centuries, the Basque culture was radically altered by the repression it faced under 
Franco. Violence was seen as the only acceptable response to violence. This new 
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aspect of Basque culture was added to the traditional culture which allowed for easy 
mobilization of the society. The result was a group who were prepared to defend its 
culture and itself through any means necessary. Even with the threat of repression 
removed changing the culture back to not accepting some form of violence has 
proven difficult. In comparison to the cultures of the Basques and the Corsicans, the 
Russian-speakers culture promoted non-violence. This was due to both the non-
violent influences of the Estonians and Latvians whom they were living among (and 
who had witnessed the break from the Soviet Union through non-violent means) and 
a lack of the nationalism necessary to encourage mobilization. This lack of 
nationalism can be attributed to the early Soviet policies concerning Russians. What 
has resulted is a new culture that is foreign to Russians living in Russia. This new 
culture lacks organization and views the use of violence for political means as 
impractical. 
 Chapter seven builds on the findings of the previous chapter. It attempts to 
understand the factors that have led to the cultures found in chapter six to become 
institutionalized. Three such factors are examined. The first is the role of geographic 
isolation because groups that interact with others will have their culture altered due to 
higher levels of intermarriage and cross-cultural dialogue. The new culture in the 
Russian community, who live predominantly in the large urban centers, particularly 
in the capitals of the Baltic states show this. The ethnic Corsicans remain isolated not 
only from the rest of France but they tend to not live in the same areas as non-
Corsicans on the island. This has helped preserve their culture and the most militant 
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Basques, the ones who remain supportive of the ETA are located in the small rural 
villages. The Basques who live in Bilbao and other larger urban centers interact more 
with non-Basques and as a result their culture is more in line with the rest of Spain. 
The second issue that is examined is the length of time the conflict has gone on. The 
key finding here is that the length of time is less important than the time period when 
the conflict was developing. The influence of the Marxist anti-colonial movements of 
Africa on the Corsican and Basque nationalists is discussed. The post-communist 
world the Russians were confronted with is juxtaposed to the Basque and Corsican 
examples. The final institutionalization factor is the use of repertoires of violence. 
Once violence is used it is difficult to stop using it, thus making it eventually part of a 
group’s culture. The impact repertoire choices have made on each group is discussed 
with particular emphasis on the Basque and Corsican cases.25   
 Chapter eight provides an overview of the study and sums up the key 
conclusions. It provides an analysis of the future of each of the groups, places the 
study in a larger context and outlines what future work leads from this study. 
                                                
25  The Russians in Estonia and Latvia have yet to use violence and therefore it is not 
possible to discuss that as a repertoire choice but the implications of this choice is 
discussed.  
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Chapter 2- The Discipline to Date and Hypotheses 
 
 Prior to examining the specific case studies to explain why they have acted in 
the way they have it is necessary to understand the various competing theories put 
forward by others. This particular work crosses paths with several of the most 
important theories in comparative politics and international relations. While it builds 
on and tests some pre-existing theories it also diverges from others and examines the 
issues in new ways. The main hypotheses to be tested in the subsequent chapters are 
derived mainly from the pre-existing literature; however they have never been tested 
together in this particular format. This chapter provides the roadmap for the rest of 
the study.  
Risk Assessment and Ethnic Conflict 
 There has been a growing demand in both the academic and policy-making 
worlds for better and more accurate risk assessment models concerning the prediction 
of ethnic conflict.26 The reason for this is simple. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, ethnic conflict has been the cause of great suffering and death throughout 
history and it continues to plague many areas of the world.27 Greater emphasis has 
therefore been placed on identifying the roots of ethnic conflict and creating tools 
                                                
26  The need for greater risk assessment capabilities in the international community 
has become a priority and is now stated in many international action plans. See for 
example: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) The 
Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Council). 
 
27  As discussed in Chapter One, for a list of current trends in ethnic conflict 
throughout the world please see the Appendix of Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr 
(2004) Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, 2nd Edition (Boulder CO: Westview Press), 
pp.198-204 or Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (2003) Peace and Conflict 2003 
(College Park MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management).  
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designed to provide ‘early warning’ on the potential of violent conflict. This is part of 
a larger emphasis on risk assessment in general. There has been increase attention on 
early warning models concerning issues such as war, genocide, migration and state 
failure.28  Schmid found that all of the various attempts at forecasting ethnic conflict 
could be classified as either prospective or retrospective in nature. A prospective 
analysis takes past successful predictions and copies the experimental design, while 
retrospective analysis looks at historical cases and bases future predictions on the 
patterns found in the past cases.29 While this may appear self evident it does illustrate 
a clear divide in strategy in devising effective risk assessments. If one is to follow a 
previous successful research design to predict future risk the researcher must be sure 
that the conditions faced by the original group are the same as the test group. If the 
conditions faced by both groups do not match then important explanations for their 
actions will be missed. While the second method allows for different cases to be 
tested in order to measure the impact of variables on the outcome (since it is already 
known) it is still susceptible to intervening variables not seen elsewhere. Schmid 
finds that the majority of risk assessment models follow the second technique and 
find explanations for outcomes in the past and use these to predict future outcomes.30 
                                                
28   An examination of the risk assessment models not concerning ethno-political 
conflict is beyond the scope of this chapter. For an examination of the development of 
these models please see John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, ed. (1998) Preventative 
Measures (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing). 
   
29  Alex P. Schmid (2001) “A Comparative Look at Early Warning Indicators” in 
Hayward R. Alker, Ted Robert Gurr and Kumar Rupesinghe ed., Journeys Through 
Conflict (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield Press), p.292.   
 
 26
This study will also follow this pattern. By explaining why the cases have acted the 
way they have it will be possible to identify the key variables that can influence the 
group’s decision making either towards or away from violence. 
 Another way to differentiate risk assessment models is by the data they use to 
test their theories. In this regard models can rely on either quantitative or qualitative 
data. In ethnic conflict risk assessment the work of Ted Robert Gurr represents one of 
the most highly respected quantitative studies. Gurr’s work throughout the 1990’s and 
through to today has relied on his Minorities at Risk Project (MAR).31 MAR is the 
only major data collection project that uses the minority group itself as the unit of 
analysis. Currently over 275 groups are actively tracked, while others are monitored 
and past data on groups no longer considered minorities (such as the Estonians in the 
Soviet Union) is maintained. To qualify as a minority in the dataset the group must be 
considered a ‘ethnopolitical’ group meaning that they must meet one or both of the 
following criteria: “The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic 
differential treatment vis-à-vis other groups in society” and/or “The group is the basis 
for political mobilization and action in defense of its self-defined interests”.32 This 
means that only groups who are actively mobilized or are specifically targeted by the 
                                                                                                                                      
30  Ibid, p. 293. 
 
31  Gurr’s work using MAR is highlighted by two volumes: Ted Robert Gurr (1993) 
Minorities at Risk (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press) and 
(2000) Peoples Versus States (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace 
Press). Since the second book builds on the first it will be Peoples Versus States that 
is discussed here. For a full list of publications that use MAR please see the 
Minorities at Risk Website: http://www.minoritiesatrisk.com. 
 
32  Gurr (2000), p.7.  
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state are tracked. MAR has two main components, one qualitative and one 
quantitative. Each group has a qualitative analysis of its history, current situation and 
past mobilization provided. With each coding update the researcher responsible for 
the group also provides an assessment of risk. This assessment concerns both the risks 
against the group by the state and the risk of continued or future militancy by the 
group itself. The majority of the work by the MAR staff is dedicated to the coding of 
quantitative data for the extensive dataset. This dataset collects information on all 
aspects of the group. Issues such as political and economic discrimination, severity of 
protests and militant activities, levels of organization, geographic concentration and 
demographic conditions are all examples of the type of data collected. It is through 
this data collection that the Gurr risk assessment models were created. Gurr’s risk 
assessment model is broken into two parts: factors that predict the potential for future 
protest and factors that predict the likelihood of rebellion. Using regression analysis 
the factors used to predict protest were found to be: Cultural Restrictions, 
Government Repression, Democratic Polity, Regime Instability and Support from 
Kindred Groups.33 Rebellion was predicted using the following factors: Past 
Persistent Protest, Government Repression, Territorial Concentration, Group 
Organization, Regime Instability and Support from Foreign Governments.34 By using 
a regression line a formula could be developed to create a risk score. The higher the 
score, the greater the risk. The advantage of this model is that it is easy to identify 
                                                
33  Ibid, p.233. 
 
34  Ibid, p.236.  
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which groups have the highest potential for risk when compared to all the other 
groups in the study. There are however some problems with this method of risk 
assessment. As Scarritt and McMillian note in some regions of the world, particularly 
sub-Saharan Africa, there is not enough information available to a coder to make 
accurate coding decisions. Without this information the risk assessment scores are of 
limited value.35 Additional concerns involve the weight assigned to each variable and 
coding accuracy. Many of the variables used in the regression line are nominal, 
therefore how a variable is coded takes on added importance. Some of the variables, 
particularly Geographic Concentration can be difficult to determine and a mis-
interpretation by the coder can heavily influence the score of the group. One coding 
error can make a group appear more likely to be involved in conflict than it may 
actually be in reality, or worse a group who has a higher potential for rebellion could 
be overlooked because its score was too low.36 As mentioned, despite these concerns 
MAR remains the leading data source for ethno-political conflict variables and the 
risk assessment models that accompany it have been widely accepted. 
 Risk Assessment models that rely on qualitative analysis are less common but 
still possible. One successful example is the work of Tellis, Szayna and Winnefeld.37 
Tellis et al. created a flow diagram for ethnic conflict that moves through three stages. 
                                                
35  James R. Scarritt and Susan McMillian (1995) “Protest and Rebellion in Africa” 
Comparative Political Studies Vol.28 No.3, pp.323-350.   
 
36 Michael Johns (2002) “Assessing Risk Assessment: A Baltic Test” Nationalism 
and Ethnic Politics Vol.8 No.1, pp.105-128. 
 
37  Ashley J. Tellis et al. (1997) Anticipating Ethnic Conflict (Santa Monica: RAND).  
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The first considers the potential for strife which is based on the political, social and 
economic conditions faced by the group as well as the cultural distinctiveness of the 
group. If the group is found to have these factors the next stage is considered which is 
the chances of moving to the likelihood of strife. In this category issues such as 
tipping events (a public galvanizing event which helps mobilize the group), external 
support and the rise of identity entrepreneurs are considered. Once again if the group 
meets these criteria the final part of the model considers the chances of actual strife. 
Here the role of the state is considered. When the model is fully considered the 
preferences for a group can be determined as well as the preferences of the state. 
Depending on these preferences violence is more or less likely.38 The advantage of 
this model is also its greatest disadvantage, it can only be applied to one state at a 
time. Unlike the Gurr quantitative analysis it is not possible to compare different 
cases. The process is also time consuming and requires a vast understanding of the 
cases considered. As with the Gurr model’s coding decisions it is imperative that the 
correct choices are made in the flow diagram based on adequate information in order 
to ensure that the correct assessment is made.  
 This analysis will be based on qualitative analysis but will not follow the flow 
diagram model found in Tellis et al. Rather, specific hypotheses will be tested to 
determine their importance in explaining why the groups chose to use or not to use 
violence. It will be retrospective in nature using Schmid’s typology. This study will 
combine the use of specific variables, as found in the Gurr model with the use of 
                                                
38  Ibid, p.10. 
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qualitative analysis. Due to the small number of cases in this study advanced 
quantitative analysis is not possible, but this work will identify specific important 
variables through qualitative analysis that could then be studied quantitatively at a 
later date with a larger sample. 
There have been other studies that have looked at issues in ethnic conflict both 
quantitatively and qualitatively that have not focused on aspects of risk assessment. 
Horowitz concentrated his efforts on explaining ethnic conflict in Africa, Asia and 
parts of the Caribbean.39 Horowitz examines several explanations as to why conflict 
occurs. His specific economic explanations will be examined in greater detail below. 
Horowitz bases his analysis on conflict theory which is concerned with “a struggle in 
which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or 
eliminate rivals”.40 Using this definition conflict occurs due to limited resources, 
whether they be economic, political or social. In order to ensure survival those who 
would take these resources must either be killed or repressed. As a result people band 
together around their ethnicity in order to try to maximize the amount of resources 
they are able to acquire or deny to others. For Horowitz a key aspect to understanding 
ethnic conflict is the psychological aspects behind them. His work looks at how the 
elites are able to mobilize the masses around their prejudices and fears of other 
groups. By examining the symbolism behind ethnic conflicts a clearer picture as to 
why people will resort to violence over differences in nationality is possible. 
                                                
39  Donald L. Horowitz (1985) Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of 
California Press). 
 
40  Ibid, p.95.  
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Horowitz is therefore interested in issues such as the social hierarchy of groups within 
a state. Horowitz provides recommendations as to how to avoid violent conflict based 
on limiting both inter-ethnic competition for power and the psychological fears that 
accompany this competition. He advocates using the electoral system to encourage 
inter-ethnic co-operation and believes by not concentrating power in a central 
government regionally concentrated ethnic groups can have some power over their 
own affairs. He believes that by interacting with other ethnic groups many of the 
stereotypes that develop and are used by ethnic elites would no longer be effective. 
Ethnicity can rip a country apart if steps are not taken to shift the focus away from it. 
For Horowitz conflict can be avoided only when groups know each other and can find 
ways of sharing power, thus avoiding direct competition. 
Laitin provides a different but relevant opinion on conflict management. It is 
particularly important to this study as it concentrates on explaining the Russian-
speaking community in the former Soviet Union. Laitin is concerned generally with 
the ability of minority groups to integrate into the society.41 When the Soviet Union 
broke apart many Russian speakers found themselves in new countries where they did 
not speak the titular language. Laitin tracks how the Russians, who instantly became a 
new minority group, developed their identity. What he demonstrates is that the new 
state must provide incentives for the minority group to learn the new language and to 
adapt to the society because without incentives the group will remain marginalized 
and will develop a very different form of nationalism than those who willingly try to 
                                                
41 David Laitin (1998) Identity in Formation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
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integrate. In order to encourage the majority of the group to integrate peacefully (as 
Laitin points out not everyone will choose to do so, some will leave others will 
remain outside of the society) these incentives must be directed at both the masses 
and the political elite. Minority rights are not enough in this regard. Efforts must be 
made to show minority political elites that there is more power available to them as 
an integrating force than as leaders of a nationalist group. “Under such conditions, the 
incentives of elites to engage in ethnic outbidding (demanding ever higher levels of 
autonomy, and eventually secession) would be reduced, as aspirants for wealth and 
power in the region would be reluctant to lose the possibility for higher rewards at the 
political center”.42 While Laitin’s theory is similar to Horowitz’s in that they both 
emphasize inter-group co-operation to avoid conflict, Laitin’s is unique in that it 
contends that the state should provide incentives to the minority to encourage cultural 
integration rather than ethnic cohabitation as advocated by Horowitz.   
O’Leary and McGarry provide a more concrete typology of ethnic conflict 
management and the minority group/majority relationship.43 They propose that there 
are two ways a state can deal with an ethnic group within its borders, the first is to 
eliminate differences, and the second is to manage them. Strategies for eliminating 
differences include genocide, mass deportations and assimilation, while options for 
managing differences include federalism, consociationalim and arbitration.44 Based 
                                                
42  Ibid, p.344. 
 
43  John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (1993) The Politics of Ethnic Conflict 
Regulation (London: Routledge Press).  
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on these typologies, the logical reaction by the minority group is easy to determine, if 
the state tries to eliminate differences conflict should result, while managing conflict 
should result in a peaceful negotiated settlement. While seemingly simplistic this is of 
great importance for this study because the cases examined were chosen specifically 
because they did not follow this pattern. McGarry and O’Leary provide one potential 
explanation for why groups may choose to follow a contradictory strategy. In their 
analysis of ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland they examine the use of ethnic markers 
by ethnic elites. An ethnic marker is how the conflict is framed by the elites in order 
to mobilize the masses. In Northern Ireland both sides of the conflict framed the 
situation in terms of religion: Protestants versus Catholics. This was the easiest way 
to make people on both sides fight, no matter what the state tried to do in terms of 
conflict management. O’Leary and McGarry were able to show that religion did not 
play a role in the activities of the elites on either side but was an effective way of 
presenting the conflict to the public.45 
Some researchers have applied theories from the field of International 
Relations to try to explain ethnic conflict. One interesting example of this is the use of 
the Security Dilemma theory by Snyder and Jervis to study civil wars.46 Put simply if 
a group views another group as a potential threat it will be prepare for conflict by 
                                                                                                                                      
44  Ibid, p.4. 
 
45  Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry (1995) Explaining Northern Ireland 
(London: Blackwell Publishers). 
 
46  Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (1999) “Civil War and the Security Dilemma” in 
Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder ed. Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention (New 
York: Columbia University Press).  
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making itself as strong as possible. The other side sees this build-up and responds the 
same way. Therefore by trying to ensure their own safety they are actually making the 
situation more dangerous. It was found that the security dilemma was more acute in 
ethnic conflict compared to international conflict because security is threatened at the 
individual and not at the state level. While none of the cases to be examined here are 
near the point of open civil war there are aspects of the security dilemma in all four 
cases. It is interesting to note as well Snyder and Jervis’ recommendation for 
international intervention to break the cycle causing the security dilemma.47  
A final example of the variety of work being conducted in the field of ethnic 
conflict is the theory of Ethnic Democracy as described by Sammy Smooha.48 
Smooha contends that there are certain states that appear to be democratic in nature 
but are not entirely so. While the majority group enjoys all of the advantages of 
democracy, minority groups are excluded. As with Snyder and Jervis’ security 
dilemma theory, here the majority views the presence of the minority as a threat to the 
stability of the state and this is the justification for restricting access to democratic 
institutions. For the minority an ethnic democracy “is an inegalitarian, exclusionary, 
disintegrative, segregative and alienating force”.49 Since the democratic system works 
against them, the minority is in a poor position to try to influence change thus 
preventing a full security dilemma from developing. While the possibility of some 
                                                
47  Ibid, p.27. 
 
48  Sammy Smooha (2001) The Model of Ethnic Democracy (Flensburg: ECMI 
Working Paper #13). 
 
49  Ibid, p.82. 
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form of arms race is not possible, conflict could eventually develop if this model of 
democracy is used for too long a period. This concept is important in this study for 
two reasons. The first is that Estonia has been considered a prime example of an 
ethnic democracy50 and it could be argued that Latvia would qualify as well. The 
second reason is that the model of ethnic democracy looks directly at the role the 
majority can play in ethnic relations. By manipulating the democratic institutions of a 
state to discriminate against a minority a state can increase the majority’s national 
identification and that of the minority group as well. This study will examine the 
relationship between the minority and the majority to understand what has caused the 
minority to act the way they have. 
Nationalism 
 Prior to examining the literature concerned with the hypotheses to be tested in 
the study it is necessary to look briefly at the literature directly concerning the study 
of nationalism. Much of the nationalism literature will be discussed in terms of 
specific hypotheses, but the key arguments in the discipline should be understood 
before any examination of these cases is begun. Without the power of nationalism this 
study would not be necessary. All of the groups involved with this study, majorities 
and minorities are heavily influenced by nationalism and are concerned with the 
protection and preservation of their particular national identity. Since these competing 
nationalities are forced to share the same physical space the possibility of conflict 
always exists. In the Baltic cases this conflict has not manifested itself yet in violence, 
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(Flensburg: ECMI Working Paper #7).   
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while in Corsica and the Basque Country the nationalist struggles have taken on a 
more militant nature. 
 The power of nationalism can be easily explained. Humans appear to have a 
psychological need to belong to a group. People want to be associated with others to 
avoid feeling alone and are therefore more attached to their ethnic or national 
identity51 than other identities they may have.52 As Berlin eloquently explains 
nationalism is “a cry for room in which men can seek to realise their natures, quirks 
and all, to live lives free from dictation or coercion from teachers, masters, bullies 
and persuaders and dominators of various kinds”.53 This attachment to their 
nationality allows for them justify certain activities, such as violence, which they 
otherwise would not consider. This is why conflict based on nationalism is so 
dangerous. As Bloomfield and Reilly note:  
What makes this kind of conflict so prevalent, so  
 pervasive, so durable, so insoluble, is the way in  
 which the issues of the dispute are so emotionally  
 charged. They go right to the heart of what gives  
 people their sense of themselves, defining a person’s bond  
 with his or her community and defining the source of  
                                                
51  In this study the terms ethnicity and nationality will be used interchangeably. 
There is no agreement on what is the difference between the two terms. Some groups 
such as the Quebecois used to refer to themselves as a national group but began 
speaking of a Quebecois ethnicity in order to add legitimacy to their goal of 
sovereignty.  
 
52  Clark McCauley (2001) “The Psychology of Group Identification and the Power of 
Ethnic Nationalism” in Daniel Chirot and Martin E.P. Seligman ed. Ethnopolitical 
Warfare (Washington DC: American Psychological Association).  
 
53  Isaiah Berlin (1990) The Crooked Timber of Humanity (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press), p.259.   
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 satisfaction for her or his need for identity.54 
 
 How does this powerful ethnic or national bond develop? There is no 
agreement on this question. There are some who advocate a primordial view of 
nationalism. This view contends that nationalism in some form has existed for 
hundreds of years and that it is a part of who we are. Geertz defines primordial 
attachments as “[that] congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to 
have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves” and 
that “[o]ne is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbor, one’s fellow believer, ipso 
facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common 
interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some 
unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself”.55 A leading proponent 
of a version of this theory currently is Anthony D. Smith who believes that within all 
people is an ancient nationalist feeling called the ethnie.56 An ethnie is a collection of 
“myths, memories, values and symbols” which are shared by a group of people.57 
                                                
54  David Bloomfield and Ben Reilly (1998) “Characteristics of Deep-Rooted 
Conflict” in Peter Harris and Ben Reilly ed. Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: 
Options for Negotiators (Stockholm: IDEA), p.11.  
 
55  Clifford Geertz (1994) “Primordial and Civic Ties” in John Hutchinson and 
Anthony D. Smith ed. Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 31.  
 
56  Smith tries to distance himself from the pure primordial approach seen in the work 
of Geertz and Harold R. Isaacs (1975) Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political 
Change (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press). He does not believe for example 
that ones ethnicity is embedded in DNA such as hair-color or skin-color. He views his 
theory as a link between genetic primordialists and modernists. 
 
57  Anthony D. Smith (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations (London: Blackwell 
Publishers), p.15. See also by Smith (1996) Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era 
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Each member of the society is linked by their common belief in these myths and 
memories. Nationalism is seen as a contract between the present and the past who 
taught them these values and between the present and the future who need to have 
these values instilled in them. Modern nationalists are therefore guardians of the past 
for future generations. These memories and values can change slowly over time but 
the underlying belief that the preservation of the ethnie is paramount remains. 
 The majority of the work on nationalism views the concept as much newer in 
origin. Here national identity is not inherent in a person’s soul rather it has been 
constructed over time. Their argument is as follows: there are no ancient ties which 
unite groups, but there are other factors which cause people to feel affinity toward 
their ethnic or nation group. Constructivist authors can be categorized into two 
schools, those who feel that identity is a by product of interaction with others, and 
those who believe identity is manipulated by elites. Authors such as Anderson believe 
ethnicity developed through modernization, specifically the use of the printing press. 
By being able to print in the vernacular, a sense of community developed within the 
group who could read what was being printed. More importantly, those who were not 
a part of the group could easily be identified.58 While not concerned with the printing 
press specifically, Gellner also believed that modernization was the leading cause of 
identity formation. Gellner felt that the industrial society and the need for economic 
growth required that people worked together, and from this need, nationality 
                                                                                                                                      
(London: Polity Press) and (1998) Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge 
Press). 
 
58  Benedict Anderson (1983) Imagined Communities (London: Verso Press). 
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developed. People needed to move from the villages and farms they were accustomed 
to and move into the larger urban centers and when they got to the cities they tried to 
find those who were most like themselves. A common language, religion, culture or 
geographic location was the precursor to national bonds.59  
 Those who fall into the elite-driven school feel that elites are able to draw 
upon symbols and selective history to shape group identity for specific means.60 It is 
their contention that identity can be literally constructed by elites in order mobilize 
the masses to achieve their goals. As these goals change, the aspects of the identity 
which are emphasized are changed accordingly. By inventing identity, or to a lesser 
extent manipulating which symbols and values are drawn upon, the elites have a vast 
arsenal of tools at their disposal to indoctrinate the masses. Within Eastern Europe, 
Tismaneanu illustrates how the power of nationalism has greatly influenced how the 
states have developed since the break from communism. He contends that many 
ethnic groups have turned to “fantasies of salvation” and other political myths to 
justify their actions and to mobilize the masses along ethnic or nationalistic lines.61 
                                                
59  Ernest Gellner (1983) Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell Press). See 
also Walker Connor (1994) Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 
and Leah Greenfeld (1992) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press).  
 
60  See for example Eric Hobsbawm (1990) Nations and Nationalism Since 1870 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) and Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger 
(1992) The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
 
61  Vladimir Tismaneanu (1998) Fantasies of Salvation (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press). To illustrate how damaging this form of nationalism has been in 
Eastern Europe, compare this analysis to Tismaneanu’s previous analysis of Eastern 
Europe in (1992) Reinventing Politics (New York: The Free Press). 
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While Caplan and Feffer agree with Tismaneanu that Eastern Europe has become a 
fertile soil for new (in reality old) forms of nationalism to take root, they go farther to 
say that there has also been a change in strength of nationalism in the west as well.62 
Issues such as regional integration and the demands of greater autonomy for groups 
within states has caused all groups, both minorities and majorities to revert back to 
nationalistic demands and strategies easily manipulated by elites.63 
Hypotheses to be Examined 
 This study will examine how the theories discussed above are influenced by a 
variety of factors in the cases studied. An obvious issue that needs to be addressed is 
the role of economics in predicting ethnic violence. Returning to the work of 
Horowitz it is possible to see the impact of class struggle in ethnic conflict. Two 
important issues are addressed by Horowitz in this regard. The first concerns 
secessionist movements and their level of ‘backwardness’ compared to those around 
them and the country as a whole. The author contends that all groups can be divided 
into one of four groups: backward groups in backward regions, backward groups in 
advanced regions, advanced groups in backward regions and advanced groups in 
advanced regions.64 An advanced region is simply one with a higher economic 
                                                
62  Richard Caplan and John Feffer ed., (1996) Europe’s New Nationalism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
 
63  This is a concept also discussed by Will Kymlicka (2001) Politics in the 
Vernacularal (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Kymlicka attempts to find a 
solution to the conflicts between majority, minority and immigrant nationalisms in a 
modern, global era. 
 
64 Horowitz (1985), p.233.   
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standard of living compared to a backwards region. Advanced groups enjoy higher 
levels of education, more access to higher paying bureaucratic and white-collar 
positions. As will be demonstrated later, the Basques in Spain represent an advanced 
group in an advanced region while the Corsicans are a backward group in a backward 
region. While not secessionist the Russians in Latvia and Estonia are backward 
groups in backward regions. Horowitz believes that backward groups in backward 
regions are the most likely to be secessionist. These groups conclude quickly that the 
society is organized not in their best interest. They demand greater rights but 
determine that their needs are not being met therefore these groups will attempt to 
secede regardless of economic costs. Advanced groups in backward regions resort to 
secession as a last resort and often try to work within the system. These groups 
consider their economic interests when choosing a strategy. Advanced groups in 
advanced regions see their economic success shared with the rest of the country as a 
disadvantage thus leading to calls for separation. Due to their privileged economic 
status their potential loss of wealth is a major issue in the decision-making. Finally 
backward groups in advanced regions are fearful of economic competition and feel 
that they are always at a disadvantage leading them to call for more rights and 
protection. As they are already disadvantaged economic considerations are not an 
issue for these groups.65  
 The second economic issue discussed by Horowitz is the role of the ethnic 
division of labor. The author finds that societies develops in such a way that some 
                                                
65  Ibid, pp.236-259.  
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ethnic groups specialize in certain occupations and other groups choose different 
occupations. For Horowitz when this occurs the possibility of competing ethnic pools 
of labor is eliminated which prevents conflict. “[W]orkers of different ethnic groups 
are often steered by helpful friends, patrons, kinsmen, and ethnic associations toward 
employment in enterprises where members of the same group already have a 
foothold. Job competition is likely to be intraethnic”.66 
 Olzak also looks at issues of interethnic competition. Her focus is on early 
American competition in large urban centers. Her analysis found that competition 
“intensifies the salience of ethnic boundaries and promotes spontaneous forms of 
collective action”.67 She argues that in the face of economic competition people will 
rally around their ethnicity making it a more important aspect of their lives. This 
allows for greater mobilization around ethnicity and when the various ethnic groups 
compete directly with one another for economic advantages conflict is likely. This 
creates a cycle of violence. Conflict increases the salience of ethnicity leading to a 
greater emphasis on ethnic boundaries. These ethnic boundaries lead to competition 
leading to more conflict. Only when ethnicity is removed from the competition 
equation does conflict subside. 
 A final theory that needs to be addressed is that of relative deprivation. This 
theory is most closely attached to the early work of Gurr. Relative deprivation is the 
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67  Susan Olzak (1992) The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition & Conflict (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press), p. 208. 
 43
“discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction”.68 If 
there is a discrepancy between two groups as long as that discrepancy remains 
constant violence is unlikely. It occurs when the gap between two groups change, 
whether by one group advancing while the other remains constant or vice versa that 
the gap becomes more noticeable which leads to a greater likelihood of collective 
violence. Using Rummel’s term, this creates the “Gap Principle” in regards to 
conflict.69 The Gap Principle states that as long as expectations are reached by both 
sides in a dispute then peace will remain stable. If one group begins to do better than 
the other or if a group’s expectations are not met, then a gap (either real or perceived) 
develops and conflict follows.  When applied to economics, if one group becomes 
more affluent while another does not progress, or if a group becomes less affluent 
while another group remains constant or advances, this increase in the gap between 
them could cause higher levels of dissatisfaction and eventually lead to violence.  
 All of these economic theories need to be accounted for and will be studied 
below. Combined they lead to the first hypotheses to be study:  
H1. The nature of the economic structure of a state and the resulting difference in 
economic affluence will influence group decision making in regards to choosing 
militant strategies. 
                                                
68  Ted Robert Gurr (1970) Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 
p.23. See also Will Moore and Keith Jaggers (1990) “Deprivation, Mobilization and 
the State” Journal of Developing Societies Vol.6 No.1, pp.17-36. 
 
69 R.J. Rummel (1991) The Conflict Helix (London: Transaction Publishers). 
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 A second issue to be addressed is the role of the international community in 
preventing ethnic conflict. This is an issue that has been somewhat ignored by 
scholars interested in understanding nationalism and its components. Brubaker for 
example discusses what he calls a triadic relationship that dominates nationalism in 
Europe.70 This relationship is comprised of 1) the naturalizing state (majority 
nationalism) 2) national minorities and 3) the diaspora. For Brubaker all three of these 
forces work against each other and pull the state in various directions. What is 
missing from this analysis is the international community. This fourth factor could 
also be seen as pulling the state towards certain choices but Brubaker chooses to 
ignore this particular factor in his analysis. 
 Those who do incorporate the international community are more often 
interested in issues of international intervention in terms of other states taking sides in 
an ethnic conflict. Saideman provides a clear example of this type of study.71 He 
examines how states decide whom to support in an ethnic conflict. He finds that 
domestic factors, such as ethnic ties with one of the participants in a conflict can help 
predict when a state will intervene and whom they will support if an intervention 
takes place.72 
                                                
70  Rogers Brubaker (1996) Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), p.55.  
 
71  Steven M. Saideman (2001) The Ties that Divide (New York: Columbia University 
Press). 
 
72   Gotlieb also looks at the issues involved in interventions after a conflict has 
begun. His analysis can be seen as a link between the work of Saideman and the work 
described below on the role of international organizations as he discusses what 
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There has been less emphasis on the role of international organizations in 
preventing ethnic conflict. Schnabel provides one such analysis. The author suggests 
that there should be an emphasis by the international community on “multilateral and 
multitrack applications of applied conflict prevention strategies” and that they need to 
“converge and be harmonized in order to facilitate coordination between different 
actors”.73 Schnabel notes that historically the international community has been 
unwilling to become involved in conflict prevention for two reasons, the first being 
the issue of state sovereignty. Ethnic issues have been seen as an internal matter that 
other states have been unwilling to interfere with. As most states have their own 
minority issues they have been less inclined to interfere with others. Secondly states 
have been busy trying to stop conflicts that have already degenerated into violence. 
The public is more concerned with ending active conflicts than preventing future ones 
as the results are easier to quantify.    
There has been a general agreement that international institutions can have a 
particularly useful role on minority issues in Eastern Europe. As Kymlicka notes 
“Western organizations clearly have the ability to impose enormous pressure”.74 As a 
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result many case studies that do deal with the international communities’ conflict 
prevention role have concentrated on Eastern Europe. Due to this regional emphasis 
many of the case studies focus on the role of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) and particularly the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities75 or the European Union.76 In fact much of the literature concerning the 
impact of the various international organizations come from the organizations 
themselves. The OSCE for example describes the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities as a conflict prevention tool that should be active as quickly as possible 
                                                
75  See for example Pál Czáky (2001) “Experiences from Co-operating with the 
OSCE HCNM” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights Vol.8 No.1, 
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“so that ideally there would never be an early warning of imminent conflict, let alone 
a need to engage in conflict management”.77 
What all of these authors share is the belief that the international community 
when given the proper resources, the correct mandate and a co-operative government 
can have a major impact at not only resolving conflicts once they start but can also act 
to prevent the conflict from beginning in the first place. The evidence indicates that 
external forces can play as important a role as the internal dimensions of the majority 
group- minority group relationship. Often the internal relationship is directly 
influenced by the actions of the international community. The exact role of the 
international community will be tested in the following chapters. The ability and will 
of the international community to become involved in the Corsican and Basque 
conflicts is very different than that of the Russians in the Baltic states. The activities 
of the international community may be an important explanation for the choices the 
minority groups have made. Therefore, the second hypothesis of this study is: 
H2: Minority groups in states that face pressure by the international community to 
improve the conditions of the minority group are less likely to be involved in militant 
activity and vice versa. 
                                                
77  The Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations (1997) The Role of the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention (The Hague: 
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 The third major theme to be investigated is the role culture plays in predicting 
the initiation and continuation (or lack thereof) of violence. It is acknowledged that 
this is a somewhat contentious topic in the discipline. Few have chosen to use this 
approach to explain the actions of a group. This is unfortunate since culture “orders 
political priorities and material objects people consider valuable and worth fighting 
over”.78 Moreover, culture “offers an account of political behaviour that makes 
particular actions more or less likely”.79 
It could be said that Clifford Geertz is the leading modern author in this 
particular form of research.80 Geertz relied on Kluckhohn who defined culture as:  
1) the total way of life of a people 2) the social legacy the  
individual acquires from his group 3) a way of thinking,  
feeling, and believing 4)an abstraction from behaviour 5) 
a theory . . . about the way a group of people in fact behave 
6) a storehouse of pooled learning 7) a set of standardized 
orientations to recurrent problems 8) learned behaviour 9) a 
mechanism for the normative regulation of behaviour 10) a  
set of techniques for adjusting both to the external environment 
and to other men 11) a precipitate of history.81     
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Analysis” in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman ed., Comparative Politics 
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79  Ibid, p.47. See also Marc Howard Ross (1993) The Culture of Conflict (New 
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81  Quoted in Clifford Geertz (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic 
Books), pp.4-5. 
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Using this definition the role of culture in explaining ethnic conflict is clear. How 
groups react to situations and influences is a result of their culture. It is therefore 
necessary to understand how a group has collectively learned how to respond. As 
each culture is unique, only through understanding how that culture deals with 
conflict can a true understanding of the situation be reached. Geertz believed that 
through careful observation, what he referred to as “thick description” a researcher 
would be able to learn the intricacies of a group and therefore interpret what certain 
gestures, responses or reactions truly meant.82 Geertz used thick description in his 
analysis of groups in Indonesia for example and argued that this style of research was 
a necessary part of any anthropological analysis. 
 Others have followed successfully in Geertz’s footsteps. James C. Scott spent 
a great deal of time observing villagers in Malaysia to better understand their 
culture.83 Through observation Scott was able to understand the culture of these 
villagers and was able to identify how they reacted to the upper-class. He observed 
that while appearing respectful and contrite in the presence of a rich land owner they 
engaged in petty vandalism, theft and private ridicule of these same people in private. 
This allowed the villagers to feel that they were fighting back against a system that 
placed them at a disadvantage. Without careful observation this window into this 
group’s culture would have been missed. 
                                                
82  Ibid, p.20.  
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 Turning more specifically to work on ethnic conflict, Frantz Fanon used his 
intimate knowledge of the culture of his adopted country Algeria to predict how it 
could successfully evict the French.84 While Fanon’s work is seen by many as a 
philosophical call to arms, it is based on an understanding of the culture of the 
Algerian people. He understood how their culture could be used to effectively achieve 
their goals. Without the ‘thick description’ as advocated by Geertz later, Fanon would 
not have been able to provide such an effective plan. 
 Ignatieff’s work on ethnic conflict also relies on cultural explanations. His 
work examines how a group’s culture develops over time and how it is slow to 
change. He is able to demonstrate how once something becomes a part of a group’s 
culture it can last for centuries. This can result in conflicts over marginal issues such 
as the use of a particular alphabet or a feeling of past wrong, real or imagined.85 
 Not all researchers have the time or resources necessary to participate in such 
thick description of culture. Many have to rely on thin description. This requires the 
researcher to rely on both the observations of previous researchers and the population 
itself. While all groups will try to present themselves in the best light possible and all 
researchers bring their own particular biases into their work it is possible to take 
primary and secondary information and compare it to historical events to come to an 
informed conclusion as to how a group’s culture has influenced their decisions. In 
arguing why it is necessary to understand the culture of a group through any means 
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Katzenstein notes that cultural-institutional contexts “do not merely constrain actors 
by changing the incentives that shape their behavior. They do not simply regulate 
behavior. They also help constitute the very actors whose conduct they seek to 
regulate”.86 Culture is such an important component of a person’s decision making 
process it must be accounted for in one way or another. If the ability to directly 
observe a group is not open to a researcher, they must rely on other sources to 
understand the situation. 
 Johnston provides an excellent example of how to examine a group’s culture 
without directly observing it. In his analysis of the development of the strategic 
culture of Maoist China he outlines a three step process as to how to test for the 
impact of culture in a group. “The first is to come up with a definition of strategic 
culture that is falsifiable. The second is to test for the presence of strategic culture in 
the formative ‘texts’ of a particular society’s strategic traditions. The third is to test 
for the effect of strategic culture on behavior”.87 This study will use the second and 
third of these processes in its analysis. It is not necessary to create a falsifiable 
definition of culture for the groups in question. Through secondary sources and the 
descriptions of culture by members of each group the definitions of each culture will 
be developed. It is these individual definitions that will be tested against history to 
test their validity. 
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 An interesting analysis of ethnic conflict that uses aspects of culture is 
Petersen’s examination of the role of group-wide emotions.88 Petersen finds that due 
to its history a group can begin to develop collective emotions and these emotions 
dictate how the group will act. His analysis finds that of all the group-wide emotions 
that could explain changes to a group’s culture, resentment provides the best 
explanation. Resentment comes from feelings of unjust treatment and this sense of 
injustice develops over time and becomes incorporated into the group’s psyche. In 
using the definition of culture by Kluckhon described above, clearly what Petersen 
defines as group-wide emotions also can be seen as part of the group’s culture.   
 Kiel also demonstrates the power of culture in explaining group decision-
making. Her analysis concerned the culture of the French military prior to the Second 
World War. As she notes “culture is not merely derivative of functional demands or 
structural imperatives. Culture has (relative) causal autonomy”.89 Keil was able to 
demonstrate how the culture of the French military had developed a particular culture 
that was ill-suited for the changes that were necessary in order to be prepared for the 
war. Therefore, while there are other structural explanations that contribute to the 
failure of the French military in order to understand why those structural issues were 
of such importance the overall culture of the organization needed to be understood. 
This concept will be incorporated into this study. While other structural explanations 
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will be examined, the role of the culture of both the minority group and the majority 
group in a state will need to be addressed in order to fully understand the structural 
explanations impact. It may be possible that some groups are more likely to resort to 
violence due to aspects of their culture while others may look to other strategies. 
H3: In order to predict whether a group will resort to militant activities it is 
necessary to understand the culture of the group and how accepting that culture is to 
violence.  
 The final area to be discussed is the institutionalization of the culture 
described above. This will take many forms. The first is an issue that is not addressed 
in much of the literature, the role of geography. While Gurr’s analysis stresses the 
importance of geographic concentration in predicting ethnic conflict90, this study will 
examine the role of geographic isolation. The cases that will be examined provide an 
interesting comparison to examine this issue. The Corsicans are separated from the 
rest of France by the Mediterranean Sea and the Basques are a mountain people in the 
north of Spain. The Russian populations in Estonia and Latvia are intermixed with the 
titular communities in the large urban centers. This may help explain why violence 
has occurred in the former cases but not in the latter. While this concept has not been 
studied at great length elsewhere due to the unique opportunity these particular cases 
provide it will be studied here. 
H4 a. Groups that are geographically isolated from the majority of the population 
are more likely to engage in militant activities. 
                                                
90  Gurr (2000). 
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 Another interesting comparison available for study due to the cases chosen is 
the importance of time in predicting conflict. As mentioned above the Petersen 
analysis does incorporate aspects of time. In order for the group-wide emotions to 
develop a great deal of time must pass. Here Kaufman provides a valuable insight 
into the question of time.91 The author dismisses the concept of ‘ancient hatred’ as 
argued by Ignatieff, Kaplan and other as an explanation of ethnic conflict.92 That 
theory states that the animosity between ethnic groups has built up over centuries and 
therefore is extremely difficult to end. He sees ethnic conflicts today as new conflicts 
with ethnic leaders calling on the myths and symbols of past conflicts as rallying cries 
for actions. Kaufman’s theory can be seen as being heavily influenced by the elite 
theories of nationalism described above. Each conflict is new since the players and 
issues change but they are rooted in historical myths that are used purely to mobilize 
the masses. While this may be in fact true, it is argued here that the length of time a 
conflict has lasted is important. If leaders are able to use history as a mobilizing force, 
then it can be argued that for the public to be convinced that violence is an option 
leaders will need some history to root their struggle in. If a conflict is new then 
enough past wrongs are not available for a leader to weave a persuasive argument 
around to justify violence. Therefore in some way the conflict it is a continuing 
                                                
91  Stuart J. Kaufman (2001) Modern Hatreds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). It 
should be noted that Gurr (2000) also has an aspect of time in its analysis. Many of 
the factors that are used to predict future protest or rebellion such as levels of protest 
or repression are based on the recent past (early 1990’s). This study will look at the 
actual length of the conflict as a factor in predicting conflict and is therefore different. 
 
92  Ignatieff (1994), Michael Ignatieff (1999) The Warrior’s Honor (Toronto: Penguin 
Press), Robert D. Kaplan (1993) Balkan Ghosts (New York: Random House).  
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struggle with different players over time. Only in those conflicts that have a long 
enough history will the possibility of violence be found.93  
H4 b. The longer a conflict has existed the more likely violence is to be used.   
 The final body of literature that is of value to this study is the field of 
repertoire choices. When a group chooses to act collectively they have many options 
as to how to do so. Some choose peaceful political options, while others choose more 
militant strategies. Over time groups may alter their strategies with some becoming 
more violent while others abandon their violent tactics.  
 One way to address this topic is by using a rational choice method to explain 
group choices. Starting with Olson94 in the 1960’s through Chong95 in the 1990’s 
there have been attempts at explaining the problems of collective action and how 
groups overcome these challenges. The key question is how groups overcome the 
‘collective action problem’. This is the problem that for a group to be successful in 
collective action the majority of the members must participate in any activity. Since 
most of the membership must participate the possibility of free riders is always 
prevalent. With enough free riders (since it is in everyone’s best interest not to 
participate but gain the benefits of the actions of the group all rational people will 
choose to free ride) the action will fail. More recently Lichbach has addressed the 
                                                
93  Despite Kaufman’s emphasis on the modernity of ethnic conflicts, this is in fact a 
consequence of his argument.   
 
94  Mancur Olson (2002) The Logic of Collective Action Revised Edition (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press). 
 
95  Dennis Chong (1991) Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press).  
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issue of why some people choose to become involved in dangerous or illegal 
activities when the rational choice would be to not participate?96 As the author notes 
“[m]ost rebels do not actually rebel”.97 Lichbach sets out what he calls the ‘five 
percent rule’ which states that the vast majority of people will never choose militant 
strategies no matter what their situation. This group constitutes “ninety-five percent 
of aggrieved people, at least ninety-five percent of the time, in at least ninety-five 
percent of the places”.98 Lichbach therefore sets out to explain the choices of the 
remaining 5% of the people, 5% of the time in 5% of the places.99       
 Other authors have been concerned with the cycles of action different groups 
follow. Tarrow outlines what he considers to be a consistent cycle of collective 
action.100 The cycle begins with heightened conflict in all aspects of the society. Next 
there is a growth in the collective action moving from the cities to the rural areas and 
from labor groups to other segments of society. Third, organizations develop and 
begin to work together for common goals. Fourth, new frames are tested and 
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100  Sidney Tarrow (1995) “Cycles of Collective Action” in Mark Traugott ed., 
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developed. Frames are how the organizations project their issues to the public with 
the goal to make their cause appear to be just and their message appealing to a wide 
range of people to convince them to join the movement. During this stage many 
slogans will be tested to see which resonates with the public. At this stage the 
movement is working within the accepted political and media channels to get its 
message out.101 Fifth, the repertoires of contention expand as new types of action are 
taken, with those that are successful retained. As long as non-violent repertoires are 
successful they will continue to be used and if violence is tested and found to work it 
will be kept. Eventually if used enough, violence becomes accepted as part of the 
routine and is very difficult to change.102 It is this fifth element of the cycle of 
violence which is of interest to this study. When or if a group chooses violence is of 
great interest. Why do some groups never get to the point where violence is tested or 
maintained for a long enough duration of time that allows for it to become routine? 
Why do others get to a point where violence is a part of the cycle of contentious 
politics? As Tilly notes “[the] viability of one of the elements of a repertoire depends 
on what sorts of things work in a given social or political structure, on what forms of 
protest have been invented and disseminated in a population and on what grievances a 
                                                
101  For more analysis on framing please see Mayer  N. Zald (1996) “Culture, 
ideology, and strategic framing” and William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer (1996) 
“Framing Political Opportunity” in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. 
Zald ed., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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102  Tarrow (1995).  
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given form is appropriate to express”.103 Based on Tarrow’s and Tilly’s discussion of 
repertoires104 the final hypotheses to be discussed in the study is: 
H4 c. Groups who have never used violence as a form of collective action will not 
choose to resort to it, while those who have used violence will continue to do so. 
 All of the work discussed above has influenced this study. It is clear that there 
is no consensus on why ethnic conflict begins, what its roots are, why it has remained 
such a powerful force or how it can be prevented. By examining the hypotheses 
outlined above this study will attempt to link several of these theories so that a clearer 
picture of ethnic conflict and the decision making of minority groups can be 
determined. Without the work of those who have come before this study would not be 
possible. This study will test these theories through the four case studies and some 
will be supported while others will be called into question. It is necessary to 
understand where the discipline has come from in order to go forward, which this 
study is now able to do.  
                                                
103  Charles Tilly (1987) The Contentious French (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press), pp.1248-1249.  
 
104  For more analysis of the theories behind Tarrow’s cycles of collective action and 
how repertoire choices are affected by it see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and 
Charles Tilly (2001) Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), particularly Part II. For examples of work that tests the repertoire theory 
please see Mark Traugott (1995) “Barricades as Repertoire” and Marc W. Steinberg 
(1995) “The Roar of the Crowd” in Traugott ed.  
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Chapter 3- History of the Cases 
The Corsicans- Europe’s Black Sheep 
 Corsica has always been on the periphery. It has always been the exception, 
always somewhat out of place. It is a small mountainous island in the Mediterranean 
Sea (8 722 square km). It is a part of France but is closer to Italy (170 km from Nice, 
100 from Livorno). It is the homeland of one of the most famous symbols of France, 
Napoleon Bonaparte, but shares most of its traditions with its island neighbors 
Sardinia and Sicily (Sardinia is a mere 17 km away).105 The island, due to its 
geographic location has historically been of interest to the great military powers of 
Europe and as a result the island has been invaded and controlled by numerous 
countries in its history. As Ramsay notes: “[d]uring the past two thousand years the 
Corsicans have had less than two decades of independence”.106 Despite this constant 
foreign control, the Corsicans have managed to remain relatively undisturbed 
culturally. The Corsican language, while understood by fewer people now than in the 
past, still survives and many of the customs and traditions unique to the island 
remain.107 The Corsicans have survived being invaded, bartered, over-managed and 
                                                
105  John Loughlin and Farimah Daftary (1999) Insular Regions and European 
Integration: Corsica and the Åland Islands Compared (ECMI Report #5, Flensburg 
Germany), p.9. 
 
106  Robert Ramsay (1983) The Corsican Time Bomb, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press), p.1.   
 
107  While some linguists dismiss Corsican as a dialect of Northern Italian (see 
Ramsay 1983, p.3), for the Corsicans it is a unique language and will be treated as 
such here.   
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ignored. Through all of this and partially because of it, their uniqueness as a people 
has remained a crucial part of their collective identity. 
Corsica Prior to French Rule 
Prior to the island becoming a part of France Corsica had been under the 
control of various Mediterranean powers, such as Romans, Vandals and Pisans. By 
far the greatest impact on the island was at the hands of Genoa which controlled it 
from 1358-1768. While each successive regime tried to control the population, each 
was met with resistance. Moreover, the various cultures never gained a foothold on 
the island or its people. Ramsay explains why: 
  Since the invaders were usually more interested in 
  the island’s strategic maritime position than in the  
  extraction of wealth from its interior, they were usually 
  satisfied with the establishment of key towns . . .  
  Conversely, the Corsicans themselves, possibly for 
  health reasons, but more likely for defensive purposes, 
  became an essentially mountain people.108    
 
By separating themselves from the cities and towns the Corsicans were able to 
survive and remain relatively autonomous. This became increasingly difficult during 
the 18th Century, the fourth century of Genoan rule. It was during the end of this 
period that the Corsican nationalist movement truly began and its first hero was born, 
Pascal Paoli. 
 Paoli who is still considered the father of Corsican identity (in Corsican U 
Babbu di a Patria)109 had witnessed his father and brother lead a movement against 
                                                
108  Ramsay 1983, p.2. 
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Genoan rule, but felt that the movement lacked direction. During the Corsican 
uprisings of 1730-1769 Genoa came to require the aid of France to subdue the 
population. The French arrived in 1747 and stayed until 1753. Paoli went beyond 
merely calling for the Genoans to also leave the island, he wanted to establish a 
completely independent Corsica. By 1755 he had begun to organize the island 
linguistically, culturally and constitutionally.110 The constitution that Paoli advocated 
was either heavily influenced by or written directly by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Paoli 
began to create a Corsican administration and bureaucracy while emphasizing the 
need to preserve the Corsican language. It was during this time that the first Corsican 
university was also founded. Paoli’s dream of a separate and independent Corsica 
died in 1768 due to the Treaty of Versailles when Genoa handed over control of the 
island completely to France. It took until May of 1769 for the French forces to finally 
defeat the Corsican forces under Paoli and with the arrival of the French and his 
military defeat, Paoli was forced into exile in Britain where he remained for the next 
twenty years.111 
Corsica under French Rule 
 Immediately upon gaining full control of the island the French re-organized 
the administration that Paoli had created. The traditional systems of justice and 
municipal governments were radically transformed. This was significant in that even 
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under previous ‘foreign’ control Corsica had enjoyed relative autonomy.112 The 
original plan for Corsica was that it was to be a “pays d’etat” which was to serve as 
the example to the other regions of France. With the French revolution these plans 
were eventually abandoned and Corsica was incorporated into the new French 
republic as one department the same as all the others.113    
 It must be noted that while many modern Corsican nationalists look back to 
the Paoli period as the birth of the Corsican autonomist movement, the arrival of the 
French and the annexation of Corsica into the French unitary state were welcomed by 
the majority of those living on the island at the time. For those who welcomed French 
rule they felt that it was better to be associated with a world power than to be merely 
associated with the other Italian islands of the Mediterranean. 
 When Paoli returned in 1790 he quickly became the President of the 
administrative council and resumed his efforts to create a sovereign Corsica. The 
Corsica Paoli returned to was very different than the one he left twenty years earlier. 
While he was still a popular figure another Corsican was beginning to rise in 
prominence, Napoleon Bonaparte. Bonaparte was loyal to France and many Corsicans 
were loyal to Bonaparte. While Bonaparte’s initial campaigns against Paoli were 
military disasters his ability to raise a force to oppose Paoli was indicative of the 
                                                
112   Peter Savigear (1989) “Autonomy and the unitary state: the case of Corsica” in 
Murray Forsyth ed., Federalism and Nationalism (New York: St. Martin Press), p.97. 
 
113  There was an attempt in 1793 to create two departments on the island but that 
proved to be inefficient and in 1811 it was returned to a single department. This is 
how the island was administered until 1975 when the island was again divided into 
two departments,  Haute-Corse in the North and Corse-du-Sud in the south.  See 
Savigear 1983, p.97. 
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divisions on the island. In one last desperate attempt to secure independence for 
Corsica, Paoli turned to Britain and King George III whose forces invaded the island 
in 1794 and was proclaimed by Paoli’s administrative body as the King of Corsica.114 
The British influence on the island lasted a mere two years and French control of the 
island resumed and this time became permanent.  
 The Corsican people became even more aligned with France due to their pride 
in their native son Bonaparte. While Bonaparte refused to show any favoritism to the 
island they saw his accomplishments as their own. He convinced the Corsican people 
through his memoirs (and not relying on actual facts) that he “had cherished Pascal 
Paoli’s ideals and that he had regretted not having the opportunity to appoint the 
Babbu (Father) to a place of responsibility”.115 While the Napoleonic mystique had an 
enormous influence in tying Corsica to the mainland the Napoleonic policies also 
were extremely important. Savigear notes, Bonaparte was the “creator of efficient 
centralizing institutions and practices, bringing to fruition the unitary state of his 
predecessors”.116  As a result of these policies Corsica became incorporated into 
French society and not just loyal to the leader of France. Corsicans showed this 
integration through large numbers of young Corsicans going to the mainland for their 
education and many joining the French army and serving in France’s colonies. Many 
saw their best opportunities for economic advancement and prosperity with the 
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French institutions off of the island and it is possible that this early integration is the 
foundation for Corsican nationalism. The true understanding that the Corsicans were 
a part of France yet were distinctly Corsican would have come not from those who 
remained on the island but rather those who left. One Corsican describes this 
phenomenon as a “permanent tension all islanders live: the desire to leave the island 
and the desire to return”.117 As a result there is now a diaspora of between 400-500 
000 on the mainland, compared to a population on the island of approximately 200 
000.118 
 After Napoleon Corsica and France settled into a pattern of “profound 
ambiguity”.119 While associating closely with the French state, Corsicans remained 
linguistically and culturally distinct. The result was the first forms of protest by 
Corsicans but they did not concern political issues such as autonomy. Rather, the 
initial voices of dissent starting in the late 19th Century, usually in the form of 
Corsican journals and newspapers, concerned linguistic and cultural protection.120 
These voices grew stronger after the First World War. It was not until the end of the 
Second World War after Corsicans had fought in large numbers and felt that their 
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120   The current President of Haute Corse Mr. Paul Giacobbi describes the 19th 
Century nationalist movement as “dignified, idealist and non-violent” in comparison 
to the movement as it exists today. Telephone interview March 24, 2004. 
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contribution in both wars was underappreciated did the more radical calls for 
constitutional changes begin to surface. 
Calls for Autonomy and Separation, 1950- Present 
 As France emerged from the chaos and destruction of the World War II the 
government began to change French society. Immediately after the war all of French 
society was in the same position because even though people were happy to have 
their freedom back, they were in a poor economic position. The 1950’s was a period 
of rebuilding and readjustment and one of the key changes was the abandonment of 
the colonies. With the end of French rule in regions outside of France the Corsicans 
who worked in large numbers in the colonies found it necessary to return to Corsica 
and find new employment.  This continued through to the 1960’s and eventually it 
became clear that “there was a rising level of affluence throughout Europe, including 
France, which had not been matched in Corsica”.121 Corsicans were forced to leave 
for mainland France to gain employment and many grew resentful of the French 
government which they felt was ignoring the needs of the island and more 
specifically the needs of the Corsican people.122 No issue caused greater unrest on 
Corsica than the end of French rule in Algeria and the arrival of the pieds noirs. Pied 
noirs translates to black feet and is the term used by Corsicans to describe the French 
settlers who had been in Algeria since the 1800’s. These settlers owned land in 
Algeria and with the end of French rule wished or were forced to return to France and 
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wanted land to compensate for what they had lost. The French government decided to 
relocate them in Corsica. These newcomers received preferential treatment by the 
French government and in total over 17 000 of them arrived in Corsica during the 
1960’s.  
 The poor economic standing of the island and the increase in non-Corsicans 
resulted in the number of people and groups calling for structural change to grow 
louder and to become more organized. The first of these new organizations was the 
L’Union Corse l’Avenir that was founded in 1963. Its message called for new rights 
for Corsicans and was aimed at the young, who were at highest risk for emigration.123 
The supporters of this group and others angry with the current situation aimed much 
of their displeasure at SOMIVAC (La société pour la mise en valeur d la Corse), a 
government organization responsible for agriculture whom the Corsicans felt was 
pro-Pieds Noirs.124 The L’Union Corse l’Avenir and other organizations of the early 
1960’s failed to make gains politically and eventually faltered, but the anger of the 
Corsicans at being treated as a ‘colony’ remained. As Savigear states, more and more 
Corsicans held the opinion that France had “lured Corsica’s best children away to be 
educated, to fight and administer for France. The French had come to Corsica, had 
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treated it with disdain, had used it, built villas on its coastline and dumped 18,000 
pied noirs there”.125  
 With larger numbers of Corsicans leaving for the mainland and the arrival of 
non-Corsicans the economic issues raised in the early 1960’s became linked to social 
issues. As Ramsay notes “the language issue did not begin to emerge in Corsica until 
anxieties arose . . . when ethnically, and therefore linguistically, a rapid dilution of the 
Corsican element in the island took place”.126  While the Corsican language had never 
enjoyed official status on the island its survival was ensured due to the island’s 
isolation. When the number of native Corsicans dropped people became concerned 
that the language would also disappear and with this greater emphasis on the Corsican 
language a renaissance in Corsican culture and society also developed. The old 
symbols of Corsica such as the Corsican flag, known as the Moor’s Head and 
Corsican anthems began to re-emerge.127 Put simply, the Corsicans began to see the 
differences between themselves and those on the mainland; however, the French 
government failed to notice or chose to ignore this growing divide. 
 By the 1970’s those angry with Corsica’s position within the French state had 
organized themselves into two general groups. The first were autonomists who called 
on a new relationship with France to ensure Corsica’s economic and cultural 
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stability.128 The second were separatists who felt that only through Corsican 
independence could Corsican society be truly protected.129 While both of these groups 
were concerned with the protection of the Corsican nation their means of achieving 
their goals were very different. While the autonomist tried to influence the state 
peacefully through politics, by the 1970’s the separatists were willing to use violence 
in their repertoire. 
 One separatist group formed in 1967 was called the Action Régionaliste Corse 
(ANC). The first violent incident occurred in 1973 when an Italian boat was attacked 
in Bastia harbor. While the ANC did not claim responsibility for this attack the 
French government blamed them. In 1975 a standoff between Corsican separatists 
and the police at a winery owned by a pieds noir resulted in the death of two police 
officers.130 General strikes periodically shut down the island and protests often 
resulted in violent clashes with the result that the government felt that it needed to 
take action and decided to ban the ANC in 1975. However, the ANC would soon 
become the least of the French government’s problems. Two small separatist groups, 
the Frontu Paessanu Corsu Di Liberazione and Ghustizia Paolina united on March 22 
1973 to form the Frontu Di Liberazione Naziunalista Corsu, known more commonly 
as the FLNC. The FLNC announced its arrival at a press conference in the Church of 
                                                
128 Interview with Paul Giacobbi 2004.  
 
129  Laughlin and Daftary 1998, p.15. 
 
130  Christian Lammert (2003) “Ethno-territorial Protest Movements and the Politics 




Saint-Anthony de Casabianca where Pascal Paoli first declared an independent 
Corsica in 1755. The FLNC first major attack was on May 5 1975 when it began a 
bombing campaign and by 1976 it had gained national attention.131 In addition to the 
bombing campaigns, organizations with political mandates were formed to replace 
the banned ANC such as the Union di u Populu Corsu (UPC) whose members began 
to run for office on the island and would soon gain approximately 9-10% of the 
electoral vote. 
 The various Corsican organizations, both clandestine and political, had 
difficulty maintaining internal stability and as a result many splinter groups formed 
and other groups disbanded. It was clear, however, that there was a large enough 
proportion of the population who were either regionalists wanting more rights or 
autonomists wanting a new deal with France or separatists who wanted out. By 1982 
it was clear that France needed to do something and what resulted was the Special 
Statute on Corsica. This statute was France’s first attempt at devolving power to a 
region and for the fiercely unitary French state the statute was revolutionary. It 
granted the regional governments limited decision making. It was also an 
acknowledgement that Corsica was in fact not like the rest of France. As Gaston 
Defferre, the Minister of the Interior said in 1982: “Corsica has its own specificity, a 
cultural identity, a language, a culture, its own traditions and all this must be taken 
into account”.132 They would be directly elected by Corsicans by proportional 
                                                
131  Ramsay 1983, p.127. 
 
132  Quoted in Hintjens et al, 1995, p. 123. 
 70
representation. The councils would be responsible for local taxation, tourism, 
education, environment, housing and culture.133 Only the legal system, policing and 
any new issues not outlined by the statute would remain under the control of the 
Minister of the Interior. The island was still heavily reliant on grants from Paris but it 
was able to make many of their own decisions. It is important to remember, however, 
that this agreement was not negotiated between the government and the island, it was 
given to the island by the government and could be taken back.134 
 While many Corsicans were pleased with the statute, others were angry that it 
was given to the two regions in Corsica and not to the Corsican people. The 
autonomists and separatists also grew frustrated with the election results. The existing 
and powerful clan system (a reminder of its Italian past) remained the dominant force 
in island politics and only a few powerful families were able to gain power. In 1991 
the Minister of the Interior Pierre Joxe provided further autonomy to the regional 
councils but his attempt at including the term ‘Corsican people’ was struck down by 
the French Constitutional Court.135  
 The 1990’s was a period of simmering discontent for the Corsican 
nationalists. Their attempts at breaking the clan system had failed politically and the 
terrorists began to aim some of their attacks at the clan leaders as opposed to French 
symbolic targets (such as French owned hotels or post offices). The violence became 
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more widespread and the French government tried once again to placate the island by 
holding a referendum in the summer of 2003 on a new deal with additional powers to 
the island. One of the key aspects of this new deal was the elimination of the two 
regional councils and the creation of one Corsican Assembly to be responsible for the 
entire island. There were to be additional powers to be devolved to the new assembly 
and more freedom to teach Corsican at higher levels of education.136 On July 6 2003 
the Corsicans voted on the French proposal and rejected it 50.98% to 49.02%. The 
President of Haute Corsica Paul Giacobbi believes that the people saw that the 
nationalists were in favor of the proposal and were concerned that if they voted for 
the proposal they would be supporting the terrorists’ agenda, even though 
autonomists and regionalists were also in favor of the plan.137 Immediately after the 
referendum the violence on the island escalated and carried over to the mainland. 
Corsica presently finds itself basically in the same position that it has been since 
1982. The clan system is still in place, the nationalists are still using violence on an 
almost daily basis, the island is still divided into two regions and France still seems 
unable to find a solution to deal with its troubled island.  
The Basques- A Survivor’s Instinct 
 If the Basques are to be believed as long as there has been a Europe there have 
been the Basques. They would also have a lot of history to back up this claim. Their 
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language is the only surviving language in Europe that existed prior to the Indo-
European languages which predominate today.138 A common Basques fable to 
illustrate how much older the Basques country is compared to Spain is the belief that 
Spanish developed as a result of a Basque speaking Latin poorly.139 The first written 
record of the Basques dates back approximately 2000 years and those records indicate 
“that they were already an ancient- or at least not new- people”.140 They have never 
strayed very far from their rugged, mountainous home. Today the Basques are spread 
across two countries, Spain and France. In France they are in three provinces (French 
names in parentheses): Lapurdi (Labourd), Benafaroa (Basse Navarre) and Zuberoa 
(Soule). In Spain they comprise four provinces (Spanish names in parentheses): 
Naforoa (Navarra), Gipuzkoa (Guipuzcoa), Bizkaia (Vizcaya) and Araba (Alava). 
The French provinces are quite small both population-wise and geographically. 
Approximately 250 000 people live in the three French provinces compared to over 
2.6 million on the Spanish side.141 Over time each of these provinces developed its 
own unique culture and dialects of the language. While they are all Basque, there are 
ideological, economical and political differences between the French and Spanish 
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sides, and even among the provinces on each side of the border. This is particularly 
true of the provinces on the Spanish side.  
Similar to the Corsicans, the Basque region finds itself in an important 
geographic location and due to its strategic location it has also endured unending 
attempts at conquest. The Basque region is very mountainous which dissuaded many 
armies from attempting such conquests in ancient times. It was not until the arrival of 
the powerful Romans were the Basques defeated but despite their defeat they 
remained relatively autonomous under the Romans. They learned lessons concerning 
the need for an efficient road system and the proper organization of towns and cities, 
but culturally they were never assimilated. With the end of the Roman Empire a new 
force came to the Iberian Peninsula, the Visigoths, who were far more aggressive 
against the Basques. The Visigoths arrived around 400 AD and used the Basque 
territory as a major transportation route and unlike the Romans decided that they 
needed to actively control the Basques. This decision set off two and a half centuries 
of war between the two peoples. This war is summarized by Kurlansky who stated 
that the Basques “won battles and lost battles, but for 200,000 Visigoth soldiers 
attempting to hold all of Iberia, the Basques were always an insurmountable 
problem”.142 By 700 AD Muslims became the Basques most immediate threat and as 
a result the people became aligned with the Catholic church. Historically the Basques 
were threatened by various invaders or would-be conquerors over the next centuries 
but each time they survived not just physically but culturally and linguistically. 
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Despite their small numbers and isolation they became known as excellent warriors 
and a people unwilling to be dominated by anyone. This refusal to be enveloped into 
any foreign culture was matched with an understanding of the need to reach out 
economically. As they were situated on major trade routes the Basques came in 
contact with foreigners and developed trading partnerships with many of them and the 
Basques became known for their abilities in commerce and their entrepreneurial 
spirit. This paradoxical belief in reaching out economically and looking inward 
politically and culturally remains an aspect of Basque society today.  Eventually in 
the middle-ages the Kingdom of Navarre came into power over almost all the Basque 
region. This kingdom had its own political structures and felt free to rule the Basque 
people as it saw fit. The creation of the Spanish state (with assistance by the King of 
Navarre) incorporated the Basques into yet another political entity in 1512. While 
being a part of Spain the Basques as in Roman times were able to maintain autonomy. 
This lasted until 1841 when that autonomy was eliminated and the current political 
struggles can be said to have begun.143 
The Basques in Spain from the 19th Century to Franco 
 Before 1841 the Basques had enjoyed relative autonomy from the Spanish 
crown due to the presence of their fueros. These were the Basques statutes and 
charters that allowed each province to maintain separate administrative records. The 
Basques fueros also exempted the Basques from paying taxes to Spain and ensured 
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that its people did not have to serve against their will in the Spanish military.144 These 
agreements were put into writing during the 18th and 19th Centuries although many 
had been in place for hundreds of years previous. By the middle of the 19th Century 
disagreement grew about the exact nature of the fueros. The Basques believed the 
fueros were a fundamental part of their agreement to be a part of Spain but the 
Spanish centralists contended that they were concessions given by the state and 
therefore could be rescinded if the state so desired.  
 From 1833 to 1839 Spain was torn apart in what became known as the Carlist 
war that pitted the conservative Carlists (named for their choice of Monarch Carlos) 
against the liberals of Maria Christina.145 The majority of the Basques supported the 
traditional conservatism of the Carlists although some of the urban areas believed in 
the changes called for by the liberals. To rally the Basques to support their side the 
Carlists declared that if victorious they would guarantee the fueros system, thus 
maintaining Basque autonomy. The majority of the fighting took place in the Basque 
country with a Basque raised army playing a key role. In the end however, the 
Carlists were never able to control the largest city in the Basque region, Bilbao and in 
1839 the war ended. The Carlists, and by extension the Basques had lost. The liberals 
punished the Basques for backing the losing side and in 1841 the fueros were 
restricted and even what was the Kingdom of Navarre, which had always maintained 
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even more autonomy than the other Basque provinces, was placed under the control 
of Madrid.146 With the loss of autonomy many Basques chose to abandon their 
ancient lifestyle and modernize and industrialize quickly. Due to the natural resources 
of the area, and the Basques’ history of ship building in some ways they were 
prepared for this massive change in the society. The Basques also developed a way to 
produce steel cheaply and efficiently and soon dominated this market as well. The 
towns and cities prospered and soon the Basque region was one of the richest areas in 
Spain. While the Basques were prepared economically they were not prepared 
socially. As Conversi explains: 
  Modernisation was not merely an economic matter; 
  It infiltrated every level of society. It did not spare 
  even the most tightly knit relationships; families were 
  broken apart and ‘foreign’ habits gained ground in 
  most walks of life. Industrialization was accompanied 
  by proletarianisation and the displacement of Basque 
  youth from the countryside to the city.147 
 
Beyond the change to the Basques in the region, with the economic boom came an 
influx of immigrants both from inside and outside of Spain. This was significant in 
that while many foreigners had come through the Basque region throughout the years, 
hardly any had stayed. The Basques were not used to cultural heterogeneity and some 
felt threatened by it148 and by 1872 the tensions in the regions grew into what became 
the second Carlist war. Once again the Basques were divided between those who 
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embraced the new society, mostly those in Bilbao, and those wanting a return to the 
old system. The war lasted for four years, and again the Carlists lost. This time the 
last of fueros were eliminated and the Basques lost control over taxation and they 
were required to serve in the Spanish military.149 
 The combination of losing two civil wars, the loss of the fueros and the 
confidence gained by excelling economically led to a cultural awakening of the 
Basques by the end of the 19th Century. This awakening was driven by the Basques’ 
equivalent to the Corsican’s Pascal Paoli: Sabino Arana. Arana published his first 
book on the Basque culture in 1892 and two years later he was the editor of a Basque 
nationalist magazine and had founded a nationalist association. This first organization 
was banned by the Spanish government as it represented a threat to the state. One 
year later in 1895 he subsequently founded the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (the 
Basque Nationalist Party, PNV). Arana was jailed in 1902 and died in 1903.150 
Arana’s ideology was simple, he believed that the seven Basque provinces should be 
united, that the Basques represented a unique nation and that this nation should have 
control over its own affairs. In order for this to be achieved, they needed their own 
country. Until Arana the Basques were missing many of the symbols necessary for a 
country. The Basques knew themselves to be Basque but had never been organized 
into a single country and therefore had no core to build around. Arana tried to correct 
this by first deriving a name for the country-in-exile: Euzkadi- by combining the 
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Basque words for ‘Basque speaking’ and ‘together’. He also wrote a national anthem, 
and designed the flag. The Basque flag is designed in the same form as the British 
Union Jack but with a red background, green diagonal cross and a white cross in the 
center. Through his magazine and his books he also started to create a published 
record of the Basque language.151 Until Arana it was extremely rare to publish in 
Basque but he believed that if the Basques were to form a country, they would need 
the legitimacy of a library of Basque language work. 
 While Arana did not live long enough to see the party he formed start to 
achieve success the PNV eventually began to grow. It was a party that gained support 
in the rural areas of the region appealing to those who had not prospered with 
industrialization and modernization. The Basques at this point split into two groups, 
those who supported the nationalist cause and those who benefited from the new 
relationship with Spain and wanted to maintain it. These people were found mostly in 
the cities, particularly Bilbao. These Basques were comfortable using Spanish as it 
was the language of business and many urban political issues concerned finance not 
nationalism. The Spanish socialist party started in Bilbao at the turn of the century 
and many Basque businessmen began moving to other areas of Spain.152 While this 
new middle class grew more closely aligned with other regions of Spain as the 20th 
Century progressed more and more people outside of the industrial centers were 
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drawn to the idea of an independent Basque country. If full independence was not a 
realistic short term goal the return of the Basque’s traditional fueros was and the next 
opportunity the Basques saw to achieve this goal was the birth of the Spanish Second 
Republic in 1931. 
The Basques Under Franco 
 By 1931 the PNV was an established political party in the Basque region that 
pushed for Basque independence and a return to more conservative values but the 
Second Republic was seen by many as radical and socialist in nature. Despite this 
clash of ideologies, the Basque nationalist leadership, headed by Jose Aguirre 
believed that there was a greater chance for an independent Basque territory by siding 
with the republicans and sided against the monarchists. With both the Basque 
nationalists and the socialists from the cities in support of the republic the Basques 
became a key power in the fight for control of Spain and this lead to negotiations for 
greater Basque autonomy. Francisco Franco’s first attempt at gaining power was a 
failed coup in 1934 but his rebels continued to fight the republic. Desperate to 
maintain control in 1936 an autonomous Basque region of Navarre was declared. The 
Basques finally had the opportunity to control their own taxation and to promote the 
Basque language in schools. Sadly for Basque nationalists their dreams of an 
autonomous Basque region was short lived. Nine months after the region was 
officially recognized by the Spanish state as being autonomous Franco captured 
Bilbao, the autonomous statute was reversed and all political parties were banned.153 
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 Franco’s rule was totalitarian but he was especially cruel to the Basques. 
During the Civil War the Basques had caused some of the stiffest resistance and 
having a growing nationalist movement in the economic engine of the country was 
unacceptable and Franco decided early on that to fully control Spain he needed to 
eradicate the Basque nationalist movement. 
 For the next decade and a half the Basques were only concerned with survival 
as they were severely repressed by Franco with any evidence of a person identifying 
themselves as Basque grounds for imprisonment. The language was banned, as were 
all Basque cultural activities such as dance and music and the Basque university was 
closed. Basque books were burnt. Basque street names were replaced, as were Basque 
names on registries and even tombstones.154 Between 100 000 and 150 000 Basques 
were imprisoned and many others fled across Europe. Early attempts at engaging the 
international community failed due to the Cold War and the resulting Western need to 
keep Spain onside with the rest of Western Europe. The Basques realized by 1950 
that they would not be able to look for international assistance and began to look for 
alternative ways to fight back.  
 The 1950’s saw the Basques begin to fight among themselves. By this point 
there was a second mass migration of non-Basques into the region particularly into 
the larger cities. Through Spanish repression and this influx of non-Basques the 
number of people who were able to speak Basque dropped to one-third of the 
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Basques.155 These newcomers were concerned with workers’ rights and most were 
not concerned with the Basque nationalist movement or the Basque’s struggle with 
Franco.156 As a result, within the Basque region there were three separate groups of 
people each with their own political agenda. The first group were socialists, many not 
ethnic Basques and most in cities such as Bilbao. They were very powerful and had 
their own problems with Franco’s regime. The second group was comprised of the 
very rich industrialists who were both Basques and non-Basques and supported 
Franco. They wanted a strong relationship with Spain and no outside trade since they 
were unable to compete in the global market. The only industrialists who were 
nationalistic were the shipbuilders who relied on foreign markets. The last group were 
the middle-class and rural Basques who were the nationalists who had suffered the 
most under Franco and were traditionally supporters of the PNV. The PNV who had 
been so outspoken prior to Franco had become a muted political force unwilling to 
violate the rules preventing them from organizing any collective action. As the 
Basques continued to suffer, the demand for a stronger resistance grew and by 1959 it 
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was clear to a small group of young Basques that they could not look to the PNV 
anymore to lead them so they broke away from the party.157  
The young nationalists turned away from the conservative nature of the PNV 
and adopted a leftist, socialistic, even Trotsky-inspired ideology. This ideology 
developed for two reasons, the first was the group’s anger at Britain and the United 
States for failing to come to its aid, the second being the growing popularity of left-
wing politics throughout Europe and later the impact of the third-world resistance 
groups.158 The new organization was called Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque 
Homeland and Liberty, known as the ETA) and apart from their ideology and tactics 
the ETA was different than the PNV in two other important ways. First, the ETA was 
not interested in autonomy within the Spanish state, they wanted outright sovereignty. 
Secondly, any sovereignty for a Basque country would require the three French 
provinces as well. Their motto being 4+3 = 1, the Basque country was to be 
indivisible.159 While the ETA had a political agenda, their methods were to include 
violent resistance. The first acts of terrorism occurred in 1961 and armed 
revolutionary tactics were approved by the group in 1964 and complete support for 
Marxist ideology in 1965. The Franco government repressed the groups’ activities 
severely during the entire 1960’s and in retaliation in June 1968 the first person was 
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killed by the ETA.160 By 1970 there were more killings and trials of ETA members 
leading to their executions resulting in large protests again the Franco regime by the 
Basques. The ETA was now seen as freedom fighters and had the support of many of 
the Basques. In 1973 the ETA carried out its largest terrorist attack, using a car-bomb 
to execute the President of the Spanish Government who was also Franco’s second in 
command. With each activity the ETA drew more attention around the world, more 
repression by the Spanish state and more support from the Basques. It appeared that 
the Basques and Franco were heading for some final epic confrontation until 1975 
when Franco died and democracy was restored. Now the Basques and the rest of 
Spain had to decide what their future would hold. 
The Basques after Franco to the Present 
 It took three years after Franco’s death for the Spanish state to reorganize into 
its current democratic form. By 1976 the Basques were divided once again into three 
groups each supporting different political organizations; 1) moderate nationalists who 
wanted to create a new deal for the Basque country within Spain and supported the 
PNV; 2) radical nationalists who saw the new Spanish state as an opportunity to 
create an independent Basque country who supported the ETA and the new political 
party Herri Batasuna and 3) pro-Spanish Basques and non-Basques living in the 
region who supported either the Socialist Party or the conservative Popular Party 
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(PP).161 Each of these groups had a specific agenda when the new Spanish 
constitution was being negotiated in 1978.  
 The Basques were not alone in their demands for a new relationship with 
Spain. The new government while maintaining that Spain was a unitary state accepted 
that there were several historical communities throughout Spain and that each should 
have some rights. This was enshrined in the constitution as the Statutes of Autonomy. 
This period has been described by some as analogous to an open bar, with each 
historical group wanting a different drink, or in this case a set of rights. Some groups 
would only want water, a small number of rights, others wanted coffee and the 
Basques wanted the most: coffee with sugar.162 The Basques successfully negotiated 
to gain back some of the fueros they had lost, the most important of these was the 
creation of a Basque government and its ability to collect taxes. Rather than Madrid 
collecting tax and giving part back to the Basques they would give a percentage of 
their taxes to Madrid. This meant that the Basques were responsible for infrastructure, 
policing and other social services. The radical nationalists felt the statute did not go 
far enough and the ETA never recognized it. The ETA’s main complaint was Article 
155 of the constitution which states that the rights given to the historical regions were 
given to them by the state and could therefore be taken away. These were not the 
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inherent rights of the groups. By agreeing to the statute the ETA and Batasuna 
believed that the PNV was no longer interested in Basque independence and were 
now part of the process they were trying to change. The violence continued through 
the 1980’s and 1990’s only interrupted by occasional cease-fires with the first being 
in the middle of the 1980’s. Inevitably with each cease-fire the ETA would break into 
splinter groups, one of which would resume the terrorist campaign as happened in 
1988 when the peace was broken.163 The violence of the ETA has hindered the PNV 
and other moderate nationalists from achieving political gains with the Spanish 
government. The Spanish people see the ETA as a threat and to negotiate with any 
Basque representative would be seen as supporting the terrorists. As a result support 
amongst Basques of the ETA has consistently fallen since the death of Franco. While 
their support slips, their political influence due to their tactics remains. They continue 
to call for an independent Basque country of all seven provinces and call for the 
return of Basque prisoners who are currently spread out throughout Spain to prevent 
greater organization from prison, to the Basque country to serve out their sentences. 
With the election of the conservative PP party in the 1990’s the relationship between 
the Basques and the Spanish state worsened. The conservative government scaled 
back some of the rights previously given to the regions and did not follow through on 
other promises such as the Basques ability to control workers rights. Returning to the 
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analogy of the open bar, the government policy became coffee for everyone: no one 
was allowed milk.164  
 Despite attempts at reconciliation and the return to an open dialogue the two 
sides grew farther apart with even the Basque moderates moving towards a hardened 
line. The situation came to a head in 2003 when the Spanish parliament decided to 
outlaw the Herri Batasuna party which they claimed is the political wing of the ETA 
and suspended the Basque autonomy agreements. At the time the HB was the fourth 
largest party in the Basque region and had 10% support of the people.165 While this 
was popular throughout Spain, the terrorism continued through the summer and the 
PNV has threatened to hold a referendum on further Basque autonomy. The Basques 
now find themselves in between the ETA and the Spanish state. While the majority of 
people in the region are concerned about terrorism, the majority also believe that the 
Spanish government’s actions will not help the situation. For most Basques there is 
now a realization that due to the high number of non-Basques in the region a 
successful vote for independence is unlikely because even if 50% of the Basques 
would vote for independence, they are only 34% of the population. What is more 
important is the belief that they should have the right to decide. 77% of all people in 
the Basque region believe that this is an inherent right of the region.166 The Spanish 
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government has refused to consider this option, therefore the ETA vows to continue 
its activities, HB despite being banned speaks out and the PNV has begun to look 
back to its roots to decide what to do next.  
The Russians in Estonia and Latvia- Unwelcome Neighbors 
 The Republics of Latvia and Estonia are countries on the periphery of Europe. 
They are not only small geographically (Estonia is a mere 45 200 square kilometers, 
Latvia 64 600)167 but also have a low population base (Latvia in 2000 had a 
population of 2.4 million people while Estonia’s population was only 1.4 million). To 
put their small size in perspective, the country of Latvia is approximately the same 
geographic size as West Virginia. 168 Estonia’s population is comparable to Phoenix, 
Arizona and Latvia’s population is slightly less than Toronto or Havana. After the 
euphoria of achieving independence passed the Estonians and Latvians began to 
realize that with sovereignty came responsibility and one of the responsibilities was to 
decide who would comprise the citizenry of the countries. While the populations of 
the countries were small, the population of ethnic Latvians and Estonians was even 
smaller with both countries having extremely large minority groups residing in their 
territory. The majority of those were either Russian or Russian speakers. The issue of 
the place of the Russian communities in the Estonian and Latvian societies has been 
paramount since independence. In order to understand why the Russian issue has 
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been so contentious it is first necessary to understand the history of the Estonian and 
Latvia people. 
Estonia and Latvia prior to 1991 
 There is evidence of Baltic societies dating back to the 6th Century, although 
most historians believe that the Baltic communities developed 500 years ago.169 The 
capital city of Latvia, Riga, was founded in 1209 and Estonia’s capital Tallinn is older 
still. The Latvian language is related to Lithuanian and other Slavic languages and 
Estonian is part of the Finno-Ugric language group, most closely linked to Finnish 
and Hungarian. Despite this long history neither the Estonians nor the Latvians have 
had much control over their own affairs. As Clemens notes the Baltic ethnic groups 
have historically “lived more as objects- passive victims- than as agents of their own 
destiny.”170 Smith describes Latvia’s history as “[f]rom the early Middle Ages 
onwards, successive invasions, wars and treaties have ensured the division, partition 
and colonization of this small country”.171 As with Corsica and the Basque country, 
Estonia and Latvia are in an important geo-political region. They represent both the 
division between Europe and Russia as well as the historic trade routes of commerce 
between the two. The Baltic Sea has been a main shipping route, while Riga was a 
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cross road for land trade and due to this geographic importance and the groups’ small 
size, they have been unable to prevent being under foreign control. 
 The first of the many invaders to the region were Teutonic knights and monks 
during the 13th century who forced the population to convert to Christianity. The 
knights were soon replaced by German industrialists and merchants and the region 
was under the control of the Germans for the next 300 years. The merchants used the 
region for trade and treated the Latvians and Estonians as serfs. Despite their second-
class treatment the Baltic people benefited from increased educational opportunities, 
which in turn helped preserve their titular languages and cultures. 
 Sweden conquered the majority of what is today Estonia and Latvia in the 
early to mid 16th Century and controlled the region until 1721 when control was 
passed to Russia as part of the Treaty of Nystad, the peace agreement to end the Great 
Northern War. Despite the various conquerors of the region the Estonians and 
Latvians quietly continued to persevere. The University of Tartu was opened in the 
1600’s and the bible was printed in both Estonian and Latvian prior to the transfer of 
the region to the Russians. Under the Russians, the German nobility who had 
controlled the region prior to the arrival of the Swedes were given back much of the 
authority they once had and by the beginning of the 19th Century Russia attempted to 
Russify the Estonians and Latvians. Despite their efforts the Estonians and Latvians 
were influenced by the rise of nationalism that had affected all of Europe at that time, 
and all attempts at assimilation failed. There were increased demands for education in 
the titular languages and in what would be a preview of things to come an increase in 
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the use of folk songs and cultural events to strengthen the resolve of the people and to 
fight against the state.172 
 Nationalist sentiment increased through the turn of the Twentieth Century and 
the demands for greater autonomy or even outright independence were growing 
louder. While the demands grew, the reality was that the small ethnic groups on the 
edge of the Russian empire were too small to break away on their own; they needed 
an opportunity to act when Russia was weak. That opportunity came with the 
combined events of the Russian revolution of 1917 and the First World War. An 
important part of the Eastern front of the war was in the Baltic region, particularly in 
Latvia. The Latvian people took severe casualties in both the military and civilian 
populations and some estimates put the decline in the Latvia population at 33%.173 
The region changed hands throughout the war, eventually falling under German 
control when the armistice was signed in 1918. With the retreat of the German army 
back to Germany at the conclusion of the war and the chaos in Russian society due to 
the revolution of 1917 the region finally saw the opportunity to declare itself 
independent because of the resulting power vacuum. In 1918 Estonia declared itself 
independent and Latvia followed in 1919 and by 1920 they, along with Lithuania, had 
been recognized by the League of Nations as sovereign countries and for the first time 
in their histories they were in control of their own destinies. 
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The Interwar Republics 
 Today the interwar period is looked to as a shining moment in Baltic history 
but in reality as Lieven notes the period was characterized by “great economic 
success, internal political failure, and foreign policy frustration followed by 
catastrophe”.174 It was an economic success in part due to the region’s geographic 
location and history of commerce with the rest of Europe and both Estonia and Latvia 
were also very effective in creating wealth through agriculture. By the beginning of 
the Second World War Estonia’s level of wealth was similar to Finland and Latvia 
was also very competitive. Politically both countries were very unstable but it must be 
acknowledged that politically Estonia and Latvia fared better than their Baltic 
neighbor Lithuania whose democratic government lasted only six years before giving 
way to authoritarianism in 1926-1927. Lieven blames part of the instability of the 
region on the fact the new polities were too democratic.175 The constitutions of the 
Baltic states used a pure ‘Proportional Representation’ electoral system as well as 
universal suffrage. The legislatures were given almost complete control, leaving the 
executive branches powerless to maintain control. In the period between 1919 and 
1934, Estonia had seventeen separate governments and Latvia sixteen. In order to end 
the constant shifts in governments the executives in both countries ended democratic 
elections in 1934. By 1938 Estonia was moving back towards democracy but due to 
the Second World War and the resulting changes in the society it never got the 
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opportunity to complete this transformation. While both countries abandoned 
democracy, the authoritarianism that replaced it was by no means repressive and was 
welcomed by many in the population as a stabilizing measure.  
 What Lieven neglected to discuss in his analysis of the interwar period quoted 
above was the treatment of minorities. The constitutions of 1918 and 1919 while 
specifying the need to protect the Latvian and Estonian people, language and culture, 
were also very open to minorities. Non-Latvians and non-Estonians had the right to 
become citizens, the right to vote and own property. This openness towards minorities 
may have been due to the fact that the actual numbers of minorities were quite small 
and posed no threat to the large majorities in each country. 
 History, geography and timing were not on the Baltic states’ side in the late 
1930’s. With the rise to power of Hitler in Germany and Stalin in the Soviet Union, 
Estonia and Latvia soon found themselves surrounded by angry voracious neighbors 
looking towards expansion. The fate of the Baltic republics was sealed without their 
knowledge by 1939. Despite non-aggression pacts with Germany and the Soviet 
Union these countries themselves had agreed by 1939 on the secret Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact which was to divide Eastern Europe between them.176 According to 
the pact the Baltic States fell under the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. When the 
war began the wheels were put into motion which resulted in 1940 with the three 
Baltic states being annexed by the Soviet Union. The fact that the states were annexed 
and did not join willingly became important once independence was re-established 
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because Estonia and Latvia both argue that their current countries are continuations of 
the interwar republics and not new republics. This distinction deeply impacts the 
Russian minorities now living in these countries and will be discussed later.  
 Immediately after the end of the war the Estonians and Latvians felt the 
oppression of Stalinist Russia. As with the Basques under Franco, the Baltic states 
were targeted by Stalin for repression with many Estonians and Latvians forcibly 
relocated to other parts of the Soviet Union and many were murdered. Ethnic 
Latvians and Estonians in positions of political and social power were removed and 
replaced with people loyal to the Communist Party and from another ethnic group, 
usually Russian. With Stalin’s death the levels of repression subsided in the region 
but the successive regimes used the region as they saw fit. Both the Estonian and 
Latvian Republics became industrial centers and were on the forefront of Soviet 
technology.177 One of these technological advancements provided the Baltic republics 
with their first opportunity to express their displeasure with the Soviet state. The 1996 
nuclear power plant meltdown at Chernobyl in the Ukraine provided the region with a 
suitable issue to organize and protest against. The Chernobyl disaster coincided with 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s loosening of restrictions on the development of small 
organizations. If the Estonians and Latvians had begun protesting on ethnic grounds 
during the 1980’s the movements would have been destroyed quickly. Instead, the 
people began to protest on environmental issues which appeared to pose less of a 
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threat to Soviet stability.178 When these protests were not stopped they then moved to 
what Clemens describes as other “safe issues” on which to challenge the state.179 
These issues included the preservation of national monuments and symbols. The 
Soviet politburo failed to recognize the growing strength of these movements and this 
inaction provided the momentum necessary to move to the next stage in protests: 
demands for greater national rights. The leaders of these nationalistic movements 
were careful to work within the limits Gorbachev placed on Soviet society. They 
capitalized on concepts such a glasnost and perestroika and used the terminology 
against Gorbachev and the Soviet government. As the movements grew they were 
also adamantly non-violent which helped gain international support and kept 
suspicions in Moscow to a minimum.180 The leaders of what was beginning to be 
called the ‘singing revolution’ (due to the use of cultural events such as national song 
competitions to rally support) were so careful in this policy of staying under the 
Soviet radar screen that they arranged to have people assigned to clean up garbage 
anywhere these cultural events and protests were being held to prevent complaints by 
local authorities.181   
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 By 1989 Gorbachev acknowledged the Baltic problem and introduced a 
proposal to alter Soviet federalism in the hopes this would placate the nationalists. 
This indicated to the leaders of the movements that Gorbachev was weak and they 
pushed on with greater confidence. The year cumulated on August 23, the 50th 
anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact when “one to two million 
Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians- one sixth to one-third of the total Baltic 
population- formed a 370-mile human chain from Tallinn through Riga to Vilnius”.182  
By 1990 the Soviet Army began an attempt to suppress the movements, particularly 
in Lithuania. As the world watched, the three small Baltic republics refused to back 
down and on August 20th and 21st Latvia and Estonia declared their independence 
from the Soviet Union. 
The Russians in Estonia and Latvia before, during and after the Soviet Union 
 It first must be acknowledged that the term ‘Russian minority’ is a misnomer 
in the Baltic. Those who have been labeled as such represent a variety of national 
groups. What they share is the use of the Russian language and therefore Russian-
speakers is a more appropriate term. However they are labeled there are two main 
groups of these non-Latvians and non-Estonians: those who came to the region before 
the Second World War, and those who came after its conclusion. Some Russian-
speakers have been established in Estonia since the 17th Century and these Russians 
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(the vast majority are ethnic Russians) are well integrated into society and have 
maintained their culture and traditions despite their length of residency.183 
Those who came after the war arrived for a variety of reasons. For example, 
due to their geographic closeness to the rest of Europe the region was also home to 
many divisions of the Soviet army. The combination of military personnel, the need 
for industrial workers, the relatively higher standard of living in the region compared 
to the rest of the country and mass deportation led to a major change in the 
demographics of the region. Table 4.1 illustrates the changing ratio of Estonians and 
Latvians to Russians over the 20th Century. 
Table 3.1 Ethnic Composition of Estonia and Latvia 1935-1989184 
    Estonia             Latvia 
Year % Estonian % Russian* % Latvian % Russian* 
1935** 87.8 8.2 77.0 8.8 
1959 74.6 20.1 62.0 26.6 
1979 64.7 27.9 53.7 32.8 
1989 61.5 30.3 52.0 34.0 
 
*   Russians or Russian speakers  
** The census data for Estonia is for 1934   
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 When the nationalist movements began many Russian speakers living in the 
region (excluding the military) supported them because they believed that when 
independence came they would automatically become citizens of the new states. The 
Latvian Minister of Social Integration Nils Muižnieks describes what actually 
happened was that they had “the rug pulled out from under them”.185 With 
independence the Estonians and Latvians looked to their past for guidance and they 
found it in the interwar constitutions. The constitution of Estonia for example was 
clear: Estonia was a land for the Estonians and should protect the Estonian culture 
and language. Despite their ideological support for independence, there was to be no 
place in the new Estonia for non-Estonians and it was decided that only those who 
could prove they or their family had been in the region prior to 1940 would be given 
citizenship and the rest were expected to return to Russia. This was the most 
dangerous period of the transition and while independence had been achieved the 
long term stability of the new states was in doubt. The main issue was the presence of 
the Soviet military still stationed in the region because no one was sure how the 
military would react. It took until 1994 for the military issue to be resolved and the 
political chaos to be stabilized.186 In that time many of the Russian speakers did 
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choose to leave the region but a large number also decided to stay. For many the 
Baltic was the only home they knew and Russia was a foreign land far away from 
their friends and careers.  
 There are two distinct time periods in the history of Estonia and Latvia since 
1991. The first is the period immediately after independence which was full of chaos 
and nationalist concerns. Out of this period came the first laws on the requirements 
for citizenship, however, these laws were deemed by many as too restrictive or that 
they presented too difficult barriers for the majority of the non-Estonians or non-
Latvians to pass. This period was marked by some protests by the Russian minority 
but in general it was not organized enough at that point to effectively argue its 
position. This is a problem that continues to plague the Russian community in both 
countries today.187  
Unlike in Corsica and the Basque country where protests were eventually 
followed by violence, with the exception of some small and isolated incidents, none 
occurred in either Estonia or Latvia. The second period started around 1995 when 
there was a realization that the Russian speakers were not going to leave. With 
pressure from the international community, particularly Max van der Stoel, the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s High Commissioner on 
National Minorities, slowly the requirements were eased, and programs were 
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implemented designed to ease this process.188 It was only in 1998 that the Estonian 
government began to look carefully into what would be required for the successful 
integration of the Russian speaking minority. This process has been difficult and has 
faced much adversity. Dr. Aija Priedte, the Director of the National Programme for 
Latvian Language Training notes by way of example, the Latvian government still 
believes that it should only take 60 hours to learn Latvian to be at a proficient level. 
Many in the Russian-speaking population have never tried to learn another language 
and to those who are elderly the idea of learning Latvian in any time period is 
impossible.189 
 By 2003 the political landscape in the two countries had crystallized. For the 
Estonians and Latvians, they are looking to the future and feel that in time the 
Russian speaking community will adapt into the society. With the education of young 
Russian-speakers there will be more who are able to speak the titular language and 
will integrate into society and Estonia believes that by 2007 all of those who want to 
integrate will have done so.190 The Estonian government believes that with the plan in 
place and given the fact that “integration is a psychological need”, the process will 
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now be more simplistic.191 The Latvian government believes that by 2008 the 
integration process could be finished but admits that the majority of the Russian 
speaking population will die out, rather than successfully integrate. In 2002 the 
number of non-citizens in the country decreased by 3000 per month, yet only 12 000 
people actually integrated. The rest either left the country or died. Currently in Latvia 
there are over 498 000 non-citizens left in the country, which is approximately 20% 
of the total population.192  
Many in the Russian speaking minority have a more negative assessment of 
the process. Boris Tsilevich notes that the success of integration in Latvia is not 
owing to the government but in spite of it.193 In Latvia there are two key areas of 
disagreement. The first is a plan to change the education system to encourage the 
teaching of Latvian in Russian schools. The second is that unlike in Estonia, the non-
citizens are not allowed to vote in local elections. Russian activists argue that by not 
having a voice in local government they are ignored and their issues are not 
addressed. Today in Latvia still only 4% of the civil service is comprised of non-
Latvians while in Estonia there are also continuing problems. Russians in Estonia 
were heavily involved in industry and have suffered economically compared to the 
Estonians. Additionally there is the problem of Narva. This is a city on the border 
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with Russia which is 95% non-Estonian. Here and in parts of the capital Tallinn the 
Russians are isolated from Estonian society and do not see the need to learn the 
language. Moreover, by not having to learn the language to use in their daily lives, 
many find practicing Estonian difficult.194 In Narva the culture of the Russians is not 
threatened and the city council operates in Russian and it is still the Estonians who 
are perceived to be the outsiders.195 In the Russian community there is the belief that 
full integration is not possible because even the young who are integrating see the 
effects of non-citizenship on their parents and grand-parents and this breeds 
resentment and will only lead to continued, long term problems.196 Many Estonians 
fear this resentment as well possibly even more than the non-Estonians. 53% of 
Estonians believe that ethnic conflict is a possible or definite threat to security in the 
country. This is compared to only 27% of non-Estonians.197 Currently there are still 
100 000 non-citizens in Estonia198, so clearly there is work remaining before the 
process is complete in either country. With Estonia and Latvia’s entry into the 
European Union and NATO they are closer to their goal of fully rejoining Europe. 
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How they resolve their minority issues will go a long way in determining how they 
are embraced when they get there.   
 103
Chapter 4- Economic Determinants 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2 there has been great interest in the economic factors 
that may lead to conflict between ethnic groups. Many conflicts involving an ethnic 
group and a state can be traced back to some form of economic discrimination such as 
barriers to entry into components of the economy or by giving one ethnic group 
preference over another. The resulting ethnic tension from these conditions may 
increase and at times lead to conflict. Conversely, ethnic tension can be lowered or 
managed if all segments of the society are benefiting economically from the current 
situation. If people have enough money to survive they will be more content. It is 
when their economic well being is threatened that group will begin to look for a 
reason for their economic condition and this is when ethnicity starts to become an 
issue. Leaders of a minority group can mobilize the people quickly around economic 
issues by drawing on the group’s fear of psychical survival. Whether the economic 
situation is due to the actions of the majority is not as important as the belief that it is. 
The cases in this study provide the opportunity to test the actual impact of 
economics in determining the actions of a minority group. The cases are each unique 
in terms of their economic situation compared to the rest of the state. In the Baltic 
states it will be shown that there has been a clear division of labor between the titular 
population and the Russian community. However, where there is competition, the 
Russians are at a disadvantage. The Corsicans were economically neglected 
throughout most of the 20th Century but recently have been the recipients of 
government aid. Finally, the Basques are an example of an economically advantaged 
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community, which has led to competition from non-Basques coming into the region 
in an attempt to capitalize on their good fortune.  
The Basques- Spain’s Economic Engine 
 The Basque region has historically been one of the wealthiest segments of the 
Spanish state. This is less true today but the difference between the Basque region 
and the rest of Spain was particularly noticeable after the industrial revolution in the 
19th Century. The Basque region was one of the first to industrialize in Spain and also 
to begin involvement in international trade at an early stage particularly with Britain. 
The region was a leading producer of coal and steel and was very active in the ship-
building industry.199 With this economic success, however, came the first split in 
Basque society. With economic success comes immigration and in this case the 
immigration did not come from other areas across Europe but from other areas in 
Spain. The first wave of new immigrants came around the turn of the 20th century. 
The influx of outsiders threatened the traditional Basque way of life and in particular, 
the Basque language. As discussed in a previous chapter, the Basque community split 
at this point with the rural Basques becoming more nationalistic and the urban 
industrialists remaining loyal to Spain. Due to their economic success as a people, the 
nationalists gained confidence that they could be a viable entity on their own and 
began to call for more rights within Spain and greater autonomy in their economic 
affairs. With the newcomers came new ideas and issues. Those who were not Basques 
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did not care about issues of autonomy but wanted greater rights for the workers in the 
mines and factories. The result was the Spanish Socialist party got its beginnings in 
Bilbao, the largest and most industrial of the cities in the Basque region.200 While 
those outside of the city viewed the newcomers as a threat, those in the urban centers 
saw them as an opportunity for economic growth and to expand further into the 
Spanish market. Basques became active in banking and soon became dominant 
players in this aspect not of Basque society, but rather Spanish society. With their 
success in the rest of Spain, the industrialists and bankers of the Basque community 
did not concern themselves with issues such as nationalism. Having access to the 
Spanish market was imperative and in order to achieve this access they needed to 
communicate in Spanish and most importantly the Basque region needed to remain a 
part of Spain. As Medhurst notes: “Basque entrepreneurs were linked to nation-wide 
financial or banking concerns which dominated the entire Spanish financial system. 
They therefore had a much closer relationship with the Spanish state and little or no 
stake in the regional cause”.201 This created an interesting cycle: the industrialists and 
entrepreneurs continued to make money and create jobs and many of these jobs were 
taken by people moving into the region. The influx of new immigrants to the region 
increased the concerns of the nationalists who were becoming almost exclusively 
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located in rural areas and as this pattern continued the Basque nationalist movement 
became almost exclusively rural and lacked the assistance of the affluent and business 
elite of Basque society. This ensured that the nationalist movement was to remain a 
grass-roots movement that was very conservative in nature.202   
This trend continued during the Franco period. While the Basques were 
persecuted, the region still continued to industrialize at a greater rate than the rest of 
Spain. In 1967 for example four of the five Basque provinces were ranked in the top 
six Spanish provinces in terms of per capita income.203 Moreover, in terms of 
disposable per capita income (income after taxes available to spend on other goods) 
three provinces, Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya and Alava were ranked first, second and third 
respectively, with Navarre sixth.204 With the exception of the ship-building industry 
(which was more international and did not need protection from the Spanish state, or 
need access to the Spanish market to compete), many industrialists in the Basque 
region worked with Franco in order to maintain their profits. By the end of the 1950’s 
the Basque region experienced its second wave of mass migration and it was at this 
point that the Basques broke into three very distinct groups. The first group was those 
who sided with Franco and remained loyal to Spain. This group lived predominantly 
in the large urban centers. The second group was the middle-class who lived in the 
cities, but also in the smaller towns. This group saw the influx of non-Basques as a 
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threat but continued to support the traditional Basque political movements that aimed 
at ending the repression of the Basques and sought greater autonomy. The final group 
was found mainly in rural areas where unemployment was at is highest. This group of 
mainly young Basques moved away from the traditional conservative Basque political 
platform and embraced a more radical, leftist ideology and broke from the PNV to 
form what would eventually become Henri Batasuna and in its most radical form, the 
ETA.205 
After the death of Franco the Basques were able to negotiate a return of their 
traditional taxation system. This system allowed them to collect tax directly and then 
send a percentage to the Spanish state and due to their economic condition the right to 
collect their own tax meant that they were able to control a large amount of money 
and improve the infrastructure of the region. By the late 1980’s Spain faced a severe 
recession and for the first time the Basque region needed to look to the Spanish state 
for assistance, particularly in the steel industry. The Spanish state introduced 
measures that greatly assisted the steel producers and the Basque region was able to 
pull itself out of the recession more quickly than the rest of Spain.206 After the steel 
crises the Basques have managed to remain an economically advanced region in 
Spain. While it is no longer the case that they alone are the economic engine for the 
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country207, in most economic indicators, the Basque region outpaces the rest of the 
country. This is due to the very high levels of industrialization of the region. The 
Basque statistical agency for 2002 had the Basque Industrial Production Indices 
rating as 124.7. This is compared to Spain in total at 111.4 and the European Union as 
a whole’s score, 108.6.208 While the Basque regions GDP was only 47.4 Billion PPS 
(purchasing power standard) when that is converted to a per capita basis, the Basque 
regions GDP is 22 936 PPS compared to Spain’s 18 583. The Basque per capita GDP 
was also higher than that of the United Kingdom (22 678), Belgium (22 603) and 
Portugal (15 372).209 The Basque region and the province of Navarre specifically 
have much lower rates of unemployment compared with the rest of Spain, particularly 
the more agricultural regions in the south. It appears as well that the Basque region 
has integrated more fully into the European Union economically, to the point that it is 
highly dependent on trade with the EU in order to sustain itself. This is due to the 
Basque reliance on the industrial sector which accounts for almost half of all jobs in 
the region.210 
 One unusual aspect of Basque society currently is that despite the negative 
role migration has had on the region culturally in the past, today the majority of the 
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Basques are more open than other areas of the country to non-Spanish immigrants. 
The Basques have embraced many of the ideals of the European Union regarding the 
mobility of people. This may be in part due to their long history of dealing with 
foreigners dating back to the first industrial revolution. Many Basques have lived in 
other areas of Spain, particularly the large urban centers of Madrid and Barcelona 
(due to the Basques influence on the Spanish monetary and industrial sectors) and 
appear to accept now that they are unable to keep outsiders away. When asked to 
agree or disagree with the statement “It is a good thing for any society to be made up 
of people from different races, religions and cultures?” 76% of respondents in the 
Basque region agreed, and only 12% disagreed. The same results occurred when only 
ethnic Basques were asked the question.211 When these same people were asked if 
they found “the presence of people of another nationality disturbing in your daily 
life?” only 4% responded that they agreed with this statement, while 94% 
disagreed.212 Finally when asked if an increase of minorities increases unemployment 
in the region only 41% agreed while 46% disagreed. This is a much lower response in 
favor compared to other EU countries such as Greece (85% agreed), Belgium (64% 
agreed), Germany (61% agreed) and the EU as a whole (51% agreed).213 In some 
respects globalization has put the Basques and the Spanish state on an equal playing 
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field. With globalization comes the threat to the Basque culture and economy and to 
the Spanish culture and economy as well.214 Many Basque nationalists feel as long as 
the threat of cultural assimilation is the same for both groups then the situation is 
more palatable.  
Corsica- Economically Neglected 
 While it is clear that the Basque region has been a strong component in the 
Spanish economy, historically the same cannot be said of Corsica in its relationship 
with France. While the French government tries to proclaim the island an economic 
success story, the European Union has declared it an economically disadvantaged 
region. While the Basques outpace the rest of Spain in terms of GDP, Corsica not 
only lags behind the rest of France, it has one of the lowest GDP’s in the entire 
European Union. Corsica’s GDP per capita is only 78% of the European Union’s 
average.215 Of the 196 regions within the European Union, Corsica ranked 143rd 
based on per capita income.216 One obvious problem with the Corsican economy is 
where the majority of the jobs are for the island. While the Basques are heavily reliant 
on the better paying industrial sector, Corsica has a very small industrial base.217 Only 
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21.8% of the Corsican workforce is in this sector, compared to 75.5% of the 
workforce who are in the low paying service industry.218 This is due mainly to the 
reality of geography because the Basques have been blessed with living in a region 
flush with natural resources, the Corsicans have not. They have had to build their 
economy around what they have in most abundance, beautiful scenery. The island is 
reliant on the tourism industry, and that is an industry where the majority of the 
workforce must settle for lower paying jobs. As a result the Corsicans economic 
situation can be described as “dependency on the outside world, low quality 
employment as well as high levels of unemployment”.219 As of 1998, 95% of all 
Corsican companies employed less than 10 employees and out of a workforce of 
approximately 100 000 (out of a total population of 250 000), 15 000 were 
unemployed and an additional 30 000 were employed in precariously low paying or 
temporary jobs.220 While the Corsicans cannot change their geography, they have also 
been the victims of poor economic planning by the French state as well as by the 
influx of non-Corsicans, all of which has fueled the conflict between nationalists and 
the French state. 
 Ramsay contends that while the Corsicans have always been an economically 
depressed region compared to the rest of France, it was not until the 1960’s that they 
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began to realize exactly how much of a discrepancy existed. As he said: “[w]hen 
‘exiles’ returned on holiday from the continent it was obvious to the resident 
Corsicans that they were enjoying a higher standard of living than that obtainable on 
the island”.221 The island, as discussed in a previous chapter was greatly affected by 
the end of the colonial era after World War II. This took away the employment of 
many Corsicans, who had to return to the island to look for work and while the 
unemployment rate was always slightly higher on the island compared to mainland 
France, this did not accurate reflect the situation. Many Corsicans, faced with the lack 
of suitable employment simply left for the mainland. Some Corsicans claim that 
despite a birth rate in line with European averages, Corsica was the only 
Mediterranean island to actual have a decrease in population in the last half of the 
Twentieth Century.222  
The emigration of the ethnic Corsicans corresponded with the arrival of the 
pied noirs from Algeria. The arrival of the pied noirs on the island had the same result 
as the arrival of new migrants to the Basque region during the 1890’s and 1950’s. As 
discussed previously, the arrival of a large number on non-Corsicans to the island 
threw the ethnic balance of the society askew. The Corsicans saw the pied noirs not 
only as an economic threat, but also a threat to their culture and language. Many of 
the Corsican nationalists used the arrival of the pied noirs as a rallying point around 
which to mobilize. While the social impact of the pied noirs was immediate, it took 
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some time before the true impact on the Corsican economy was to be realized. The 
French government repatriated the Algerian settlers in Corsica due to the similarity in 
climate between Algeria and the island. The government encouraged them to 
purchase land and to continue the farming they had been involved in while they were 
in North Africa. Many Corsican farmers and land owners were initially happy to sell 
their land to the new settlers, as the increased demand for land caused prices to climb 
from 600-800 francs per hectare in 1958 to 8 000- 10 000 francs per hectare six years 
later.223 Their enthusiasm for selling their land quickly evaporated when it became 
clear that the pied noirs were coming in greater and greater numbers, and that they 
were quickly buying up all of the usable land on the island and by the end of the 
1960’s the majority of usable land for farming was in the hands of the pied noirs and 
the ethnic Corsicans had to either work on the farms for the settlers, or they needed to 
find a different occupation.224  
 Finding a different occupation was difficult as there were very limited options 
available in terms of opportunities. As Ramsay notes the “secondary sector was 
virtually non-existent and formerly successful industries, such as forestry products 
were seriously in decline. Even in tourism, for which Corsica was climatically and 
scenically well equipped, the island was poorly provided for by way of 
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accommodation, personnel training and the necessary finances”.225 The tourism 
industry will be returned to in a moment. 
 The first effort by the French state to try to improve the economic condition of 
the island was in 1957 with the creation of the semi-governmental institution known 
as SOMIVAC. This organization was initially tasked with improving the 
infrastructure of the agricultural industry in Corsica but unfortunately, the creation of 
SOMIVAC corresponded with the arrival of the pied noirs and its work became more 
closely associated with accommodating the new settlers’ needs than the native 
Corsicans. During the early 1960’s the French Ministry of the Interior set up DATAR 
(Délégation à l’Aménagement du Territoire et à l’Action Régionale) which was 
tasked with trying to improve the economy of various regions in France, particularly 
through an increase in industrial capabilities.226 
 Demands for greater control over the island’s economic policies continued 
through the 1970’s as the economic condition of Corsica became linked with the 
survival of the Corsican identity. The argument of the nationalists was simple: if the 
economy remains poor, more Corsicans will be forced to leave the island and 
eventually there will not be enough Corsicans left on Corsica to protect the language 
and culture of the group. The French state tried to alleviate some of these concerns 
with the Special statute of 1982. A key economic concession given to the island was 
the transferring of control of the tourism industry over to the Corsican themselves.227 
                                                
225  Ramsay (1983), p.42. 
226  Ibid, p.45. 
 
 115
As the main source of income to the island it was believed that without control over 
this sector of the economy no other economic concessions would matter. Even with 
this provision the island as a whole continued to struggle. As Kofman notes of 
previous improvements to the tourism industry: “the land of opportunity was not to be 
the whole island, for only the coast offered the stimulus of rapid growth and large 
profits”.228 The 1982 statute also created a consultative committee on economic 
development which gave the Corsican assembly (which had no formal powers) the 
right to consult the French government on all matters that concerned the island. These 
powers were enhanced with the 1991 statute that gave the assembly more control over 
the economy, allowing for medium-term economic objectives to be determined by the 
assembly.229 
 While the amount of influence the Corsicans have had over their own 
economic development has increased since the 1960’s the island today remains 
dependent on France for government subsidies for its long term survival. This has had 
two long term effects on the Corsican conflict. The first is that it has created some 
resentment and a lack of understanding among the rest of the French population of the 
Corsican cause. For the rest of the country, they see their tax dollars being spent on 
people who appear to them to be actively trying to break away from the mainland and 
this has made any French government attempts at providing more rights to Corsica 
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difficult for the French public to accept.230 The other affect has been that as money 
became available to the island through subsidies and improvements in the tourism 
sector, nationalists who were committed to violence have joined with criminals to 
gain access to that money. By working with organized crime, the nationalists have 
lost credibility with both the French and Corsican people and have made it difficult to 
make a distinction between political violence, and mob-related violence.231    
 Clearly the attempts to improve the Corsican economy through state 
intervention have failed. Since the arrival of the pied noirs, the French state has been 
fighting a losing battle to try to convince the Corsican people that it is interested in 
trying to improve the island’s economy and is not interested in assimilating the 
Corsicans fully into French society. These tactics were “a source of extreme tension 
within the island community”232 and have simply not worked. The Corsican 
nationalists have used the failure of these economic strategies as an argument for 
greater control over their own affairs and they have been successful in arguing that 
only they can properly implement an economic policy. They have failed to 
demonstrate, however, that their economic strategies are any more effective than what 
has been used before. Corsica must face the reality that there is not much usable land 
for farming (and most of that is in the hands of non-Corsicans), there is little industry 
and the EU cannot help them. They must use what they have been dealt and that 
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requires the expansion of the tourism industry. Many of the concerns of regionalists 
and nationalists today involve the rights of the Corsican Assembly to have control 
over environmental issues. It is argued that the tourism industry is dependent on the 
protection of the environment. Therefore environmental issues are in reality economic 
issues.233 The economic state of the island is a leading cause of the nationalist 
movement and the threats from outsiders economically have been framed as threats to 
Corsican culture. It appears that the future of the conflict will also center around the 
protection of the only viable source of economic prosperity and until the economy is 
fully equal to that of France it seems that the nationalists will continue to call for 
greater autonomy. As long as violence continues on the island and organized crime 
has a powerful influence, the economy will not improve.234 This cycle needs to be 
broken or else Corsica will remain a disadvantaged region of Europe. 
The Russians in Estonia and Latvia- Life with the Baltic Tigers 
 Of all of the post-Soviet societies, the Baltic states are by far the most 
economically successful. This is due partly to their proximity and historical ties with 
the rest of Europe but they have also managed to quickly adapt to the western style of 
doing business. Their success has been so pronounced (more so in Estonia than either 
Latvia or Lithuania) that they have been dubbed by some as Baltic tigers, a 
comparison with the Asian tigers of South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Singapore.235 
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Estonia and Latvia present a very different economic situation in comparison to both 
Corsica and the Basque region. First, while Basques and Corsicans have had to deal 
with outsiders coming to them and disrupting their economic development, in Estonia 
and Latvia it was the Russians who came looking for a better economic future. 
Secondly and more importantly, despite continuing economic inequities the Russian 
community has not rallied around this issue in either country and the main reason for 
this is that the Russians in Latvia and Estonia are not now, nor were they ever 
historically in direct competition with the titular communities economically. They 
have been employed in different sectors of the economy and therefore have not seen 
how the other half lives. 
 Many of the Russians who came to the Baltic region immediately after the 
annexation of Estonia and Latvia were sent there by the Soviet government. They 
were sent for two reasons, the first being to try to dilute the ethnic majorities of the 
new republics and second, they were sent to fill very specific segments of the 
workforce. In Estonia for example many Russian specialists were sent to work in the 
electrical plants. These plants were supplying energy to other areas of the Soviet 
Union, and it was therefore necessary to ensure that the plants work at top efficiency. 
This was accomplished by bringing skilled workers from elsewhere to operate the 
plants236 with some entire towns, such as Sillamae being closed entirely to the 
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Estonian population with all of the labor brought in from elsewhere around the Soviet 
Union.237 Historically, the Estonians and Latvians had been involved in farming and 
light industry, such as clothes manufacturing. With restructuring under the Soviet 
command economy, part of the emphasis shifted towards the heavy industry sector 
where the Russian immigrants found employment. During the Soviet period Russians 
and Russian speaking migrants were the main ethnic group employed in the machine-
building, mining, textile and chemical producing sector.238 This created a condition 
that some have referred to as ‘internal colonialism’ where the labor market became 
segregated. As Mettan and Williams state: “the crystallization of ethnic identities is 
considered in the context of the structure of labour markets in a multiethnic context 
and the emergence of localized cultural division of labour”.239 What is interesting is 
exactly how specific the migration into Estonia and Latvia during the Soviet period 
was. The migrants moved almost exclusively into the cities and took up work in 
industry whereas very few migrants moved to the region to take up agriculture. In 
1934 only 8.5% of the rural inhabitants of Estonia were of Russian descent and 7.6% 
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of the urban population was Russian. In 1989 the urban level had risen to 39% but the 
rural level remained at 8.5%.240 
This cultural division of labor has remained today. There are still some 
segments of the workforce where ethnic Estonians or Latvians are practically shut 
out, and vice versa. Another way to examine the cultural division of labor is to look at 
what languages are needed where the titular and non-titular populations work. In 
Estonia 98% of Estonians work in a place that requires Estonian. Only 61% of 
Russians’ workplaces require Estonian. 55% of Estonian workplaces require Russian, 
compared to 86% of workplaces where Russians are employed.241  In Latvia the 
numbers are even more striking. Only 13% of Russians work in an environment that 
requires only Latvian, and only 34% of the workplaces of Russians use both Russian 
and Latvian. Almost half of the Russians in Latvia, 48%, work in an environment that 
uses Russian exclusively. 73% of the Latvians work in a Latvian-only environment, 
with only 18% working in an environment that uses both Latvian and Russian.242 It is 
interesting to note that Latvia differs somewhat from Estonia in this regard in that the 
Russian community has been more effective since independence in gaining access to 
higher income positions in the business world as opposed to their counter-parts in 
Estonia. In Latvia, many Russian businessmen have used their connections within 
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Russia to establish highly successful companies and have become (or at least the 
perception in Latvia is that they have become) the nouveux riche.243 While in Latvia a 
small segment of Russians have gained access to the upper strata of the economic 
ladder the majority are employed in lower paying jobs such as unskilled laborers. 
Russians also have consistently had a higher level of unemployment in Latvia 
compared to ethnic Latvians. In 1996 for example 26% of Russians were unemployed 
compared with 14% of the ethnic Latvians.244 In Estonia, Russians also have a higher 
unemployment rate and more telling, the average Russian who is unemployed has a 
higher level of education compared to the average Estonian.245 Even those Russians 
who gain employment in traditional non-Russian industries now find that in most 
cases they will not earn the same level of income as their Estonian or Latvian 
counterparts. Table 5.1 illustrates the differences in mean income between Estonians 
and non-Estonians in a variety of segments of the economy. Due to the low number of 
non-Estonians who have citizenship and are thus excluded from professions such as 
police officer or border guard, the average income for non-Estonians in that field is 
not reported. Clearly even in areas where the Russians predominate, in most cases 
they are not paid equally to non-Estonians. Only in agriculture, where the low 
numbers of Russians employed throws off the sample, and also education, where 
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there is demand for teachers capable of teaching the Russian population in both 





Table 4.1 Average Monthly Net Income by Sector in Estonia (in EEK)246 
Sector Estonians Non-Estonians 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing 3053 3533 
Industry 3767 3508 
Energy, Gas and Water 3954 2923 
Construction 5323 4027 
Transport, Communication 4128 3892 
Banking, Insurance, Real 
Estate 5072 2750 
Retail and Services 4141 3387 
Education and R&D 3305 3296 
Public Administration 4334 3005 
 
 Despite these obvious discrepancies, most Estonian and Latvian politicians do 
not feel that economics is an important issue for integration and ethnic stability. The 
Latvian Minister for Social Integration Nils Muižnieks believes that the fragmentation 
of the Russian’s economically makes it difficult for the Russian community to use 
this as an issue to rally around. Some of the Russians have done very well as 
discussed above and this makes it hard for them to sympathize with their less 
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fortunate Russian brethren.247 The former Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs (and 
also mentioned by Muižnieks) notes that immediately after independence, when many 
of the policies were being introduced that impacted negatively on the Russians 
economically, in fact the economic situation in Russia was much worse than in the 
Baltics. As a result many Russians decided that it was in their best interests to accept 
an imperfect situation in Estonia and Latvia rather than to leave for Russia where they 
would be even more disadvantaged.248 Illze Brand Kehris goes farther and argues that 
those Russians living near the Latvian-Russian border see first hand how the Russian 
economy has struggled and therefore are more pro-Latvian than others who live 
farther away in the capital, Riga.249 In Estonia, Muižnieks’ counterpart Paul-Eerik 
Rummo believes that while there are economic issues, these revolve more around the 
industries the Russians have been historically employed in, particularly in the Russian 
dominated city of Narva. For him, the integration of the Russians include the 
modernization of industry, which will increase their productivity and improve the 
economic condition of the Russians employed in them.250 Some in Estonia believe, 
like Kehris in Latvia that most Russians have relatives living in Russia and therefore 
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know how much better off they are in Estonia compared with Russia and therefore 
they do not complain.251 However, others disagree. Mati Luik of the Non-Estonian 
Integration Foundation believes that due to the large number of Russians around the 
world and the fact that most do not have direct attachment with Russia, the Russian 
community could leave Estonia and go elsewhere and this will be easier still once 
Estonia joins the EU. Estonia is not a large country and requires the Russians to stay 
in order to keep their workforce at an acceptable level and therefore, the Estonian 
government needs to improve the economic condition of the Russian population for 
the sake of the country’s economy.252 
 Many of the leaders of the Russian community in both Latvia and Estonia 
share Luik’s belief. For them, the main issue is not the present economic 
discrepancies, but the future ones. In Latvia for example, Boris Tsilevich contends 
that with changes to the education system the Russian community will fall further 
behind and will be eliminated from economic opportunities due to lack of 
qualifications.253 Tsilevich believes that if this trend continues, large number of 
young Russians will take their education elsewhere (in or out of the European Union) 
and move to where their skills will be appreciated.254 In Estonia, this problem has 
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already been identified by the government which wrote in an integration report that 
“non-Estonians seem to be distressed not so much by salaries than limited choices 
which are contingent on their place of residence . . . as well as persisting variance 
between the requirements of the local labour market and the professional capacities of 
non-Estonian employees”.255 Vadim Poleshchuk of the Russian advocacy group the 
Legal Information Centre for Human Rights believes that if this is occurring now, 
when the Russians and Estonians have approximately equal education levels, there 
could be the potential for conflict if the Estonian government’s integration attempts 
fail, and more Russians fall behind.256  
 The long term impact of the integration policies of both Estonia and Latvia on 
the economic condition of their Russian speaking communities is unknown. What is 
certain is that without the Russian population, neither country has a workforce 
capable of maintaining economic growth or continuing the development of the ‘Baltic 
Tigers’. Poleshchuk believes that the Russian community is aware of this and will 
eventually use their “demographic strength” to force changes in Estonian society.257 
A more interesting question is why they have not used this strength already? Clearly 
in Estonian and Latvia, economics have not played an important role in mobilizing 
the Russian communities. Two possible reasons why have been addressed above. The 
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first is the division of labor in the Baltic states with the Russian community simply 
not working in the same businesses and sectors as the titular societies and as a result, 
some of the discrepancies in income go unnoticed. Second, if a discrepancy in income 
was observed, it was less of a concern in the early years after independence since the 
economic situation in the Baltic states was far superior to that of Russia. Most 
Russians in Latvia and Estonia did the calculus and saw that no matter what their 
economic situation was in comparison to those around them, it was better than the 
alternative of leaving for Russia. By the time it was clear that the Russian community 
would have the option of leaving for other areas outside of Russia (particularly the 
EU) most had made the decision that they would stay in the region.  
Conclusion 
 In a previous chapter the work of Susan Olzak was discussed. In review, Olzak 
contends that direct economic competition between ethnic groups is a main factor in 
ethnic competition and eventually conflict.258 The cases discussed here seem to 
validate Olzak’s conclusion only to a point. In the Basque country the nationalist 
movements became more organized and eventually violent after the introduction of 
migrants to the region. These migrants were in direct competition with the Basques 
for land, jobs and wealth. However, the cities where this competition was most acute 
were never the breeding ground for the nationalist movement, instead socialism grew 
in the cities, while the nationalist movement gained strength in the countryside. In 
Corsica the nationalist movement also developed after the introduction of the pied 
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noirs and it is here Olzak’s theory has the most support. Like the Basques the 
nationalist movement was centered outside of the cities but this was due to the fact 
that the non-Corsicans were mainly in the cities and the Corsicans have been forced 
into the center of the island where their economic prospects are not as great. In 
Estonia and Latvia, due to the ethnic division of labor, the two groups were never in 
direct competition and this may explain the lack of violence in that region. The 
Estonians and Latvians have tended to work in some industries and not others and the 
same is true for the Russians. This is taken to the extreme in some cases where the 
Russians work in industries where they do not need to even learn Estonian or Latvian. 
As more and more Russians gain citizenship and become proficient in the titular 
language it will be interesting to see if direct competition for jobs changes the levels 
of conflict.  
 The other main economic theory to consider is Gurr’s theory of relative 
deprivation. As discussed this theory contends that when a group’s economic 
condition changes in relation to another, conflict can occur.259 In the cases of Estonia 
and Latvia, this theory may explain why the Russians remained complacent during 
the early 1990’s. It may be that they perceived their economic situation as improving 
while those Russians still in Russia saw their situation declining. What the theory 
cannot explain is why the Russians have not become more militant since that point 
when their economic condition has remained about the same, yet the Estonians and 
Latvians are becoming more prosperous? The theory cannot explain the Basque 
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country in that it has been and remains an economically advanced region in Spain. In 
Corsica it can be used to explain the violence after World Ward II when it became 
clear that the rest of France began to grow economically and Corsica fell behind. 
However, the theory cannot explain why the violence has not stopped. The economic 
discrepancies between France and Corsica, and the Corsicans and non-Corsicans on 
the island have not changed for many years and the discrepancy has become the status 
quo and therefore should not warrant militant activity. 
 Clearly the economic situation in each of these regions plays an important role 
in inter-ethnic relations. However, economics alone does not appear to be enough to 
explain the minority groups’ activities. The Basques still are very economically 
successful, yet violence and conflict remain. The Corsicans have been an 
economically poor region for over 50 years and the French government has tried to 
encourage the economy of the island through subsidies and autonomy, yet again 
violence continues. In Estonia and Latvia, while the Russians are not in direct 
competition with the titular communities, they are better off there compared to Russia 
and they are aware of discrepancies in income.260 They also are aware of their higher 
levels of unemployment and they are concerned that changes in education and 
training will make these discrepancies even greater. Despite all of this, they remain 
peaceful. It appears therefore that with the possible exception of the genesis of the 
Corsican movement, it is less useful to use economics as an explanation of each 
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group’s decision-making. For these cases economics appears to be a sufficient but not 
necessary condition in predicting the groups’ behavior.   
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Chapter 5- The Role of the International Community 
 
 Can international organizations and foreign states have an impact on a 
minority group’s decisions? The international community attempts to influence both 
minority groups and states all of the time with in obvious way: these organizations 
exert influence is in deciding who receives assistance and who does not. Those 
groups or countries that most closely conform to the guidelines set out by various 
funding agencies will be those who receive aid. The International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank both employ this method of determining aid. Where money, aid and 
support from the United States is sent is also determined partially by the willingness 
of states to embrace democratic ideals. Motivating a group to act based on economic 
incentives has historically worked in regions such as post-war Europe, Africa and 
South-East Asia. The cases being examined would not be affected in the same way. 
Neither the Corsicans nor the French government requires the aid of these 
organizations. The same is also true for the Basques and the Spanish state. The Baltic 
states, as will be seen to follow, are somewhat influenced economically but their 
motivations are for future economic prosperity and not the need for the immediate 
assistance that comes from the IMF or World Bank.  
 In examining the cases it is clear that the international community can have a 
great impact on minority group/state relations. It can do so in two ways, it can act or 
it can choose not to act. Each is equally effective in motivating a minority group to 
make decisions relating to the use of violence or its willingness to work peacefully 
within the political system. 
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 Of the cases examined, the Baltic states provide the most clear cut illustrations 
of the importance of the international community. In their case the international 
community has been actively involved in their affairs since 1991261 and this 
involvement has led both the Russian speaking minority and the states themselves to 
alter their behavior and modify their strategies. 
Estonia and Latvia- International Attention Overload 
Post-1991 Russia and the OSCE 
 Due to their geographic proximity to the rest Europe and the precarious 
position they found themselves in relation to Russia, the international community was 
quick to embrace the new Baltic states after 1991. The first international organization 
involved in the Baltic States was the Conference on the Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, the CSCE (later the Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
the OSCE). The CSCE first arrived in 1993. Their presence came in two forms, the 
first were permanent missions in Latvia and Estonia, and the second were the visits 
by the High Commissioner on National Minorities. 
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 The High Commissioner position was established in 1993 with Dutch 
diplomat Max Van der Stoel taking the position. After agreeing to the position Van 
der Stoel found that the position’s mandate was extremely vague as to how he was to 
decrease ethnic tensions within CSCE countries to prevent future conflict. His exact 
mandate resulting from the 1992 CSCE Helsinki Summit was: 
  The High Commissioner will provide ‘early warning’ 
  and, as appropriate ‘early action’ at the earliest possible 
  stage in regard to tensions involving national minority 
  issues, which have not yet developed beyond an early 
  warning stage, but, in the judgment of the High  
Commissioner, have the potential to develop into conflict 
within the CSCE area, affecting peace, stability or 
relations between participating states.262 
    
 
The only limitation on the position was that he could not travel to areas where there 
were active campaigns of terrorism. He decided that the places where the mandate 
allowed him to go and that he could make the greatest impact at that time were 
Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Hungary.263 In Estonia and Latvia the areas he was 
most active in addressing were citizenship and language laws. As Bernier notes: “The 
High Commissioner made it clear, from the beginning of his involvement, that the 
path taken by both countries to secure the ‘privileged position’ of the core group over 
minorities not only ran against international norms, but also disrupted internal social 
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cohesion”.264 It was this danger of a disruption of social cohesion that led Van der 
Stoel to Estonia and while there was no actual violence, the situation was critical. He 
felt that two things needed to be done immediately: “calm the Russians down, and 
change the laws” on language and citizenship requirements.265 His first trip as High 
Commissioner was to the Baltic states in January of 1993 and when he returned he 
produced a list of recommendations to decrease the level of ethnic tension in Estonia 
and Latvia (as discussed earlier Lithuania did not have many of the problems found in 
the other two Baltic States). In Estonia the central recommendation was “for the 
Estonian Government to show a clear intention to reduce the number of stateless 
persons through naturalization”.266  
 The initial response to Van der Stoel’s recommendations was not positive. 
Despite being well received in both countries, neither implemented any of the 
proposed changes. In June of 1993 the Estonian parliament passed the Law on Aliens 
which solidified the long term Russian residents of the country as non-citizens and 
the response in the Russian dominated North-East was a call for a general strike and 
later to call for greater autonomy. Van der Stoel returned to Estonia and was able to 
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persuade the parliament to add amendments to the legislation which placated the 
Russian population.267 In order to reach this agreement the High Commissioner took 
the highly unusual step (and went against his own mandate which was designed for 
‘quiet diplomacy’) of making a public statement. This statement told of an agreement 
he had reached with the Russian leaders in Narva that they would respect the ruling of 
the Estonian High Court on their rights on autonomy and with this agreement public, 
the Estonian government was willing to make their own concessions.268  
In Latvia, while Van der Stoel was welcomed by the Russian minority, but 
there was less enthusiasm for him within the early Latvian governments.269 Van der 
Stoel was often ridiculed in the Latvian press and in an unfortunate coincidence the 
Latvian word for chair is very similar to Stoel and many political cartoons and 
editorials centered on the theme of “we don’t need any more chairs in Latvia”.270 
Eventually the Latvian government became more accepting of his visits and less 
skeptical of his intentions. 
 Fueled by his success in encouraging amendments to the Law on Aliens in 
Estonia and the continuing threat to peace and stability in the region, Van der Stoel 
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made repeated trips to the two countries over the next few years. Over time the 
novelty of international attention began to wear off and the reality set in that there 
was still a great deal of work to be done. At this point the relationship between the 
states and the High Commissioner changed and Van der Stoel was put in the awkward 
position of being disliked and considered untrustworthy by both the majority and 
minority groups. The Estonians and Latvians saw him as an “agent of Moscow” and 
to the Russians he was not effective in bringing about the necessary changes quickly 
enough.271 It is possible that the High Commissioner’s effectiveness was in part due 
to this lack of support by both sides. While both sides claimed he was working for the 
other, they did have a common bond in their opinion of the High Commissioner. The 
High Commissioner needed to reassure the Russian community that he was listening 
to their concerns and would bring violations of their rights to the attention of the 
government but he also needed to constantly remind both the Russians and the 
Latvians and Estonians that his position was the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, not for National Minorities. This meant that he was not an ombudsman for 
all of the Russians’ concerns and that he was interested in compromises and 
agreements.   
 As mentioned, in addition to the Office of the High Commissioner, the CSCE 
also had permanent missions on the ground in both countries. While the visits of Van 
der Stoel were high level meetings with the leaders of the two countries, the missions 
provided the day-to-day interactions with the rest of the population. While the 
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Estonian and Latvian people did not see a difference in the mandates of the High 
Commissioner and the missions there were important differences.272 The missions did 
not have to be involved in quiet diplomacy because they were dealing with both large 
and small issues and were there to report back to the CSCE Secretariat on the 
situation.273 As Former Deputy Head of Mission in Estonia, Sabine Machl, notes the 
missions played more of an ombudsmen role, where they tried to listen to complaints 
from all groups. The High Commissioner was more effective in pinpointing specific 
problems and providing recommendations at the government level.274 The different 
mandates between the two CSCE bodies at times caused confusion and may have 
periodically limited the effectiveness of both, however, in general the High 
Commissioner was able to use the missions as a neutral third- party in the country 
that understood what each side wanted and were able to assist the High 
Commissioner when he made his higher profile visits.275 The other main function of 
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the permanent missions was to provide a reminder to the Estonian and Latvian people 
that the issues facing their countries were important and that the world would be 
watching. As then Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt noted in 1993: “The presence of 
CSCE officials makes it clear to the governments in Tallinn and Riga that these are 
issues that are taken seriously by the international community and reassures those in 
Russia who have a legitimate concern for the rights of their fellow countrymen 
abroad”.276 While the missions served as a reminder to the Russians that their 
concerns for their diaspora were important they also served another psychological 
function because the missions acted as security blanket for the Estonians and Latvians 
against Russia. Latvia and Estonia believed that with an international presence such 
as the OSCE on the ground, Russia would be unable or unwilling to act militarily 
against them.277 
 It was the influence of Russia that was of great concern to the OSCE and the 
Estonians and Latvians themselves in the early years of the High Commissioner’s 
work. Early on Russia was active in its criticism of the laws enacted against Russian-
speakers and this was of great concern since there were former Soviet, now Russian, 
troops still in the region until 1994. The Estonian Law on Aliens was particularly 
criticized by both Russian nationalists and the Russian government. Any complaint 
made by the Russia needed to be addressed in some arena due to its strong military 
presence but this concern never materialized into a direct threat because “Russian 
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support for its diaspora was strictly confined to diplomatic and economic pressure”.278 
Russia used organizations such as the OSCE as a vehicle to express its outrage at 
Estonian and Latvian policies. Russia also used economic boycotts as a way to punish 
these states but it never resorted to or threatened the use of violence.  
Vadim Poleshchuk notes that the work of the High Commissioner can be 
broken down into four phases, with the first of these phases ending on August 31 
1994, when the last Russian troops left the region.279 After this departure, while the 
views and opinions of the Russian government remained important, the immediate 
concern for conflict was removed. After the troops left, for the most part Russia has 
not interfered in the affairs of neither Estonia nor Latvia. As of today the influence of 
the Russian government has declined so much that any statements made in regard to 
the treatment of Russian speakers in Estonia and Latvia is usually made for the 
benefit of the Russian electorate and appears not to be directed to the Russian 
speakers in the Baltic themselves.280 While the audience for the message may have 
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changed, the Russia does continue to speak out on the treatment of Russians in 
Estonia and Latvia.281  
 The second period of influence by the High Commissioner was between 1994 
and 1997.282 During the majority of this time the OSCE was still the only large 
international organization with a presence in the region. In 1996 the Council of 
Europe opened its permanent missions but until that point all international influence 
came from the OSCE permanent missions and the visits of the High Commissioner. 
In 1994 the High Commissioner was very active in the region visiting both Estonia 
and Latvia several times and his main issue of concern continued to be the citizenship 
laws which were still very restrictive. Those who had been denied citizenship still 
needed to wait a lengthy period and then had to pass a difficult language proficiency 
test. During this time the rights of children born in the two countries to non-citizens 
were also pressed.283 At this point the countries were still less than five years 
removed from the Soviet Union and still required assistance. The High 
Commissioner, with the help of the permanent missions was therefore very successful 
in influencing the wording of legislation that was passed into law and in many cases 
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the missions and High Commissioner’s staff were active in actually writing the 
legislation that was being discussed passed in the legislature.284 During this time the 
attention of the High Commissioner moved somewhat away from Estonia and more 
towards Latvia. Early in the mandate it was the Estonian government that was more 
active in passing legislation that angered the Russians (as seen with the Law on 
Aliens).285 After those initial fires were extinguished it became clear that the potential 
for conflict was in Latvia where very little progress on the citizenship laws was taking 
place. The Russians in Latvia were not organized politically until 1996 and therefore 
the government did not have to address many of their issues. In this vacuum the High 
Commissioner was left to fight the Russians’ battles for them.286 If not for the vast 
amount of energy and political capital expended by the OSCE staff many of the early 
changes to the citizenship and language laws would not have occurred.  
 By the end of this second phase the difficult negotiations on small technical 
issues had caused both the Estonian and Latvian governments to suffer what Kemp 
called ‘Van der Stoel fatigue’ and in Estonia the government “argued that as soon as 
one issue was addressed, another one was raised and that Estonia was being singled 
out for ‘violations’ that were significantly worse in other countries”.287 The High 
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Commissioner’s mandate only allowed him to make recommendations; he did not 
have any influence to make a country do something it did not want to do and the 
result was that by 1997 the governments of Estonia and Latvia began to tune Van der 
Stoel out. He needed to find another way to increase his influence and he found it in 
the form of another international organization, the European Union. 
The EU and the Baltic States 
  By the middle to late 1990’s the Baltic states were at a point in their 
development when they 1) believed that they did not need the assistance of the OSCE 
High Commission on National Minorities and 2) were ready to move towards the rest 
of Europe by joining the European Union.288 Any thoughts that they could 
accomplish both wishes evaporated quickly. Due to the history of the High 
Commissioner in the region he had become the leading authority on minority issues 
in the Baltic states as well as throughout Eastern Europe and as a result, other 
international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union turned 
to the High Commissioner for advice and recommendations.289 When the various 
states in Eastern Europe (and Malta) petitioned to join the EU the existing members 
needed to determine what requirements needed to be met. As in past accession 
processes issues such as banking, economics, environmental concerns and farm 
subsidies were all included in the requirements. A new issue that this group of 
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candidate countries was to be judged on was human rights, with a subsection on the 
treatment of minorities. As the process developed each country would receive a 
yearly ‘Accession Report’ that outlined what changes still needed to be made to meet 
EU requirements.  As the ranking authority the recommendations of the High 
Commissioner, that up to this point were non-binding, now became part of the 
accession requirements. Instead of being in a situation where they could now ignore 
the advice of the High Commissioner, the Estonian and Latvian governments were 
required to meet the standards that he set out, or risk being shut out of the European 
Union.  The 1999 EU Accession report for Latvia is a clear example of the EU 
deferring to the High Commissioner and the OSCE in addressing minority rights. 
Despite the High Commissioner’s best efforts and attempts at persuasion, the 
citizenship laws were still not in compliance with his recommendations. The tests to 
gain citizenship were deemed too difficult but the Latvian government was unwilling 
to compromise further until the following section appeared in the 1999 Accession 
report: “A last issue to be addressed in this context, concerns a further simplification 
of the citizenship test on Latvian history, and the constitution in accordance with the 
recommendations made by the OSCE”.290 The Latvians now faced the possibility of 
being denied access to the European Union and the economic and security stability 
that went with membership if they did not change their laws to comply with the High 
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Commissioner’s recommendations. The Estonian government faced similar choices in 
their report.291 
 The pull of joining the EU has shaped politics in Estonia and Latvia since the 
accession reports began and these reports and the visits by the High Commissioner 
put these governments in very difficult positions, particularly in Latvia. Due to the 
complex coalition governments in Latvia the President and Prime Minister could not 
always be seen as complying with these international organizations. There is a 
segment of Latvian society, usually supporters of the right-wing For Fatherland and 
Freedom Party, who do not trust outsiders and believe that Europe cannot or will not 
understand Latvia’s history which drives their current actions.292 As a way of trying 
to look independent to the Latvian people while complying with these imposed 
international standards the usual tactic used by the government was to refuse to act 
until the last possible moment and then pass the law as mandated.293 
 In Estonia the government was more transparent with the population almost to 
its own detriment. When a recommendation would come from the EU (as a result of 
the High Commissioner) the Estonian government would change the targeted law and 
say that this was necessary to get into the EU. The former Minister of Minister of 
Population and Ethnic Affairs, Katrin Saks, believes this had a negative impact on 
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Estonians’ view of the European Union and contends that Estonian society was 
moving in the direction of integration anyway and would have supported laws to give 
citizenship to children for example, but by saying the government had to do this 
caused resentment.294 Saks’ contention that by being seen as complying too quickly to 
EU demands has had an negative impact on Estonians’ view of the EU is 
substantiated by public opinion polls in 2000. The New Baltic Barometer IV study 
asked respondents if they were in favor of their country joining the European Union. 
48% of ethnic Latvians responded they were either strongly or somewhat in favor of 
Latvia joining EU. Approximately the same percentage (45%) of Russian-speaking 
Latvians strongly or somewhat agreed. In Estonia while 49% strongly or somewhat 
agreed, only 9% fell into the strongly agreed category (compared to 13% of Latvians 
and 15% of Russians in Latvia). Estonian Russians responded 64% in favor of joining 
EU with 23% responding that they were strongly in favor. Clearly the Russians in 
Estonia saw the benefits of EU involvement in their lives more strongly compared to 
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Table 5.1 Public Opinion on joining the European Union in 2000295 
Question: What do you think of the idea of this country joining the European Union? 
 Estonians 











Strongly in favor 9 23 13 15 
Somewhat in favor 40 41 35 30 
Somewhat Opposed 24 14 19 15 
Strongly Opposed 15 9 14 16 
Difficult to Say 13 13 20 25 
 
Future Impact of the OSCE and the EU 
 While the OSCE and the EU had a profound impact on Latvian and Estonian 
society during the chaotic years immediately after independence and then when EU 
accession was a priority, what happens now? It is not clear what future impact 
international organizations will have in the region. The current OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities Rolf Ekeus believes that there still will be a 
role for his organization. He contends that now that the Baltic states have been 
accepted into the EU and eventually NATO they can be secure in their place in 
Europe and will be more open to concessions and also believes that his office will be 
able to assist in the integration process through the securing of fund and the providing 
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of expertise.296 Others disagree with this assessment. Many in both countries believe 
that after being accepted by EU the concessions should stop and the High 
Commissioner has no place interfering in their internal affairs. The current Estonian 
Minister of Population and Ethnic Affairs, Paul-Eerik Rummo, believes that the High 
Commissioner should not come back and that any work with minorities should be left 
to the European Union once Estonia is a full member.297 His counterpart in Latvia, the 
Minister of Social Integration Nils Muižnieks believes that without the ability to hold 
the European Union over the heads of countries the leverage of the High 
Commissioner position may be crumbling and as with Rummo believes that the EU 
can handle any issues on integration.298 Even some in the Russian community accept 
that the time of influence by the High Commissioner may have passed. Vadim 
Poleshchuk believes that while his recommendations were often circumvented in 
Estonia by other restrictive laws being passed to replace those changed through the 
High Commissioners influence, the Russian community still saw the High 
Commissioner as a voice of reason. This voice he contends will not be listened to in a 
European Union dominated continent. He contends that “the time of the OSCE and 
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Council of Europe is over”.299 In Latvia the opinion is similar. It may be that the job 
description of the High Commissioner has changed too much and his influence in 
Latvian society so diminished that his demands for change will fall on deaf ears once 
EU membership is gained.300 
 If it is true that the OSCE will no longer be effective in influencing the 
behavior of Latvia and Estonia, will the EU be capable of it? There are some serious 
questions concerning the European Union’s interest and capabilities to influence 
minority issues in member states. Some in the region have noted that there are similar 
minority issues present in other member states and the EU has not tried to influence 
them. This was an issue when the High Commissioner was making his 
recommendations during the 1990’s and also during the accession process. In 
response to a recommendation by the High Commissioner in 1997 the then Estonian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Tomas Ilves wrote that the Estonian laws were similar to 
those in other current EU and Council of Europe members so it “can therefore not be 
argued that Estonian legislation in the present formulation is at variance with 
international practice or with practice in Council of Europe states”.301 Katrin Saks 
also notes that the size of the minority group in question should not matter in the rest 
of Europe. If Estonia is monitored then all other states should also be monitored as 
                                                
299  Poleshchuk (2001) and Interview with Vadim Poleshchuk, Legal Advisor- Legal 
Information Centre for Human Rights, March 9 2004, Tallinn. 
 
300  Interview with Boris Tsilevich, 2004.  
 
301  Letter by Tomas Ilves to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 4 
June 1997 found on the OSCE website, www.osce.org. 
 
 147
well.302 The European Union as it is currently mandated does not have an 
organizational body capable of dealing with minority issues. This is problematic due 
to the emphasis placed on EU membership by the Latvians and the Estonians and this 
becomes even more problematic because as the Russian speakers have seen the High 
Commissioner lose influence in the region they “have big expectations for the EU and 
could be very disappointed”.303 
 The European Union will need to address one common issue in both Estonia 
and Latvia and an additional issue in Latvia once the accession process is complete. 
In both countries a determination on the status of the non-citizens needs to be 
devised. If they are not citizens of Estonia or Latvia but they live within the EU 
region, what rights do they have and what are they called? The Estonian and Latvian 
governments contend that they will be “third-party nationals” within the EU and have 
the same rights as third-party nationals elsewhere. The non-citizens argue that this is 
impossible because there is no ‘third-party’ for them to be nationals of. If they have 
lived in the region their entire life then Russia or the other areas of the former Soviet 
Union is not their country of origin. In effect they will be stateless people and the EU 
is not prepared to deal with such a large, well established population of stateless 
people. They are not refugees yet they are not citizens. In Latvia the problem is worse 
due to the citizenships laws as written, prevent non-citizens from voting in local 
elections. Many argue this is an unnecessary law as the Russians pay taxes but are 
                                                
302  Interview with Katrin Saks, 2004. Also see Johns (2003). 
 
303  Telephone interview with Stephen Heidenhain, 2004. 
 
 148
denied the right to vote. Moreover, the issues decided upon at the local level do not 
concern national security therefore the Russians could not have an influence on 
matters of true national importance.304 EU law states that citizens of EU states have 
the right to vote in all local elections within the EU as long as they meet the residency 
requirements. This means that a citizen of France who has lived in Latvia for a long 
enough period of time will be able to vote in the local elections but a Russian speaker 
who has lived their entire life in Latvia but has yet to meet the citizenship 
requirements will not be permitted to vote. If the EU does not work to find an 
acceptable resolution to this double standard quickly the Russian-speakers may lose 
faith quickly in the organization. 
Corsica and the Basque Country- Left out in the cold 
The Lack of International Attention 
 The majority of the chapter has been dedicated to the influence of 
international community in the Baltic states. The reason for this is simple; there has 
been little or no attention by these organizations in either Corsica or the Basque 
region in Europe. In Eastern Europe minority issues have been tied to the 
democratization process. John Loughlin describes the network of organizations (the 
OSCE, Council of Europe, European Union, etc.) as having acted as “a midwife to 
democracy”.305 This has allowed for international influence on minority issues in the 
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east. In Western Europe without the democratization process as a framework 
international organizations have made less of an impact. 
 As early members of the European Union, neither France nor Spain were 
asked to make any changes to their laws concerning minorities in order to gain 
membership. The European Union currently does not have any institutional body with 
authority over minority issues. There is a court that handles cases involving Human 
Rights, but discrimination within states involving citizens or non-citizens does not fall 
under its jurisdiction. The EU’s first attempt at any form of influence on minority 
issues was the most recent round of accession reports. Prior to the potential entrance 
of states from Eastern Europe, the EU had refrained from discussing minority rights. 
Therefore, any changes that could be recommended by an international organization 
such as the EU or the OSCE do not have the same potential threat behind it. Any 
changes made by the two states have had to come from inside and both France and 
Spain have rejected any calls for international assistance or mediation. In Spain for 
example both the United States based Carter Center and an Irish peace organization 
have offered to provide their expertise but have been continually refused.306 It should 
be noted that many of these attempts by outsiders have been rejected by the Basques 
as well. Unlike the Catholics in Northern Ireland there is not a large Basque diaspora 
from which to draw international support. Due to the association of the Basque 
conflict with the ETA and the resulting violence, the Basques have little sympathy 
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throughout the world and have become somewhat isolated. As a result, any Basques 
separatists are leery of the international community.307 
 Like the Russians in Estonia and Latvia the Basques do place hope in the 
European Union as a possible way to break the current stalemate between themselves 
and the Spanish state. The Basques (and now following their lead the Catalans and 
other regional groups within Spain) have a permanent mission to the EU where they 
observe and comment on the EU activities. While Spain’s membership in the EU has 
not paid any dividends for the Basques to this point and that there is nothing currently 
the EU will be able to do for them, there is still a sense that the new European 
constitution may provide the mechanisms to increase their autonomy.308 The EU may 
be the only forum eventually capable of dealing with the Basque issue not because of 
the Basques who are seeking more autonomy (e.g. the Basque delegation to the EU) 
but due to the demands of the separatists in Batasuna and the ETA. While the 
autonomists are looking for a solution to the problem in Spain, the separatists do not 
make the distinction between the French and Spanish sides of the border because they 
believe the Basque problem is an international one involving the Basques, the French 
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and the Spanish. If the violence continues it will be a ‘European problem’ and will 
need to be addressed by Europeans.309  
Despite this hope the Basques have a negative view towards the EU. This is 
counter to the amount of support the EU enjoys in Spain generally and among non-
Basques in the Basque region. Table 6.2 is telling in it shows respondents from the 
Basque region’s satisfaction with the European Union by party preference. Those 
who support either the conservative Popular Party (PP) or the Socialist Party (PSE-
EE) have a much higher opinion of the European Union compared to those who 
support the Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV) or particularly Batasuna. PP and 
PSE-EE supporters tend to be either non-Basques living in the region or those who 
have no interest in Basque autonomy or separation. EAJ-PNV supporters favor an 
increase in the rights of the Basque people within Spain while the supporters of 
Batasuna support a separate Basque country comprised of all seven Basque provinces 
in Spain and France. It is also interesting to note the large number of respondents 
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Table 5.2 Satisfaction in the Basque Country with the European Union by Party 
Preference- May 2002310 
 
Question: In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the European 
Government? 
 







Satisfied 63 48 27 17 




25 28 35 23 
    
The split between Basques and non-Basques is confirmed in Table 5.3 which 
breaks the same question down by how the respondents identify themselves: Mostly 
Basque, both Basque and Spanish, or Mostly Spanish. What these results confirm is 
the opinion of the former Batasuna Member of Parliament Esther Agirre that the 
majority of Basques follow closely what the European Union has been up to, but are 
either feeling ignored and dissatisfied or have reserved the right to pass judgment at a 
later time. If after the constitution is ratified the EU continues to ignore the Basque 
situation then more of the undecided will move to the dissatisfied column. Most 
Basque autonomists and separatists are of the belief, however, that now that the EU 
has made changes in Eastern Europe there will be more attention placed on the 
minority issues of Western Europe.311  
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Table 5.3 Satisfaction with the European Union on Spanish-Basque Axis- May 
2002312    
 
Question: In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the European 
Government? 
 
 Predominantly Basque (%) 




Satisfied 25 45 55 




31 34 30 
 
 The Corsicans find themselves in a very similar position as the Basques. The 
French government has made it very clear that the relationship between itself and the 
Corsicans is an internal matter. France is willing to allow international organizations 
(such as the OSCE) to come to the island and monitor elections and referendums to 
ensure they are fair, but it will not allow for any outside mediation or interference.313 
The President of North Corsica, Paul Giacobbi explains the French government’s 
position on the possibility of international assistance to solve the Corsica problem as: 
“If 200 countries do something one way France would assume that the 200 were 
wrong and it was right”.314 Despite not having a permanent mission as the Basques, 
                                                                                                                                      
311  Interview with Esther Agirre, 2004. 
 
312  Sociological Survey Office- President of the Basque Government’s Office (2002).  
 
313  Interview with Frederic de Touchet, Political Advisor Permanent Mission of 
France to the OSCE, February 25 2004, Vienna. 
 
314  Telephone interview with interview with Paul Giacobbi, President Haute Corse 
(North Corsica), March 24 2004.  
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the Corsicans have had a little more success in using the EU. The EU has helped 
shape the Corsican conflict and it is now seen as a struggle over sovereignty. As the 
EU increases its ‘federalization’ of Europe there are opportunities for ‘positive sum’ 
negotiations. Prior to this the conflict was shaped in win-loss terms. There has also 
been an opportunity for Corsica to work with the other Mediterranean islands on 
issues inside the EU.315 It has been argued that the European Union’s Peace programs 
designed for conflicts elsewhere in Europe could be a model for Corsica but that 
would require France’s capitulation, which is unlikely.316    
A Future Role for International Organizations in Corsica and Spain? 
 Clearly at this point the international community has been unable to have an 
influence on the Corsica and Basque conflicts. Many involved in the politics of 
resolving these conflicts believe that some form of international influence would be 
very helpful if not decisive. Paul Giacobbi believes that the influence of an 
international organization would help prove to the French people that devolution 
would not end the Republic.317 In the Basque country there are organizations such as 
Elkarri, who are trying to raise awareness on the Basque question and are looking for 
international assistance in ending the conflict. The hope behind this effort is that it 
                                                
315  Telephone interview with Dr. John Loughlin, 2004. Also see Francesco 
Letamendia and John Loughlin (2000) “Peace in the Basque Country and Corsica?” 
in Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke and Fiona Stephen ed., A Farewell to Arms? 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
 
316  Ibid. 
 
317  Telephone interview with Paul Giacobbi, 2004. 
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would not only present possible solutions for the conflict but it could put subtle 
pressure on the both the Spanish government and the Basque terrorists to resolve the 
problem since the world is watching.318  
 One institution that may play a role in the future could be the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities. Currently, the mandate for the position 
prevents the Commissioner from intervening in areas where terrorism is occurring 
and thus prevents visits to Corsica and the Basque region. There is some reason for 
optimism that this could change as there have been discussions within the OSCE on 
changing the mandate to allow for intervention in these regions.319 While the High 
Commissioner admits that some of the tools that were effective in Eastern Europe 
would not work in the west there is a growing belief that due to the radical changes 
forced upon the incoming EU members “it is time for everyone to live up to the 
standards”.320 In a sign of the changing view of conflicts in the west the High 
Commissioner in a speech on November 5, 2003 (at an event celebrating the success 
of the Copenhagen criteria on minority rights no less) warned: “the standards on 
which the Copenhagen criteria are based should be universally applicable within and 
                                                




319  Internal OSCE memo, July 1, 2003. Former High Commissioner Max Van der 
Stoel believes that the mandate should not be changed because if the mandate is open 
for changes it could also be changed in other negative ways making the position 
redundant or powerless. Interview with Max Van der Stoel, 2004. 
 
320  Interview with Rolf Ekeus, 2004. 
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throughout the EU, in which case they should be equally- and consistently- applied to 
all member states”.321 It is unclear if the mandate will be changed to allow the High 
Commissioner to go to Corsica or the Basque country as well it is also unknown if he 
could have any influence if he were allowed to go.322 As the High Commissioner’s 
Legal Advisor on the Baltics Zdenka Machnyikova notes, he may have been too 
successful in places such as the Baltics in changing legislation. Now other states are 
leery of his intervention in their affairs.323 
As for the European Union, there is hope by some that it could become an 
important player in both the Basque and Corsican conflict. As Espiau notes in 
reference to the Basque conflict: “The Basque case is a European problem. The 
priority of the citizens of this part of Europe is pacification and normalization”.324 
Only time will tell how the EU and the OSCE begin to address these issues if at all. It 
is clear, however, that many people in both regions expect the EU to become involved 
and will hold it accountable once it does. 
Conclusion 
                                                
321  Speech available on the OSCE website. 
 
322  Petschen believes that the High Commissioner would not be allowed into Spain 
even with a change in the mandate, but he would not have an influence if he came, as 
no one would meet with him. Telephone Interview with Prof. Santiago Petschen, 
2004.  
 
323  Interview with Zdenka Machnyikova, Legal Advisor OSCE High Commissioner 
on National Minorities for the Baltics, March 23 2004, The Hague. 
 
324  Gorka Espiau (2002) “Spain and the Basque Conflict: Still Looking for a Way 
Out” in Paul van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen and Juliette Verhoeven ed., Searching 
for Peace in Europe and Eurasia (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishing), p. 152. 
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 The influence of international organizations, particularly the OSCE and the 
European Union cannot be overstated in Estonia and Latvia. The OSCE alone earlier 
and then with the influence of the EU behind it was able to accomplish many things. 
It was able to prevent outright violence during the turbulent period after independence 
when the society was turned on its head and the Russian army was still on the ground. 
It was able to convince the Estonian and Latvian governments that they needed to 
make changes to their minority laws and that they had a responsibility to take care of 
their Russian speaking minorities. They also acted as protective shell for the fledgling 
countries to make the necessary changes at an acceptable pace without fear that 
Russia would strike against them. The Russian speaking community was ill-prepared 
to organize itself in the early 1990’s and came to view the OSCE (and later the EU) 
as negotiators on its behalf. By staying quiet and particularly non-violent they knew 
that the Estonian and Latvian governments would be induced to make changes in 
their favor and while at times suspicious of these organizations, they came to rely on 
them and chose how they would act against the government accordingly. As Latvia 
and Estonia edge closer to EU accession Russians have grown to see the EU as not 
only their means to greater rights, but also as their escape valve in case the changes 
that were made to join EU were not permanent. While the Estonians and Latvians 
want to protect their own culture and language demographically they need the 
Russian speakers to stay.325 Russians have used this threat of peaceful migration, as 
opposed to violent protests, to gain more influence.  
                                                
325  Interview with Valdis Birkavs, 2004.  
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 The Corsicans and Basques have been left to their own devices by the 
international community. Organizations such as the EU and OSCE have been unable 
or unwilling to interfere with established EU members. Due to the violence associated 
with the two conflicts a vicious circle develops: France and Spain appeal for 
sympathy to the international community in their fight against terrorism and the 
Corsicans and the Basques become even more isolated and the response by nationalist 
groups such as the ETA and the FLNC become more radical and they employ more 
violent tactics to gain awareness for their cause and to try to force a settlement. 
Without a change in this cycle there can be no end to the two conflicts and the 
violence that results. While direct international influence acted to prevent violence in 
the Baltic states it can be argued that the lack of intervention is both a cause and a 
result of violence in Corsica and the Basque country. The European Union has seen 
the impact their influence can have. It will be up to the member states to acknowledge 
that there are problems outside of Eastern Europe and for them to have the courage to 
try to influence the established Western European members to the same degree as the 
incoming members. 
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Chapter 6- The Role of Culture 
 
 Of all the possible explanations for the minority groups’ activities discussed, 
the role of culture is the most challenging. It is difficult to discuss the prevailing 
culture of a group, let alone make predictions on the activities of a group based on 
this culture. While it is difficult, it is necessary. When two groups have very different 
cultures they are unable to understand the actions of each other and there is no 
starting point for discussion, no room for compromise, no way of seeing eye-to-eye. 
As Cornell and Hartmann note: 
   Human beings live not only in the midst of 
   material relationships and sets of opportunities- 
   political, economic, social- but also in the midst 
   of ideas and understandings. The social world is 
   an interpreted world, as much conceptual as it is 
   concrete. Interpretations, ideas, and understandings 
   are part of culture, and culture is an identity 
   construction site of uncommon importance.326 
  
What differentiates one group from another is not necessarily the language it speaks 
or the religion it practices, it is its culture. A culture develops over time based on the 
specific history faced by the group. If one group has only known war and violence 
their culture will develop to expect violence but conversely a group never exposed to 
violence may look for other avenues to prevent conflict. Moreover, the prevailing 
culture of a group can change over time due to a change in its situation. A peaceful 
group may become more militant over time depending on their treatment by the state. 
This occurs when the group’s perception of what is right and wrong, proper and 
                                                
326  Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann (1998) Ethnicity and Race (Thousand 
Oaks: Pine Forge Press), p.173. 
 160
improper changes. This occurs “first in our heads and then in our practices”.327 In 
short “[c]ulture is sense-making”.328  
What will become apparent is that all of the groups discussed in this study see 
their specific culture as being a key, if not the main causal factor in predicting why 
the group acts the way it does. This chapter will demonstrate how different cultures 
are more or less accepting of violence as means to an end. While the majority of a 
group may not advocate the use of violence, if the culture of the group allows it, 
violence can occur. If the culture of a group is to reject the use of violence in all 
aspects of society, then no matter how angry the group may be at the state, violence 
will not be considered as an option by any but marginal members of the group. This 
chapter will examine the culture of each of the groups and provide an explanation 
about how the group’s culture has influenced its relations with the state. 
The Corsican identity- An island onto itself 
 Paul Theroux may best describe Corsica when he says that “it is a French 
province in name only. Corsica is Corsica”.329 While much of the island has been 
incorporated with the mainland in terms of economics, education and government, the 
culture of the Corsicans has never changed. It is still an island that works by its own 
rules, has its own unique customs and has a culture unlike anything seen in the rest of 
France. It is this clash of cultures that have led to many of the problems on the island. 
                                                
327  Ibid, p.174. 
 
328  Ibid. 
 
329  Paul Theroux (1995) The Pillars of Hercules (New York: Fawcett Columbine), p. 
135. 
 161
The French government appears to not fully appreciate the differences in culture 
between Corsicans and the mainland and are therefore unable to predict how they will 
react to proposed changes to Corsican society. The Corsicans have refused to alter 
their culture to be more in line with not only the rest of France but also the rest of 
Europe. 
 One cultural difference between Corsica and the rest of France is the role of 
traditional clans in the day to day business of the island. These clans, the powerful 
historical families, wield enormous influence on politics and business. Throughout 
recent Corsican history the same surnames appear over and over in various 
government posts and segments of the economy. Each clan remains in power due to 
the loyalty it demands of those within it. This clan system dates back to the 1880’s 
and is similar to other clan systems found throughout Italy. The clan is “the political 
superstructure of a cultural infrastructure articulated on a base of family and 
traditional values”.330 The various clans have historically worked not for the 
betterment of all Corsicans, rather they have used their power to maintain their clan’s 
stature in the community at the expense of all others. This has lead to competition and 
electoral fraud politically and the hoarding of resources economically. Many blame 
some of the economic problems faced by the island (as discussed previously) on the 
in-fighting and the corruption of the clans. As Jaffe notes the clan use “the culturally 
valued idiom of kinship to disguise the fact that it does not act on behalf of the 
                                                
330  Alexandra Jaffe (1999) Ideologies in Action: Language Politics in Corsica 
(Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter Press), p.49. 
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collectivity, and undermines the already limited potential for collective, solidary 
behavior”.331    
 One of the main consequences of the continuation of the clan system is the 
acceptance of violence on the island because the clans have been in competition with 
one another for so long rivalries have developed and over time these rivalries have 
taken on a violent component. This violence is now seen in business relationships, the 
prevalence of organized crime on the island and it can be argued in the political arena 
as well. Quite simply, violence is more accepted in Corsica than in other areas of both 
France and the rest of Europe. Paul Giacobbi believes that the Corsicans see 
themselves as a ‘mountain people’ who are more open to the use of violence within 
the society. He claims that there is a “tradition of violence” in Corsica that is different 
than other places.332 Giacobbi goes further to say that violence is such a common part 
of Corsican society that when there is an apparent nationalistic terrorist attack it is 
actually difficult to determine if that attack is for political, economic or personal 
reasons. By way of example, in July 2003 there were approximately fifty separate 
bombings in Corsica. Of those, about twenty were directly linked to the FLNC or one 
of its splinter groups with the rest of the bombings occurring as a result of other non-
political disagreements.333 Violence is a part of doing business on the island. For 
example, if there are two businessmen who are in competition, Giacobbi contends 
                                                
331  Ibid, p.51.  
 
332  Telephone interview with Paul Giacobbi, President Haute Corse (North Corsica), 
March 24 2004. 
  
333  Ibid. 
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that the prevailing culture of the island allows for the one who is less successful 
economically to try to remove the competition by vandalizing the competition. There 
is less shame in using violence to succeed than there is in failing in a business.334 
 Loughlin concurs with Giacobbi’s assessment of the Corsican culture. He 
believes that the need to maintain honor is the most important characteristic of 
Corsican society. The use of violence, particularly the types of violence usually 
associated with the terrorist activities of the FLNC and others (bombings, arson, etc.) 
are not major violations of the codes of the society.335 Loughlin also ties this type of 
activity to the traditional Corsican society based on the clans for this acceptance of 
violence. The competition between the clans has led to the constant need for 
retribution by one clan against another. When one clan has been wronged, there is a 
loss of honor, which is unacceptable and therefore the clans honor needs to be 
regained. This has led to a ‘vendetta culture’ where one violent act is met with 
another and this becomes all the society knows as acceptable behavior.336 This is 
why, for Laughlin, the main nationalist political groups have refrained from 
condemning the terrorist attacks. While they may not support them directly and may 
wish to find a political solution to the nationalist problem, they do not necessarily see 
what the terrorists are doing as not normal. There is no stigma attached to using 
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violence, so there is no need to condemn such activity because in Corsican society 
using violence is as normal as negotiating with the state.337 
 The difference in culture between the Corsicans and the rest of the French can 
be seen in the term maquis. During the Second World War the French resistance was 
know as the maquis and to this day the term refers to a struggle against Nazism. The 
term means something completely different in Corsica. The maquis refers to those 
who operate outside of the law. Maquis are similar to Robin Hood in that their actions 
are criminal but to the people they are considered heroes.338 Jaffe sees this embracing 
of criminal activity as a way the Corsicans have dealt with the constant foreign 
interference on the island. This culture “nourishes a rejection of external authority, 
and discourages people from recognizing any central authoritative state structure as 
legitimate”.339 It is based historically on the idea of Corsican pirates who existed 
during the times of the Genoan occupation. This ancient conception has been updated 
in modern times, but the idea of embracing those who live outside the law remains. 
Therefore the Corsican hero has become a person who above all rejects authority and 
remains true to their Corsican roots. They are seen as “bandits of honor”.340    
The other aspect of culture that needs to be addressed is the French culture 
and how it impacts its relationship with Corsica. French nationalism is based on the 
                                                
337  Ibid. 
 
338  Ibid.  
 
339  Jaffe (1999), p.44. 
 
340  Ibid.  
 165
idea that there are no historical minorities within France. Everyone who embraces the 
French ideal is French and French nationalism therefore, is ill-prepared to deal with a 
region that considers itself unique. This culture of ‘oneness’ has manifested itself into 
the very strong unitary state.341 The French government and by extension the French 
people have been unwilling to work with Corsica and have rushed to judgment on it 
because their culture cannot tolerate internal division.342 While it has tried to make 
improvements recently this clash of cultures has existed for over 200 years and this 
has lead to growing frustration on both sides. As Jaffe notes the constant 
misunderstandings between the rest of France and Corsica has led to negative 
stereotypes against the Corsicans and has led the Corsicans to embrace their own 
unique culture. A 1989 Le Monde article describes Corsica as “an intolerable island- 
you forget it for a few months, 55 million people are not by its bedside, and it spikes a 
fever”.343 Faced with such statements it is not surprising that the reaction of the 
Corsicans would be “heroic or good-for-nothing, with a slothful or aristocratic soul, 
bandit or man of law, the Corsican has never succeeded in finding his just place on 
                                                
341   Interview with Frederic de Touchet, Political Advisor Permanent Mission of 
France to the OSCE, February 25 2004 Vienna. While de Touchet admits that the 
unitary state and the nature of French nationalism contributes to the problem, he 
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government. 
 
342  Telephone interview with Giacobbi 2004. 
 
343  Quoted in Jaffe (1999), p.45. Originally published in French in Le Monde on 
March 19, 1989. 
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the continent”.344 The Corsican culture stresses the need to bind together to protect 
traditions and if necessary to embrace violence as a way of achieving goals while the 
French culture cannot accept another culture living within its territory. It should not 
be surprising therefore that violence has not only occurred but why it has remained 
such a large aspect of the conflict between the Corsicans and the French. 
The Russians in the Baltic- A learned culture of non-violence and apathy 
 If the Corsicans represent a culture that not only accepts violence, but also at 
times embraces unlawfulness, the Russian community in Estonia and Latvia would 
represent the complete opposite. The culture of the Russians in the Baltic states has 
been influenced by both the prevailing Russian and Soviet culture and the Baltic 
culture in which they have been immersed. The result is a people who lack the 
organization to carry out violent acts and even if they could organize to such a degree, 
would not consider violence as an option. 
The Legacy of Soviet Nationalism 
 The Russians in Estonia and Latvia as previously stated can be divided into 
two broad categories: those who arrived prior to the Soviet annexation, and those who 
came afterwards.345 There is agreement by scholars on the region that the two 
categories have different cultures but there is no agreement on what those cultures 
are. There are some who argue that the Russians who came during the Soviet period, 
                                                
344  Ibid. The quote is originally by Culioli and is translated from French by Jaffe. 
 
345  In the interest of space, this chapter will concentrate on the ethnic Russians of the 
Russian-speaking population. As discusses previously there are many Russian-
speakers of Ukrainian and Belarusian decent. The majority are ethnic Russians and 
therefore will be discussed here in relation to their unique position in Soviet society.  
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like those who came before, have become completely ‘Balticized’ due to their 
everyday proximity with the Estonians and Latvians. Others claim that the Russians 
who came during Soviet times were influenced by Soviet culture.346 This is due to the 
fact that those who came from Russia during the Soviet period came mainly for the 
economic advantages available in the region. They were able to move freely 
throughout the Soviet Union due to their advantaged position within the Soviet 
system. Not only were they the largest ethnic group in the country, they were also the 
dominant group linguistically, culturally and politically. They were able to find the 
region that best served their needs and were able to move their with the knowledge 
that everyone would speak Russian, their children would be able to learn in Russian 
and more than likely all of the important political figures would be of Russian 
descent. They also would have been influenced by their interactions (and those of the 
parents and grand-parents) with the Soviet government’s policies on nationalities. It 
will be argued in this chapter that the Russian-speakers who came during the Soviet 
period’s culture are heavily influenced by both of these factors: the Soviet system and 
their interactions with Baltic culture. To understand the Soviet influence it is 
necessary to look back to the nationality policies of the Soviet Union and the unique 
place the Russian nationality had in this system.347 
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Nationalism in the Soviet Union 
 From the earliest days of the Soviet Union its leaders grappled with the 
nationalities problem. The problem was simple: the Soviet Union was comprised of 
numerous nationalities, each with its own unique culture, many with its own 
language. As Slezkine notes: “Lenin’s acceptance of the reality of nations and 
‘national rights’ was one of the most uncompromising positions he ever took”.348 To 
enact the necessary radical economic changes to the society the state needed the co-
operation of the various ethnic groups within its border and of all ways of classifying 
people outside of economics, nationality was the only one that received special 
attention by the state. Both Lenin and later Stalin divided the various nationalities of 
the Soviet Union into classes. There were the great, progressive nations, such as the 
Russians and the Ukrainians, and there were backward nations such as the Tatars. In 
order to create the socialist society it was necessary to promote the language and 
culture of the backward societies and through these policies it was hoped that the 
local intellectuals would be better able to spread the anti-bourgeoisie message and 
inform the proletariat of what needed to be done. This strategy of appealing to the 
intellectuals within the titular nationality has been repeated as “every communist 
regime throughout its history has attempted to gain the loyalty of the intellectuals 
through a variety of means, be it terror, coercion or co-optation”.349 Co-option came 
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349  Yitzhak M. Brundy (1998) Reinventing Russia (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
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to be seen by the Soviet government as the most effective way to solve the 
nationalities question.  
 While the early Soviet policy on nationality was to try to promote the 
development and maintenance of the ‘backward nations’ it also wanted to suppress 
any form of Russian nationalism. Lenin saw that “the essence of the national problem 
in Russia was the development of a core-periphery colonial relationship between the 
Russians on the one hand, and the non-Russians and their homelands on the other”.350 
As a result he felt that “Great Russian chauvinism was treated as the state’s greatest 
problem”.351 By 1923 Slezkine argues that the term Russian as a nationality within 
the Soviet Union “was a politically empty category unless it referred to the source of 
great-power chauvinism . . . or to the history of relentless imperialist oppression”.352 
 By the late 1930’s and the beginning of the Second World War (the point 
where Estonia and Latvia were annexed by the Soviet Union) Russian nationalism 
was in the beginning of transition and while the Russians were denied the same rights 
as other nationalities353, they were becoming more associated with the pan-Soviet 
nationality. Russian was at least one of the official languages throughout the union, 
and Cyrillic replaced the Latin alphabet in official documents and in the education 
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system. Due to this emphasis on aspects of Russian society, the Russians became an 
advantaged segment of Soviet society despite their lack of a specific and unique 
national identity and the Russians who left Russia proper for other republics (such as 
Latvia and Estonia) could have all of the advantages without the need to organize 
around their nationality.  
 It can be argued that today the Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia still 
lack the nationalist identity necessary to organize.354 Their culture became linked to 
that of the Soviet Union. Falk Lang, the Senior Advisor on the Baltic states to the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities describes the Russians who moved 
to the Baltic states as the prime example of homo-Sovieticus. Without the Soviet 
Union they had nothing to base their culture around355 and with it gone they are 
unable to see themselves as Russian because for the past 80 years they have not done 
so. Without the ability to organize they have been unable to act.356 They represent the 
clearest example of what Ken Jowitt sees as a consequence of the Soviet period. For 
them the political realm was “something dangerous, something to avoid. Political 
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involvement meant trouble”.357 A Russian activist in Estonia describes the Russian 
community as “like a crowd” unable to mobilize.358 In this regard it is not that the 
Russian culture is non-violent, it is merely incapable of rallying the nation due to the 
Soviet history which forced it to the background and made Russians suspicious of 
political mobilization. 
 One aspect of Russian culture that has survived in Russia and may be 
influencing the Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia is its view of sacrifice. There 
is a sense of fatalism within Russian culture and a view that life at times is difficult. It 
is a belief held by Solzhenitsyn and others that “it is the suffering of the Russian 
people that is the essence of their identity. It is through this suffering that the Russian 
people have advanced to a higher level of humanity”.359 This has allowed Russia (and 
by extension during its existence, the Soviet Union) to survive famine, war and 
terrible economic conditions and this has led to a belief that security is the most 
important aspect of life. As long as one is secure everything else is tolerable.360 This 
may also explain the lack of action by the Russian-speakers. As discussed earlier the 
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Russians who have remained in Estonia and Latvia stayed partially because their 
economic opportunities are better in the Baltic states compared to Russia. It is 
possible that they are willing to give up some political and economic rights in order to 
maintain their basic economic security. Since the Russians also suffered under the 
Soviet system they were not completely shocked by their treatment at the hands of the 
Estonians and Latvians. They were willing to tolerate this treatment in exchange for 
economic stability.361 This can be illustrated through survey data from the 2000 Baltic 
Barometer survey.  In Estonia when asked if there were economic inequalities 
between Estonians and non-Estonians, 68% of non-Estonians responded that there 
were very large or fairly large inequalities.362 However, when asked to disagree or 
agree with the statement “Conditions for people like me in Russia are worse than 
here” 67% of non-Estonians agreed, and to the question “This country offers better 
chances for improving living standards in the future than does in Russia” 67% also 
agreed.363 
 Obviously the Russians in Estonia have been influenced by their historical ties 
with Russia but they have also been influenced by Russian culture to this day. The 
majority of Russian-speakers prefer to watch television programs produced in Russia 
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respectfully. 
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and prefer to read Russian media sources for information.364 In Estonia alone in 2000 
75% of non-Estonians watched television from the Russian federation 6-7 times a 
week and 27% read Russian federation newspapers at least once a week.365  
The Balticization of the Russians 
 Beyond these cultural ties, the Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia have 
been heavily influenced by the titular populations as well. It would be impossible for 
the Russian-speaking community to live among the Baltic people during the Soviet 
period without adapting their culture to be more in line with the Estonians and 
Latvians. One of the main aspects of both Estonian and Latvian culture is a rejection 
of violence. Throughout their histories, both Estonia and Latvia have tried to avoid 
conflict and they describe themselves as pragmatic people who are similar to 
Scandinavians and Finns in their belief in non-violent strategies.366 Lieven describes 
the Estonians as having the “fundamental quality of restraint, pragmatism, and indeed 
decency”.367 The most recent and most telling example of this commitment to non-
violence was seen in the ‘singing revolution’ of 1989. Many believe that the 
                                                
364 As Mati Luik, the Director of the Non-Estonian Integration Foundation notes the 
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365  Rose (2000), p. 62. 
 
366  See for example the discussion of the Estonians and Latvians use of non-violence 
in Walter C. Clemens (2001) The Baltic Transformed (Lanham MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield Press). 
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Estonians and Latvians’ refusal to use violence in their dealings with the Soviet 
Union shaped the Russians living in the region to such a point that violence was not 
perceived as a viable solution.368 Due to their interactions both the Estonians and 
Latvians and the Russian-speaking populations within their borders now share a 
culture that has created a level of patience not found in other areas of the former 
Soviet Union.369 This change is seen in the statement by the Former Deputy Mayor of 
Tallinn, Boris Yulegin: 
   The Russians who have lived here all their  
   lives have changed a lot. They have taken on 
   something of the Estonian coolness, restraint and 
   habit of hard work- whether they like it or not! 
   They do not feel at home when they go to Russia. 
   The Russians who come here also sometimes do 
   not understand our character and ask us, ‘Why 
   don’t you protest? Why don’t you go on the streets?’370 
  
The adaptation of the Russian-speaking community to Baltic culture is one of the few 
issues that both sides agree on. The current Estonian Minister for Population and 
Ethnic Affairs, Paul-Eerik Rummo contends that one of the leading causes for 
prolonged peace during the integration process was the embracing by the Russian 
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369  Interview with Falk Lang, 2004 and Mati Luik, 2004. The tolerance of the Latvian 
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community of the Estonian ideal of non-violence.371 His predecessor Katrin Saks 
believes that the Russians have learned from the Estonians to “be tolerant, survive 
and integrate”.372 From the Russian-speaking perspective, Vadim Poleshchuk 
contends that Estonians and Russians now have the same view of what is involved in 
identity and have similar views on adherence to state institutions and practices which 
has led to a lack of violence.373 In Latvia, Boris Tsilevich notes that the Russians 
never developed a leader who was willing to be responsible for bloodshed (which 
would have contrasted with the singing revolution) so violence was never a viable 
option.374 
A New Russian-Speaking Identity 
 The Russian-speaking community in Estonia and Latvia finds itself in a 
unique position. The majority of them have a culture that is heavily influenced the 
heritage of the former Soviet Union and yet they do not share the exact same culture 
as those in the Russian federation. They have been influenced by the culture of their 
Estonian and Latvian neighbors, yet they have not fully integrated. It does not appear 
that a uniform culture can emerge. Those who arrived prior to 1940 are more 
influenced by the Baltic culture than those who arrived after the annexation. The 
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374  Interview with Boris Tsilevich, 2004. 
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latter group has an identity more closely linked to communism. Their ideological base 
was taken away from them after 1991 as it was no longer acceptable to be seen as 
communist. They have adapted to try to survive in this new reality. There appears to 
be a hybrid culture forming in the region with the Russian-speakers beginning to 
come to terms with their own unique history. This new cultural awareness is most 
prevalent among the young Russians in the region.375 Laitin describes this as “a new 
form of national identity that blurs the divide between titular and non-titulars”.376 
Laitin goes on to describe the new identity as ‘russkoiazychnoe naselenie’ or the 
Russian-Speaking population of the Baltic, neither Russian or Baltic but both.377  
 Regardless of how the Russian-speaking communities in Estonia and Latvia 
define themselves, it is clear that their culture has prevented violence from occurring. 
They have been influenced by the Estonians and Latvians to avoid conflict and were 
aware that any use of violence would have prevented any advancement of their cause. 
Even if they had chosen to follow a more violent path, the policies of the Soviet 
Union in regards to not fostering Russian nationalism has made organizing around 
this nationality difficult. Combined the result is a new nationality that is prepared to 
endure hardships and does not think to resort to violence. With the Estonian and 
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Latvian cultures also stressing non-violence, patience and pragmatism it is not 
difficult to ascertain why the region has been relatively violence free despite the real 
(and more importantly perceived) inequalities in the societies. 
The Basques- Violence Begets Violence 
 The culture of the Basques would fall in between the non-violent, dis-
organized culture of the Russians in the Baltic states, and the violence-accepting 
vendetta culture associated with the Corsicans. The Basques represent a culture that 
radically changed over the course of the 20th Century. While the acceptance of 
violence was not an aspect of their culture in the past, it became accepted in the face 
of extreme repression. When faced with this repression the Basques were able to draw 
upon specific aspects of their cultural past as inspiration and use other aspects for 
mobilization.   
 There are some that argue that there is nothing in Basque culture that makes 
them prone to violence.378 Conversi believes that when the nationalism that developed 
in the Basque country is compared to that of the Catalans, there are the same 
opportunities for violence to have developed because both had used it in the past and 
there were times when “Catalonia was one of the most violent societies on the 
continent”.379 The fact remains, however, that Catalonia no longer has violence 
associated with it, yet the Basque country does. Therefore, while it may not be 
                                                
378  This was emphasized in an telephone interview with Ignacio Sũarez-Zuloaga, 
Basque Author, February 18 2004. Mr. Sũarez-Zuloaga did admit that the Basques do 
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379  Daniele Conversi (1997) The Basques, the Catalans and Spain (Reno: University 
of Nevada Press), p.222. 
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inherent in Basque culture, there must be something within Basque culture that allows 
for it to continue. 
 Most believe that it was the repression faced by the Basques during the Franco 
regime which radically altered the culture of the Basques. Kurlansky notes that for the 
Basques “culture has always been a political act, the primary demonstration of 
national identity. One of the keys to Basque survival is that political repression 
produces cultural revival”.380 Franco treated the Basques more severely than the 
Catalans or any other group in Spain. His goal was the eradication of the Basque 
culture and specifically the Basque language. This threat to the language had a 
pronounced impact on the Basques because much of Basque identity is tied to their 
language. The combination of the threat of having their language taken from them 
and the actually physical repression they endured (or heard others enduring) was 
enough to change how the Basques viewed violence. Due to Franco “Basque 
nationalism was reborn in a thoroughly new shape” and further “a new Basque 
identity was formed in the process”.381 When the ETA broke from the Basque 
Nationalist Party and began to employ violence against the state it was seen by the 
Basque people as a legitimate way of fighting back against Franco. The ETA was 
seen as something similar to Robin Hood, while their actions were illegal their 
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motives were right and therefore they were embraced.382 If Franco had not targeted 
the Basques and their culture to the level he did it is unknown if the Basque culture 
would have changed to such a point where it would have tolerated being associated 
with violence. As a result “ETA’s violence achieved strong affective support within 
broad sectors of the Basque population, given the total prohibition on public 
expression of discontent or of any ideological or cultural manifestations from the 
official ideology. This state violence, symbolic and physical, provided legitimacy to 
the political violence”.383  
 The ETA used (and continues to use) references from the Basque culture to 
justify its actions. They have created a mythology that allows violence. An example is 
the use of the image of the mythical Basque soldier as proof that the Basques have 
always resisted foreign occupation. The Basque soldier (called Eudari) is thought to 
have been extremely adept at fighting, was very strong and extremely brave.384 This 
is coupled with the myth of the rural farmer and even though the majority of the 
Basques are urban, the nationalist movement has always come from the villages and 
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their lifestyle is transposed onto the entire population.385 The idea of Basque strength 
is reinforced through the sporting activities enjoyed by the Basques. The majority of 
these activities emphasize bravery and brute strength. Bull-fighting was popularized 
by the Basques and many other sports emphasize strength.386 Combined, these myths 
and cultural traits were used by the ETA to convince the people that not only were 
their goals noble but they were also in line with the Basques’ historical culture. 
 When Franco died it was assumed that the violence by the Basques would 
end. The fact that this did not happen indicates the extent to which the Basques 
culture had changed. Within the nationalist movement today there is still a latent 
acceptance of some of the activities of the ETA and this acceptance is based on their 
memory (or in the case of the youth, those most active in the nationalist movement, 
what they have been told) of their treatment in the past. This was particularly true 
during the transition from Franco, as Perez-Agote notes: “within nationalist circles, 
even those for whom the violence was politically incorrect, there was, nevertheless, a 
certain sentimental acceptance of it, based on biographical memories”.387 For those 
within the nationalist movements there is still the belief that the Basques are facing 
repression currently. They discuss the activities of the Spanish army and police and 
claim that the Basques continue to have violence forced upon them and their response 
is the same as what the ETA used during Franco’s time, that violence is an 
                                                
385 Interview with Luis Francisco Martinez Montes- Counselor to the Spanish 
delegation OSCE, February 24 2004, Vienna. 
 
386  Telephone interview with Petschen, 2004. 
 
387  Perez-Agote (1999), p.64. 
 181
understandable and logical reaction to violence.388 This reaction to violence is seen in 
the actions of the terrorist activities of the ETA and also in the growing problem of 
young urban Basques fighting with both the Spanish and Basque authorities in 
activities known in Basque as kale borroka. The result is a situation where “violence 
is engendered, materialized, and reproduced as, and within a realm of, violence and 
terror woven by the rumors of abuse and death circulating within the Basque 
country”.389 While the ETA’s level of support continues to drop and the acceptance of 
their activities evaporates, clearly there are aspects of the new Basque culture which 
allows for violence to exist and these continue to influence segments of Basque 
society. This phenomenon is described by Gorka Espiau as the persistence of the 
logic of violence within Basque society.390 
 It would be remiss if the role of Spanish culture was not addressed briefly. As 
with the Corsicans and the French state, it is the competing cultures in the Basque 
country and Spain which contributes to the conflict. The main aspect of Spanish 
culture which makes the conflict continue is the belief that the Basque region is a part 
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of the Spanish state and there is a lack of understanding that minorities exist in Spain 
and that they may have needs and goals different from those of the Spanish.391 
Another important cultural factor is the lack of willingness to compromise. In Spanish 
there is no actual word for compromise, to give in while negotiating is seen as 
weakness.392 This leads to a psychological impasse in that neither side is in a position 
where they can effectively negotiate without being seen as losing honor. As a result 
the situation has evolved to the point where Dr. Ruiz-Vieytez, Director of the Basque 
Human Rights Institute describes the relationship between the Basque and Spanish 
people as “completely broken”.393 
 The final aspect of the Basque culture which needs to be examined is the role 
of the Catholic church in mobilizing the Basque people. Even if the violence were to 
end it is likely that large protests, not seen in places such as Estonia and Latvia would 
continue to occur. While Catholic, the Basque church has strayed from the traditional 
positions set out by the Vatican. It has been more militant and more nationalistic. The 
church in the Basque region has historically been very active in mobilizing the 
Basques to protest and it is part of the tight social network of Basque culture. The 
church, along with social organizations and political parties hold great influence on 
their memberships because the church has used its access to their congregations to 
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shape public opinion and to organize events. Even during the Franco regime the 
church was “an undercover source for the preservation and dissemination of Basque 
culture”.394 Many of the protests organized through the church are attended by people 
of all ages and become cultural festivals with singing and story-telling (thus ensuring 
that the various Basque myths discussed above continue to be passed down).395 While 
not contributing to the levels of violence directly, the strong social bonds 
demonstrated by the influence of the church illustrate a culture that allows for 
effective mobilization of its people in a way not seen in the Russians in Estonia and 
Latvia and allows for the political and social struggle (which currently brings with 
them the violent struggle) to continue. 
Conclusion 
 What this chapter has illustrated is the importance of culture in predicting 
political violence and mobilization. If the culture of a group is such that violence is 
considered a normal response to a disagreement then this will carry over to the 
political sphere as well. On the other hand, groups whose culture does not tolerate 
violence will be more likely to remain peaceful no matter what discrimination they 
happen to face. This chapter has also shown that the culture of a group can change 
over time but those changes occur slowly.  
 The cases show three different types of cultures. The culture of the Russians 
in Estonia and Latvia is influenced by both the titular population with whom they 
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interact and the nationality policies of the Soviet Union. This has created a unique 
new identity different than any others in the region. This culture is both non-violent 
and unorganized and it maintains aspects of the Russian fatalistic view of life and 
adds the pragmatism for which the Baltic communities are known. The result is a 
group that appears almost incapable of resorting to violence. While individual 
Russian-speakers may be angry by the policies introduced by Estonia and Latvia they 
have not resorted to violence and no one in the region appears to believe that they 
ever will. 
 The Corsicans are a close-knit community based on clan loyalties. This 
culture promotes the need to maintain honor and as a result a vendetta culture has 
developed that accepts violence as an aspect of negotiation. The concept of the noble 
bandit is embraced and those who continue to break the laws and use violence to 
achieve political goals, while not endorsed by the majority of the population, are 
accepted and are seen as carrying on the traditions of the community. If violence is 
accepted as a part of life and by extension politics then it is extremely difficult to end 
the cycle of violence that has begun on the island. It apparently does not take a great 
deal of state action to warrant violence and since the state has a responsibility to try to 
end the violence they will continue to face resistance and the resulting continuation of 
violence. 
 The Basques represent a culture in flux. While historically neither adamantly 
non-violent like the Baltic states nor embracing violence like the Corsicans, their 
culture was changed due to severe repression. When faced with the possibility of 
 185
cultural eradication they began to embrace the need to fight back using any means 
necessary and as a result violence became an acceptable part of their culture. Those 
spearheading the resistance were able to use aspects of their existing culture to justify 
their actions in terms of history. Their cause being noble allowed for the use of 
violence and an acceptance of such activity by the community, including those who 
did not use it themselves. Now that the severe repression has ended the Basque 
culture is once again in transition. There are those who remember the repression faced 
by the Basques and see it as continuing today and for them violence is still an 
important aspect of their culture. They are willing to tolerate the violence and those 
who are involved in it, however, others want to return to the culture of before Franco 
when they were still strong but not violent. Currently there are enough Basques who 
believe in the former to allow the ETA to attract many young Basques embracing the 
romantic ideals of the ETA and continuing to embrace violence. It is unclear where 
the culture will go. What is clear is that the Basques are a close-knit community with 
a rich culture and deep social bonds led by the church. Even if the culture changes 
enough that violence is not tolerated, the Basques have a culture that encourages 
collective action, ensuring that the Basque question will continue to be an issue for 
the Spanish government.  
 While this chapter has been concerned with the actual culture of the groups, 
there are other ways the culture can be tested. The following chapter looks at how 
culture can be institutionalized within a society and how this has impacted the choices 
of these ethnic groups.
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Chapter 7- The Institutionalization of Culture 
 
 While the preceding chapter discussed the role culture has played in 
determining whether conflict is likely within a society, this chapter will examine the 
issue in more detail. The chapter will look at the remaining hypotheses that were 
outlined at the beginning of this study. When these hypotheses are examined closely 
it becomes apparent that they all are part of a larger issue, the institutionalization of 
culture. Beyond the use of repression or other state policies that could affect the 
culture of a group these are other factors that can play an important role.   
 This chapter will look first at the role geography has played in refining the 
culture of the groups. What is of interest is each group’s level of geographic isolation. 
While the Corsicans and Basques have had to deal with an influx of outsiders to their 
region both groups are still isolated from the majority of the French and Spanish 
population and there are areas within Corsica and the Basque country (in both cases, 
rural areas) where they are completely isolated. The Russian-speaking community in 
Estonia and Latvia is very urban and are concentrated in both capital cities and 
therefore they have a great deal of interaction with the titular community (with the 
exception of the Estonian city Narva). The impact of this interaction will be 
discussed.  
 The chapter will then discuss the relevant length of the conflicts. Here two 
additional issues will be discussed. The first is the difference between a conflict that 
is less than 15 years old in Estonia and Latvia and conflicts in Corsica and the Basque 
country that date back to the 19th Century. Second when the conflicts evolved will 
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also be examined. The ETA and the FLNC were heavily influenced by the African 
anti-colonial movements in the 1960’s and as these movements were left-wing by 
nature these organizations shifted ideologically to that end of the political spectrum. 
The conflict involving the Russian-speaking community in Estonia and Latvia has 
occurred in the period after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. This time 
frame has dictated what ideologies the movements could take and this has affected 
how the cultures of the groups have developed. 
 Finally the concept of repertoire choices will be examined. Until a particular 
repertoire is tried there is no history of it in a culture of a group. While this may 
appear self-evident the ramifications of this is important. The culture of violence in 
Corsica is heavily influenced by the fact that they have used this repertoire in the past 
and it has now been established as part of the process. The same can be said of the 
violence in Spain. Once the bombings and other criminal activities of the ETA began 
they are extremely difficult to stop. In Estonia and Latvia violence has never been 
tried so there is an assumption that it would not work there and this belief, based on 
no actual evidence, has heavily shaped the culture of the Russian-speaking 
community. 
 Combined, these factors are linked with the pre-existing culture of the group 
and they reinforce it. These factors it will be argued are what make changing a 
group’s culture, either towards a greater acceptance of violence or to move away from 
a tradition of violence, so very difficult. By understanding the factors that shape a 
group’s culture, the impact of culture on the group’s decision making is better 
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understood and can be used in any analysis of the potential for violence in a society. 
The Role of Geographic Isolation 
 The development of a group’s culture can be influenced by where the group 
lives particularly in comparison to others. The geographic isolation of the Corsicans 
has directly influenced not only the development of their culture but also has allowed 
for this culture to be maintained. As Paul Giacobbi notes, two aspects of geography 
have affected Corsican identity. The first is its geographic location in the 
Mediterranean where it has been influenced by its neighbors in Sardinia and Sicily 
and the second is the actual terrain of the island. Giacobbi believes that the 
mountainous terrain has made the Corsicans more rugged and set in their ways than 
other societies.396 Ramsay agrees and adds that the maintenance of the Corsicans 
“intact social order and culture” is a result of “two internal geographic factors: first, 
the difficult mountainous terrain of the interior and, second, the swampy and malarial 
nature of the coastal plains”.397 Ramsay contends that it has proved difficult to 
administer the entire island and therefore it was necessary to maintain clan control in 
the interior region where the majority of the ethnic Corsicans lived. This helped keep 
the culture intact and actually helped infuse it with a survivor’s instinct. It must also 
said that while this has helped in the preservation of a Corsican culture as a whole, 
geography has also helped splinter the Corsicans into different groups as well. The 
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mountains and difficult interior terrain made travel difficult during the development 
of Corsican identity and actually continues to make traveling across the island 
difficult. The result is that “Corsican geography has thus led to strong forms of 
internal insularity”.398 This has also reinforced the clan system, which brought with it 
the vendetta culture that allows for the continuation of violence. While the island has 
been under French influence since the 1800’s the Corsican identity is not much 
different than when it was under the control of Genoa because both the clan system 
and reliance on familial ties has remained. This has created a closed society that is 
difficult for outsiders, even the French, to access.399 It is this insularity that has been 
the main cause of conflict between the French state and the Corsicans. The Corsicans 
refuse to let outsiders truly understand their culture and society but also refuse to 
abandon this way of life. This has put the French government in a no-win situation400 
because they must try to work around a culture that is not only foreign to their own; 
but they are also not privy to how the culture operates. 
   The Corsicans’ ability to maintain aspects of their culture despite their 
reliance on and the influence of the French state is helped by the geographic distance 
between themselves and the mainland. Being an island they have the advantage of 
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isolation. Even with the influx of non-Corsicans the French state has been unable to 
have the Corsican institutions take on French characteristics. As John Loughlin notes, 
while the laws are similar in Corsica to mainland France their enforcement is very 
different.401 An example is that Corsicans openly carry firearms, something that 
would not be tolerated in the rest of France. Other laws, particularly ones involving 
low intensity violence are ignored or not punished to the same extent as elsewhere in 
France and as a result the Corsicans are allowed to keep and in fact embrace some of 
the more violent aspects of their culture. Violence therefore is openly accepted in the 
society and this carries over to the political arena and the actions of the FLNC. 
 The Basques also live in a mountainous region. While they are not separated 
from the rest of the country by water, the Basque region is somewhat isolated 
geographically from the rest of Spain. It is a 10 hour train ride to Madrid and 11 hours 
to Barcelona. The Basques have used, as stated previously, their geographic location 
to their economic advantage and have become more integrated with the rest of Europe 
than other regions of Spain. This has helped provide the Basques with the confidence 
to stand up to and fight Franco, leading to the formation of the ETA and the violence 
that followed and to call for more autonomy.402 
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 The key geographic consideration in the Basque country is the difference 
between the cities and the countryside.403 The power of Basque nationalism has 
always resided in the countryside. Many of the Basques who live in the urban centers 
such as Bilbao have been more interested in socialist issues, not concerned with 
nationalist issues. As the waves of immigrants came to the region to find work they 
settled en mass in the urban centers where they have interacted and inter-married the 
Basques. The Basques who have remained in the smaller mountain villages, who have 
no interaction with non-Basques, are more nationalistic and more supportive of both 
Batasuna and the ETA.404 Dr. Eduardo Ruiz Vieytez, the Director of the Basque 
Human Rights Institute believes that the insular Basques in the villages have an 
overly romantic view of Basque nationalism and as a result are more willing to accept 
the use of violence to achieve their goals.405  
 The difference in opinion on the Basque nationalist question between those in 
the large urban centers where they interact with non-Basques and those who remain 
in pure Basque villages can be seen in the results of a poll taken by the Basque 
Sociological Survey Office. Table 7.1 outlines its findings below. It is clear that those 
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who have the greatest support for independence are those who live outside of the 
large cities in the Basque country. These people are geographically isolated from not 
only the rest of Spain, but also from the non-Basques who have come to work in the 
region. Without being exposed to other cultures, theirs have remained strong and 
insular. Those Basques in the larger cities have other issues that become more 
important to them rendering nationalism less of a concern. 
Table 7.1. Levels of Pro-independence Feelings by Size of Municipality406 
Question: With regards to the subject of independence for the Basque Country … 
what is your personal view? 
 
     Municipality Size 
 Small Medium Large 
Agree 
 33% 21% 17% 
Would Agree or 
Not According to 
Circumstance 
39% 30% 32% 
Disagree 
 15% 32% 42% 
Don’t Know 
 13% 16% 9% 
  
 The Russian-speaking community of Estonia and Latvia present an interesting 
comparison to both the Corsicans and the Basques. The Corsicans have used their 
isolation to preserve their culture and resist the influences of other cultures. The 
Basques are divided between those who have interacted with non-Basques in the large 
urban centers and those who have remained more nationalistic in the small 
mountainous villages. Both nationalists and non-nationalist Basques can at least 
                                                
406  Sociological Survey Office- President of the Basque Government’s Office (2003) 
Basque Sociometer 21, Basque government website 
http://www.euskadi.net/estudios_sociologicos, p.71. 
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benefit from the geographic location of the region as a whole. The Russian-speakers 
do not benefit from these advantages. They came to the region at different times from 
a variety of areas across the then Soviet Union (and before that, Russia) with the 
majority settling in urban areas surrounded by Estonians and Latvians. With the 
exception of a few cities (particularly Narva in North-East Estonia) there is nowhere 
in either country where they are the overwhelming majority. As discussed in the 
previous chapter the Russian-speakers culture has been shaped by their interactions 
with the titular society in a way not seen in Corsica and the Basque region. The lack 
of geographic isolation may be a key explanation for this cultural influence.  
 Despite the large majority of Russians in the Estonian town of Narva, it can be 
said that the majority of all the Russian-speakers in Estonia live in the capital city of 
Tallinn. The same can be said in Latvia where the majority live in the capital of Riga. 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 illustrate the breakdown of Estonians and Latvians respectively to 
Russian-speakers in the major urban areas of the two countries. What is evident is 
that not only are the majority of Russian-speakers living in the two capitals but the 
Russian-speaking community comprises the majority in most of the other large urban 
centers. Since they are the minority as a whole it can be assumed that the rural areas 
are almost completely devoid of non-Balts. This high number of Russians in the 
urban centers helps explain the dual nature of their identity because they interact in 
large numbers with the titular community. Being in such large numbers in the capitals 
they are exposed to Estonian and Latvian culture. Conversely, they are in such large 
numbers in the cities that they are able to maintain aspects of their old culture. Due to 
 194
their demographic strength pure assimilation is impossible but due to their daily 
interactions isolation was also not a possibility. 
Table 7.2.  Ethnic Composition of Estonian Major Cities- 1989407 
 % Estonian % Russian Total Population 
Tallinn 46.79 41.55 499 421 
Tartu 73.32 21.69 113 420 
Narva 4.33 85.45 84 975 
Sillamae 3.19 86.43 20 561 
 
Table 7.3. Ethnic Composition of Major Latvian Cities- 1989408  
 % Latvian % Russian Total Population 
Riga 36.5 47.3 910 500 
Daugavapils 13.0 58.3 124 000 
Liepaja 38.8 43.1 114 500 
Jelgava 49.7 34.7 74 100 
Jurmais 44.2 42.1 60 600 
                                                
407  It is acknowledged that there has been a large migration of Russians out of 
Estonia since 1989, however it is still acknowledged by Estonians that they are the 
minority in most of the major cities in the country. Attitat F. Ott et al. (1996) “Ethnic 
Anxiety: A Case Study of Resident Aliens in Estonia (1990-1992)” Journal of Baltic 
Studies Vol.27 No.1, p.39. 
 
408  As with the Estonian case, this census data was collected before a large number of 
Russians left the country therefore it may be assumed that the percentage of Latvians 
in the cities is higher, particularly in Riga. This does not negate the impact of the size 
of the Russian minority in each of the cities. Peter Zvidrins (1992) “Changes in the 
Ethnic Composition of Latvia” Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol.23, No.4, p.365.  
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Ventspils 43.0 39.4 50 600 
Rezekne 37.3 55.0 42 500 
 
 The result of the combination of lack of geographic isolation in Estonia and 
Latvia and sizeable minority enclaves in the large urban areas has created a condition 
that helps prevent conflict. Figure 7.4 shows what Mati Luik, the Director of the non-
Estonian Integration Foundation believes is the necessary position of minorities in a 
state. Minority groups are led towards conflict either when faced with complete 
assimilation or complete separation. The balance that is found in the demographic 
make-up of Estonia and Latvia is not found in Corsica (who fall on the segregation 
side) or the Basque country (who under Franco were on the assimilation side) and as 
a result has promoted an environment for peace. 
Length of Time of the Conflict 
 Time is an important factor in understanding the influence of culture on a 
conflict. While certain events can lead to a change in culture, what Laitin refers to as 
“tipping events”409, it takes some time for this change to be seen in noticeable action. 
The longer a conflict continues the positions of the two sides become more 
entrenched and the more difficult negotiations become. With a prolonged conflict 
both sides can fall back on historical wrongs in their arguments for more rights or in 
the case of the state, the necessity to deny some rights to the minority group.  
 
                                                
409  David D. Laitin (1998) Identity in Formation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).  
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Figure 7.4. The Necessary Conditions for Peace410  
 
The cases studied here provide interesting examples of the importance of time. 
The conflict between Corsica and France is very old and the Basque/Spain conflict is 
also ancient but has been radically altered in the past 75 years. While the Estonians, 
Latvians and Russians have been living in the same region for over 500 years, the 
current conflict is relatively new (with some ancient overtones). It will become clear 
below that not only is the length of time a conflict has existed important, when the 
conflicts were active also plays a crucial role in understanding why these groups have 
acted as they have. 
                                                
410  This figure was developed based on an interview with Mati Luik, Director- Non-
Estonian Integration Foundation, March 10 2004, Tallinn. It should be noted that not 
everyone believes that this is true. The Latvian Minister for Social Integration, Nils 
Muižnieks, believes that geographic proximity leads to violence. For him, the size of 
the Russian minority in the cities allows for them to isolate themselves from the 
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   Time is one of the most important aspects of the Corsican case according to 
John Loughlin. In this regard, the Corsican case is similar to other European cases 
that have been tied to violence, the Basques and the troubles in Northern Ireland.411 
Corsica finds itself in a continuing violent spiral where the length of time the violence 
continues is both a cause and a result of the conflict. The French government has been 
working for over 200 years to try to solve the Corsican problem and as each attempt 
failed, with the defeat of the autonomy referendum in the summer of 2003 being the 
most recent example, the levels of frustration on the side of the government and the 
French people grows.412 The French have become less inclined to try to find political 
solutions to the problems because they are resisted by a violent minority who has no 
interest in finding political solutions.413 The Corsican nationalists (and many 
autonomists who are content to remain in France) see the actions of the past 200 years 
by the French government as a reason for the continuation of the conflict. They recall 
the historic neglect by the government, the introduction of the pied noirs to the island 
and the treatment of some Corsican nationalists by the police as an explanation for 
continued violence.414 With each failure by the government or each new bombing by 
                                                
411  Telephone interview with Dr. John Loughlin, School of European Studies- Cardiff 
University, February 19 2004. 
 
412  Interview with Frederic de Touchet, Political Advisor Permanent Mission of 
France to the OSCE, February 25 2004, Vienna. De Touchet notes that 6 separate 
French governments have tried to find a political solution to the Corsican problem. 
While each has had some success the conflict continues which makes the job of the 
subsequent government more difficult.  
 
413  Ibid. 
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the FLNC the history between the two sides grows. As history lengthens the chances 
of an end to the conflict are lowered. The amount of time the two sides have spent 
arguing over these issues has increased the levels of frustration on both sides. For 
those willing to use violence this frustration leads to more action in their attempts to 
finally bring an end to the conflict. Unfortunately, with the new violence the French 
government’s position hardens and the chances of an end to the conflict, particularly 
one that would be acceptable to the autonomists, let alone the separatists, decreases. 
 The situation is similar to the conflict between the Basques and the Spanish 
government because the length of the conflict has helped ensure that it will continue. 
The separatists and the ETA frame the conflict as an ancient one with its roots prior to 
the Franco regime. For many separatists the conflict dates back either to 1512 when 
the region was conquered or to 1841 when Basque autonomy was officially ended.415 
If this history of the conflict is accepted then the collective memory of the Basque 
people is one a “history of invasion” which has created a survivors instinct416 and the 
Franco regime only crystallized this identity. After Franco and his repressive policies 
Basque nationalists were hyper-sensitive to any action by the Spanish state that could 
be contrived as repressive. As with the Corsicans the level of frustration continues to 
rise on both sides as they search for a solution. A segment of the Basque separatists 
use violence to maintain pressure on the Spanish government to finally solve a 
                                                                                                                                      
414  Telephone interview with Giacobbi, 2004. 
 
415  Interview with Esther Agirre, Former Member of Parliament- Batasuna, February 
5 2004, Bilbao.  
 
416  Ibid. 
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problem that has existed since 1512 or 1841 or 1938 or 1978. The Spanish state sees 
the actions of the ETA as preventing any peace agreements from being reached and 
therefore the length of the conflict is their fault.417 With both sides blaming the other 
for the length of the crises the result is what Ignacio Sũarez-Zuloaga refers to as a 
“poisoned environment”.418 With the continuation of the ETA’s bombing campaign 
over time the Basques have come to accept living with the radical nationalists and the 
shock value or outrage that could have existed has been replaced with quiet 
acceptance. Even with less people supporting their activities, the ETA is allowed to 
exist because, due to the length of time they have operated, they have become a part 
of the landscape.419   
 While the Basque and Corsican questions have been framed as ancient 
conflicts, the cases of Estonia and Latvia are seen as very recent. Most view the 
situation as dating from the Baltic states’ break from the Soviet Union in 1991. If this 
is correct then there is less than thirteen years of history to consider. In terms of the 
Russian minority this is true because prior to 1991 the majority of the Russian-
speaking minority had always been an advantaged minority. They had no reason to 
mobilize around their ethnicity until they became a disadvantaged minority in 1991. 
                                                
417  Interview with Maria Amor Martin Estebanez- Advisor to the Spanish delegation 
to the OSCE, February 24 2004, Vienna. 
 
418  Telephone interview with Ignacio Sũarez-Zuloaga, Basque Author, February 18 
2004.  
 
419  Interview with Ibon Mendibelzva, Adviser- Press Services, Basque Country 
Delegation to the European Union, February 10 2004, Brussels. 
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Time does play a role in understanding why the Latvians and Estonians have 
implemented the restrictive policies that have caused the problems. As discussed in 
chapter three the Estonians and Latvians have had a long history of foreign 
occupation and control and when independence was achieved in 1991 it was seen as 
an opportunity to protect the titular culture and language. They were willing to 
sacrifice the rights of the Russian-speakers, even though they had assisted in the 
independence movement, because of the long period of Soviet control that they had 
endured. While the Russians had not organized and mobilized around their culture, 
the Estonians and the Latvians have. The restrictive citizenship policies and the 
language policies found in both countries as well as their reluctance to change them 
can be seen as a direct result of the length of time the Estonians and Latvians had to 
endure threats to their culture.  
 While they were hesitant to make the changes to these policies, due to the 
influence of the international community there has been substantial change in a 
relatively short period of time. Many Estonian and Latvian politicians feel that while 
there is more work to be done, it’s this rapid response to Russian-speakers concerns 
that has prevented violence from occurring.420 The Estonian government, as discussed 
                                                
420  Interviews with Aarne Veedla, Counselor to the Minister- Office of the Minister 
for Population and Ethnic Affairs, March 9 2004, Tallinn, Katrin Saks, Member of 
Parliament , Former Minister of Population and Ethnic Affairs (1999-2002), March 
11 2004, Tallinn. Reinis Āboltiņš Director of the Society Integration Department and 
Former Advisor to the President disagrees believing that the culture of non-violence 
is the overarching explanation and the amount of time would not affect this 
predominant culture. Interview in Riga, March 18, 2004. 
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previously, is convinced that their rapid response will ensure the successful 
integration of their Russian-speaking minority by 2007.421   
 While many Estonians and Latvians see the successes in a short time period as 
proof of a peaceful integration of the Russian-speaking minority others see a real 
threat. They feel that there has not been any violence yet, but that is due to the short 
amount of time the Russians have faced this situation and after their initial shock and 
adjustment period ends they will then potentially resort to violence. The Director of 
the Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies, Illze Brand Kehris, sees the 
lack of integration in the Russian youths as cause for concern. The young are the 
group with the most advantages in the integration process and if they remain outside 
of Latvian society then over a longer period of time they may choose other avenues to 
express their displeasure with the Latvian state. She sees two alternatives if this 
occurs, they could either leave the country or eventually they could abandon their 
current culture and become more militant.422 A Russian activist in Estonian Vadim 
Poleshchuk agrees. He believes that the attempts at reaching the Russian youth have 
failed in Estonia and that while currently the disenfranchised Russians obey the laws, 
in time this could change. If this occurs he warns that Estonia should “prepare for 
                                                
421  Interview with Interview with Paul-Eerik Rummo, Estonian Minister for 
Population and Ethnic Affairs, March 8 2004, Tallinn and Estonian Integration 
Foundation (2001) Üks Ühiskond, Üks Riik/One State, One Society: Integration 
Yearbook. 
  
422  Interview with Illze Brand Kehris, Director of the Latvian Centre for Human 
Rights and Ethnic Studies, March 15 2004, Riga. Falk Lang, the Senior Advisor on 
the Baltic States to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities also warns 
that if frustrations continue to ferment that violence could some day in the future 
become an option. Interview in The Hague, February 20-21 2004. 
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some unpleasantness”.423 Finally, Boris Tsilevich, a Russian activist in Latvia notes 
that not enough time has passed for the policies implemented by the Latvian 
government to fail. The Russians are currently working to integrate with the hope that 
once this has been accomplished they will be equal. Tsilevich believes that even when 
fully integrated, by the government’s standards the Russian-speakers will still be 
behind educationally compared to their Latvian counterparts. After putting in all of 
the effort to integrate if they are still second-class then problems may occur.424 
The Importance of the Historical Time Frame 
 Clearly the length of a conflict is a relatively important determinant pf the 
potential of violence. It is also necessary to look at when the conflict occurs as well in 
determining the likelihood of violence. Minority groups are influenced by what is 
occurring around them and this can dictate what options are open and closed to them. 
The Basque nationalist movement was a conservative, peaceful movement until the 
1960’s. While Franco was the major influence on the change of culture in the 
Basques, the time-period when this was occurring can be seen as an important factor 
in changing the tactics. A generational gap developed in the Basque movement when 
many young Basques were heavily influenced by the Marxist, anti-colonial 
                                                
423  Interview with Vadim Poleshchuk, Legal Advisor- Legal Information Centre for 
Human Rights, March 9 2004, Tallinn. 
 
424  Interview with Boris Tsilevich, Former Latvian Member of Parliament and 
Russian Activist, March 16 2004, Riga. 
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movements in Africa during the 1960’s.425 The ETA took as their model the Algerian 
struggle against the French during the 1960’s. “The experience of Algeria seemed to 
hold out the promise that violence would pay off and lead the insurgents to 
victory”.426 The Basques used the writings of Frantz Fanon, the leading writer on the 
Algerian conflict, as the basis of their actions. Fanon called on the repressed to rise up 
and use the only means available to them to defeat their colonial adversaries and this 
was of course violence. Fanon also said that there is the possibility of a split in the 
nationalist movement because the bourgeoisie from both sides would try to 
compromise so profits could be maintained.427 To this day this is the argument of the 
ETA and Batasuna regarding the PNV who they feel are more interested in 
maintaining their power than the best interests of the Basques.428 Since the anti-
colonial movement was viewed be many as a noble cause (even though it was Marxist 
in ideology), by rooting their movement in the same ideology the ETA was able to 
use violence and still claim moral legitimacy. 
 The political violence in Corsica began in earnest in the 1970’s and there is 
evidence that it also was influenced by the Marxist ideology of 1960’s Africa. First, 
                                                
425  Interview with Luis Francisco Martinez Montes- Counselor to the Spanish 
delegation to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, February 24 
2004 Vienna. 
  
426  Daniele Conversi (1997) The Basques, the Catalans and Spain (Reno: University 
of Nevada Press), p.244. 
 
427  Frantz Fanon (1963) The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press), p.62.  
 
428  Interview with Esther Agirre, Former Member of Parliament- Batasuna, February 
5 2004, Bilbao.  
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the FLNC was inspired and influenced by the actions of the ETA and the Irish 
Republican Army (who also followed the teachings of Fanon).429 The FLNC saw the 
successes of these groups and the acceptance they received and copied them. Second, 
the troubles began to escalate in Corsica after the French colonists began to arrive 
from Algeria. Militant Corsicans saw what caused France to abandon its colony in 
Algeria and tried the same strategy. As a result violence was used and the 
nationalists’ rhetoric has Marxist undertones. 
 While the Corsicans and the Basques were able to tap into the Marxist anti-
colonial movements in Africa for strategies in their struggle with the state, the 
Russian community in Latvia and Estonia had to operate in a completely different 
environment. After 1989 and the fall of the Berlin Wall a new wave of 
democratization hit Eastern Europe. When this happened to be seen as anything that 
resembled communist was not acceptable. When the Baltic Republics managed to 
break away from the Soviet Union this feeling was magnified. Many of the politicians 
who formed the first post-Soviet governments were former Communist party 
members but were successful in distancing themselves from their former positions.430
 For the Russian-speaking community the political views they had long had 
socialized into them were now impossible to hold. As discussed previously, Nils 
Muižnieks, the Latvian Minister for Social Integration noted that the Russians had the 
                                                
429  Telephone interview with Dr. John Loughlin, School of European Studies- Cardiff 
University, February 19 2004. 
 
430  Interview with Boris Tsilevich, 2004. 
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“ideological rug pulled out from under them”.431 With the presence of international 
organizations in the region it was not possible for the Russians to fall back on the 
Marxist ideologies of Fanon which would have called for violence. With such a large 
Western presence in the region the Russian-speakers had no choice but to follow the 
model of protest that the Latvians and Estonians had followed and this was a model 
they were comfortable with. Even if they had wanted to use another, more violent, 
option they would have been seen as communist and it would have backfired.432  
The Use of Repertoires 
 The final institutionalization of culture that needs to be addressed is the idea 
of repertoires. Put simply, groups tend to use the same strategies over and over again 
as long as they are successful. Once one repertoire is used and works in some regard 
it becomes very difficult to abandon this strategy. Which repertoires are tried is 
directly linked to a group’s culture.433 In Corsica once violence was introduced as a 
tactic it has proven impossible to end and this is partially due to the fact that people 
now rely on this violence as their occupation. The links between political violence 
and organized crime are now difficult to determine and as John Loughlin describes, 
many Corsicans now are “gangsters by occupation” and they are willing to use 
                                                
431  Interview with Nils Muižnieks, Latvian Minister for Social Integration, March 17 
2004, Riga. 
 
432  Ibid. 
 
433  Interview with John Packer, Director, OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, February 19 2004, The Hague. 
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violence politically, economically and socially.434 Giacobbi believes that even if a 
political solution were found the violence on the island would continue purely 
because there are some on the island whose livelihood depends on it.435 
 A similar situation exists in the Basque country. Even with fewer and fewer 
people openly supporting the activities of the ETA, it continues to exist and is still 
involved in violent activities. Conversi notes that since “the 1970’s, political violence 
seems to have become an intrinsic feature of Basque society”.436 A pattern in Spain 
has developed concerning the violence of the ETA where they engage in violent 
activities, the police crack down on them and the ETA responds to this action with 
more violence. Both sides continue to use the same repertoires. As a result “once you 
open the door to violence, you cannot close it”.437 
 In the Basque country all sides in the dispute are tied to this repertoire of 
violence by the ETA. The Basques have had to learn to work within the framework of 
the ETA, knowing that their actions will impact all political negotiations. The ETA 
has now tied themselves to their violent activities to such a point that without 
violence they have little influence in society. Since many are involved in illegal 
activities tied to the ETA as an occupation they feel they must continue to engage is 
these activities. Finally, the Spanish government has used the ETA’s activities as a 
                                                
434  Telephone interview with Loughlin, 2004.  
 
435  Telephone interview with Giacobbi, 2004. 
 
436  Conversi (1997), p.248. 
 
437  Interview with Gorka Espiau, Director and Spokesperson for Elkarri, February 4 
2004, Bilbao. 
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way of avoiding other issues. The government has used the violence of the ETA as an 
excuse to not negotiate with the Basque government and to avoid other important 
issues facing Spain. They are able to present themselves as fighting terrorists and 
therefore their actions are always justified.438 All sides therefore have found a way to 
use the violence of the ETA to their advantage making it very difficult for it to ever 
end. 
 The case of the Russians in Estonia and Latvia is much different. Having 
never used violence it is unlikely that they will. Many of the reasons for why they 
have not used violence have been discussed in the last two chapters but it can simply 
be said that the non-violent repertoires used by the Russian-speakers have worked to 
a satisfactory extent and therefore they are likely to be used in the future as well. It 
will only be when the non-violent tactics completely fail to improve their condition 
that other alternatives will begin to be examined.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter aimed to understand how the cultures of the groups discussed can 
be institutionalized through a variety of factors. The cases illustrate how certain 
conditions can take a pre-existing culture and solidify it and as a result the potential 
for violence or non-violence which could be predicted by a group’s culture is made 
more certain once these factors are taken into account.  
                                                
438  Interview with Maria Amor Martin Estebanez- Advisor to the Spanish delegation 
to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, February 24 2004, 
Vienna. 
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 It is by examining these factors that we can see that the Corsicans who have a 
vendetta culture that accepts violence have difficulty avoiding violence in the 
political arena. Their geographic isolation has created an environment where violent 
acts are not punished to the same extent as on the mainland. The long period of time 
that the conflict has spanned has allowed frustrations to build to the point where 
violence becomes seen as a way of finally ending the stalemate. The conflict gained 
strength during a period when left-wing radical groups could use terrorism and still be 
seen as noble freedom-fighters. Finally, once violence was used it became linked to 
organized crime to such an extent that ending the conflict would cause many 
Corsicans to lose their livelihood, making the chances of an end to the violence 
remote. 
 The Basques, particularly the nationalistic ones are isolated in the small 
villages of the Basque country. There they do not interact with non-Basques making 
the impact of violent activity seem more remote. They also have endured a long 
frustrating struggle with the Spanish state and were influenced by African anti-
colonial ideology which called on the use of violence. All of this meshed with the 
Basques’ pre-existing culture of survival in response to Franco’s repressive policies. 
Currently all sides in the conflict have found a way to use the ETA’s violence to their 
advantage which also makes any long-term cease-fire very difficult to envision. 
 The Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia face very different influences on 
their culture. As discussed above, their culture has been shaped by a lack of 
nationalism dating back to the Soviet period and their interactions with the non-
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violent Baltic people. Their lack of isolation allows them to interact with Estonians 
and Latvians on a daily basis and this interaction makes using violence more difficult 
as there is less division geographically between ‘them’ and ‘us’. The Russian-
speakers also found themselves being denied rights during a historical period when 
anything resembling Marxist thought was taboo. They had to operate in an 
environment that stressed international interventions and compromise and it was clear 
that any violent response would cost them valuable international support. The 
Russian-speakers have also only had 13 years of frustration to contend with. It 
appears that this is not enough time for them to reach such a level of disillusionment 
that they would be willing to abandon their culture and attempt to engage in more 
overt militant activities. If their frustration level ever reaches that point they should be 
very hesitant to cross the line into militancy. As the Basque and Corsican cases show, 
once the Pandora’s Box of violence is opened, it is almost impossible to shut.  
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Chapter 8- Conclusions and Future Work 
 So what has been learned in this study? Due to this analysis are we better able 
to explain why groups act the way they do? Why have these groups chosen their 
particular relationship with the state? More specifically, why do violent organizations 
continued to exist in Corsican and Basque society while no violent organizations have 
developed in the Baltic states? This study has provided compelling evidence to 
answer all of these questions. This chapter will briefly review the main findings of 
this study and it will provide a link between the groups studied and the larger field of 
ethnic conflict. Finally, it will provide a road map based on this study as to what the 
next steps should be to continue our understanding of the development and 
persistence of violent groups in Europe and around the world. 
The Findings 
 In Chapter 2 of this study the hypotheses that were to be examined and 
provided the structure of the rest of the work were presented. To review they were: 
H1. The nature of the economic structure of a state and the resulting difference in 
economic affluence will influence group decision making in regards to choosing 
militant strategies. 
H2: Minority groups in states that face pressure by the international community to 
improve the conditions of the minority group are less likely to be involved in militant 
activity and vice versa. 
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H3: In order to predict whether a group will resort to militant activities it is 
necessary to understand the culture of the group and how accepting that culture is to 
violence.  
H4 a. Groups that are geographically isolated from the majority of the population 
are more likely to engage in militant activities. 
H4 b. The longer a conflict has existed, the more likely violence is to be used.   
H4 c. Groups who have never used violence as a form of collective action will not 
choose to resort to it, while those who have used violence will continue to do so. 
 After careful examination during the preceding chapters most of these 
hypotheses were found to be useful in explaining why the groups have acted as they 
have. Of all of the hypotheses the first one, economic deprivation, proved to be the 
least useful. The Russians in Estonia and Latvia are considerably worse off 
economically than the titular population. There is an ethnic division of labor in both 
countries which may explain some of the behavior of the Russians but the gap in 
income is known by the Russians and yet it is not enough to bring them to action. The 
majority of the Basques are economically advanced compared to the rest of Spain. 
The most militant of the Basques do live in the more rural areas in the mountains 
which are less economically advanced, but this is by choice and cannot explain their 
actions. While part of the nationalism movement was a result of migration of non-
Basques into the region the reason for their anger was not in the potential loss of jobs, 
rather it was the threat to their culture and language.  
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Only in Corsica can economic factors be seen as directly influencing the 
creation of the Corsican nationalist movement and the militant FLNC. The 
combination of the end of the French colonial period that provided many Corsicans 
with jobs and the resulting arrival of the pieds noir from Algeria was perceived as not 
only a threat to the Corsican culture and language but also their economic well-being. 
Unlike the nationalist Basques who chose to remain in the rural areas, the Corsicans 
are concentrated in the less valuable interior of the country out of necessity. The best 
farm land was given to the pieds noir, and the valuable coastal region is 
predominantly owned by non-Corsicans and as a result the Corsicans must work for 
non-Corsicans and remain very much economically disadvantaged. In this case the 
militant nationalists have used economics not only as the impetus for their activities, 
but also the reason for their continuation. Explaining the actions of only one of the 
four groups appears insufficient to conclude that economics play a vital role in 
predicting group decision making. 
 A more promising explanation is the impact of the international community. 
The cases in this study show a clear distinction between the groups who received 
attention by the international community and those that were ignored. Shortly after 
Estonia and Latvia declared their independence from the Soviet Union the 
international community became involved in preventing ethnic conflict from breaking 
out. At the beginning Max Van der Stoel, the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities and his staff was actively engaged in lowering ethnic tensions, particularly 
while the troops from the Russian Army were still stationed in the region. Later, his 
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recommendations were used as the basis of the European Union’s accession reports 
that for the first time contained chapters concerned with the treatment of minorities. 
The Russian population in the two countries quickly came to see these powerful 
European institutions as ombudsmen for their cause and in order to stay in favor with 
these institutions the Russians could not resort to militant activities. By staying non-
violent the OSCE, the EU and other organizations pressured the Estonian and Latvian 
governments into concessions which on their own the Russian communities would 
not have been able to force. In comparison to the massive involvement in Estonia and 
Latvia, there has been little to no involvement in France and Spain. Neither country 
has been open to international intervention, assistance or mediation and France and 
Spain see the Corsican and Basque problems as internal matters and not the business 
of the rest of Europe. The High Commissioner’s mandate has prevented his 
involvement regardless of France and Spain’s wishes due to the provision that he 
cannot become involved in regions with active terrorist movements. The European 
Union as currently mandated has no provisions to influence member states on 
minority rights issues meaning both the Corsicans and Basques have felt somewhat 
abandoned by the rest of Europe. They have seen the changes in Eastern Europe and 
the international community’s attention to the Northern Irish conflict and have grown 
frustrated knowing that their cause has been ignored. Violence is one way to make 
sure that their issues make the news but rather than gaining public attention for their 
cause the violence has only made the situation worse in that the Corsicans and the 
Basques have become pariahs in Europe. This has created a vicious cycle that has 
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been difficult to break, however, both the Corsicans and the Basques continue to hold 
out hope that the European Union will eventually become involved in their situation. 
Both hope that the new constitution will give the EU authority to mediate in member 
states but if the international community fails them again it will make finding a 
peaceful solution to these conflicts even more difficult. 
       The third hypothesis tested, the role of culture also proved to be extremely 
valuable. While difficult to specify, it is clear that culture plays a vital role in 
predicting whether violence will be used or not. The vast majority of those 
interviewed for this study ranked it as an important explanation for the group’s 
activities and many would rank it as most important.439 When the history of each 
group is examined the cultural explanation becomes an even stronger predictor of 
violence. The traditional clan system on the island of Corsica has led to the 
development of a ‘vendetta culture’ and in this culture violence is not seen as 
completely out of the ordinary and in some cases it is expected. This culture of 
accepting violence is seen in social, economic and political affairs and thus while the 
majority of Corsicans do not condone the activities of the FLNC and other militant 
nationalist groups they are not quick to reject them. If violence is a somewhat 
accepted part of the society it should not be surprising that on issues as emotionally 
charged as those associated with nationalism that eventually violence would become 
part of the equation.  
                                                
439  Those who were interviewed were not asked uniform survey questions so it is not 
possible to provide statistics. All interviewees were asked in some form what has 
caused the group to act in a particular way and the majority of the respondents 
mentioned culture as a leading cause. 
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 While there have always been aspects of Basque culture historically that could 
be seen as promoting violence it was not until they themselves experienced violent 
repression at the hands of Franco did Basque culture begin to incorporate an 
acceptance of violence. Faced with the potential elimination of their language and 
traditions the Basques began to see violence as the only option left to fight back and 
when all one knows is violence is understandable that they will eventual turn to 
violence themselves. The early activities of the ETA during the 1960’s were seen as 
great victories for the Basques. Soon fighting back against Franco through terrorist 
tactics was seen as not only acceptable but also expected. Unfortunately, this aspect 
of Basque culture has been difficult to change back even after Franco’s death. There 
are still many Basques who see the treatment of the group by the Spanish government 
as a continuation of the oppression started by Franco. With the culture of the group 
changed to accept violence in defence of the group, the terrorist activities continue. 
As with the Corsicans, many Basques do not condone the activities of the ETA but 
there are still enough that do not fully reject it to allow for the ETA to function and 
remain clandestine.440  
 The Russians in Estonia and Latvia have two factors influencing their culture 
that have made violent protests a non-issue. First, under the nationalist policies of the 
former Soviet Union Russians were not encouraged to organize around their ethnicity. 
Early Soviet leaders, starting with Lenin, saw the Russians as a great chauvinist 
                                                
440  It would appear that there are a smaller number of the Basques who continue to 
accept violence as a part of their culture than Corsicans. There have been more anti-
ETA protests by Basques in the past years than seen in Corsica. See the chronologies 
for each group on the Minorities at Risk Website http://www.minoritiesatrisk.com.  
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society so while other groups, including eventually the Estonians and Latvians, were 
encouraged to see themselves as a particular ethnic group and to take pride in that 
group, the Russians were not. This has left the Russians, particularly those who 
moved during Soviet times to what is now know as the ‘near abroad’ with a weak 
sense of ethnic identity and has left them ill-equipped to organize to a level necessary 
to become militant. Secondly, the Russian speakers who moved to the Baltic states 
were heavily influenced by the culture of the titular community and both the 
Estonians and Latvians pride themselves for having a non-violent culture. The proof 
behind this pride was the relatively peaceful movement during the 1980’s that led to 
their independence. The Russians, many of whom have lived in the region for more 
than forty years, could not help but be influenced by the titular culture, which has 
been adapted into their own. The Russians living in Russia notice a difference in the 
Russian community in Estonia and Latvia as they are seen to be more placid and 
more difficult to bring to conflict. This indicates a new culture has developed that has 
combined the non-violent aspects of the Baltic nations with the lack of national 
awareness from the Soviet period. The result is a culture that does not see collective 
action and particularly violence as an option when negotiating with the state.  
 The fourth hypothesis was broken down into three parts. Each segment on its 
own would be insufficient to be useful in explaining or predicting behaviour. 
Together and in conjunction with the third hypotheses they become a valuable tool 
and can be seen as factors leading to the institutionalization of the culture described in 
hypothesis three. For example, the level of geographic isolation appears to be an 
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important factor and due to its isolation from the rest of France the vendetta culture of 
Corsica has been easier to maintain. While there is obviously a police presence on the 
island certain violent offences are not prosecuted to the same level in Corsica as on 
the mainland. This helps reinforce the idea that violence is not as serious an offence 
as seen in other societies. Their isolation in the interior of the island away from the 
non-Corsicans also helps maintain the traditions and culture of the group since they 
are not interacting with others whose values could help change the Corsican values. 
The same holds true in the Basque country: those who live in the larger Basque cities 
where there are large populations of non-Basques are the ones who have most 
rejected the culture of violence developed under Franco. The Basques who live in 
smaller non-urban centers who have little interaction with non-Basques continue to 
support the ETA and the culture that does not condone violence in the name of 
protecting the nation. The Russian populations in Estonia and Latvia are found in the 
large urban centres in both countries and the majority of Russian speakers live in the 
two capitals of Tallinn and Riga. For the most part the Russians are surrounded by the 
titular population.441 The levels of intermarriage is also growing in both countries. 
This high level of interaction has increased the influence of the Baltic culture on the 
Russian community and has made the idea of militant activity less appealing. 
                                                
441  The exception being the almost entirely Russian city of Narva in Estonia. In 
Narva the lack of activity by the Russians after 1994 can be explained as a mix of a 
lack of threat to their language and culture due to their overwhelming majority and 
their proximity to Russia. They see that their standard of living is higher in Estonia 
and therefore are placated. 
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 In regards to the length of the conflict, there is some evidence that the 
frustration level is higher in Corsica and the Basque country due to the centuries of 
conflict between themselves and France and Spain respectively. There is some 
concern as well that the conflicts in the Baltic states are too new and not enough time 
has passed to allow for frustrations to reach the point where violence is a possibility. 
While this may be true, this study found that the length of time a conflict has carried 
on is less important than the historical time period in which the conflict takes place. 
Both the Basque and Corsican nationalist movements turned violent in the period 
after the colonial conflicts in Africa and South East Asia and both groups were 
heavily influenced by the left-wing militant movements that had won independence 
for countries such as Algeria and Vietnam. Thus both militant movements became 
very left-wing, some would say Marxist in ideology and advocated the same armed 
struggle as described by leaders of those movements. Developing during the 1960’s 
and 1970’s exposed the nationalists to a very different ideology than if they had 
developed earlier or later. The Russian community has been limited ideologically due 
to the historical time frame it has been forced to operate in. In a post-Soviet society 
such as Latvia or Estonia it is impossible to turn to Marxist thinkers such as those of 
the colonial struggle. The Russians needed to convince the Estonians and Latvians 
that they were not communists and supporters of the Soviet Union and therefore they 
needed to find a more moderate ideology in which to operate. The Marxist ideology 
were not acceptable in Eastern Europe in the 1990’s which has helped prevent 
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Russian activists from using it. This lack of an ideology that condones violence has 
limited the choices available to the Russians. 
 The final hypothesis that is part of the institutionalization of culture concerns 
repertoires. It is difficult to prove that the Russians in the Baltic states do not use 
militant strategies now because they have not used them in the past because this is 
speculation at best. What is observable is how difficult violence is to stop once it has 
been used. In both the Basque country and Corsica part of the difficulty in ending the 
violence is that it has become so much a part of the conflict. There are members of 
the FLNC and the ETA whose ‘careers’ involve using violence and it has become a 
way of life for many and they have been unwilling to give this lifestyle up. In both 
cases the nationalist groups have taken on aspects of organized crime as they use their 
knowledge of violence and the intimidation that comes with it to branch out into other 
areas of crime, including extortion. Partly these activities are used to bankroll the 
nationalist campaigns but mostly the profits go to the individuals themselves. 
Breaking this overall cycle of violence has proven difficult for both the French and 
Spanish authorities. 
 To review, this study found that in order to predict whether a group will resort 
to violence the most important factors are the influence of the international 
community and how the group’s culture views violence. This culture is influenced by 
the level of geographic isolation a group has, the historical time period when the 
nationalist group developed and possibly by the use of violence in the past. 
Differences in levels of economic wealth may contribute to a nationalist movement 
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beginnings and can be used as justification for violence but it is not a necessary 
condition for a group to chose to use violence or not.        
The Future of each Group 
 Each of the groups discussed throughout this study is at a crossroads in 
relation to the state. After the defeat of the referendum on greater autonomy during 
the summer of 2003 it is unclear if France will try again to come to a new agreement 
with Corsica as this referendum was the culmination of years of negotiations between 
Corsican and French government officials and represented the best chance for 
massive changes that could have brought lasting peace and stability to the island. The 
French government, for this first time, was willing to discuss structural changes to its 
unitary system. Many of the political leaders on both the island and the mainland 
invested a lot of political capital during the referendum and its failure indicated to 
some that the island’s problems are not fixable and only embarrassment can come 
from trying to resolve the conflict. The resulting post-referendum violence seen both 
on the island and in Nice indicates that there remains a small but dedicated group of 
nationalists who see violence as their best outlet for collective action.442 Paul 
Giacobbi, the President of North Corsica believes that due to this failure, there is little 
chance of another referendum in Corsica for the next “20 to 30 years”.443 Giacobbi 
contends that in the wake of the referendum government on the island is now 
                                                
442   Associated Press (2003) “Separatists in Corsica claim Nice bombings” 
International Herald Tribune 22 July 2003, p.5. 
 
443   Telephone interview with Paul Giacobbi, President Haute Corse (North Corsica), 
March 24 2004. 
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localized and complex which makes it dangerous and ineffective. Giacobbi’s view 
corresponds with comments made by the French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy in 
the wake of the referendum defeat. Sarkozy declared: “The government will respect 
their choice, nothing more can be done for that place”.444 Sarkozy went further to say 
that in regards to the activities of the FLNC and others that “the age of impunity is 
over”.445 Without a political settlement from the French government it will be up to 
the Corsican National Assemblies to find solutions and this may require more 
inclusion of the nationalist parties in the government.446 The other consequence of the 
defeat of the referendum is that the French state and also Corsican politicians are 
unclear as to what exactly the majority of Corsicans want.447 By rejecting a proposal 
that would have provided them more autonomy it is no longer clear if that is the 
solution for the island and if only the minority wants outright independence, and the 
majority (if only an extremely small one) voted against greater autonomy, why should 
future efforts be concerned with autonomy? This is where the Corsican case holds the 
potential for greater conflict in the future. If Giacobbi is correct that no new 
referendum is coming and that many people who voted no on the 2003 referendum 
                                                
444   Jon Henley (2003) “Corsicans say No to more home rule” The Guardian, 7 July 
2003.  
  
445   Reuters (2003) “Corsica Shuns Autonomy, Chirac Airs Regret” Washington Post, 
6 July 2003. 
  
446   Ibid. 
 
447   Interview with Frederic de Touchet, Political Advisor Permanent Mission of 
France to the OSCE, February 25, 2004 Vienna. 
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question did so either because they were unhappy with the French government or did 
not want to side with the FLNC448 then frustration could build on the island. If in fact 
the majority of people want greater autonomy (even if they voted against it) then over 
the next 20 to 30 years people may grow tired of inaction. If this frustration ferments 
then these people may move ideologically away from being simply nationalists and 
larger numbers of separatists could develop among the Corsican people. This would 
impact not only the political system on the island but also the activities of groups 
such as the FLNC. 
   There is some reason for optimism in the Basque Country. The majority of 
the Basques do not actively support the ETA and many Basques see it as a hindrance 
to any lasting peace agreement. While not supporting the ETA the Basques also felt 
persecuted by the right-wing government . By banning the separatist political party 
Batasuna and refusing to negotiate with the Basque government, the PP had created 
an impasse between the two sides. All Basques, ETA or not, had been painted by the 
same brush by the government. As a result there was more hostility, no 
communication and the moderate Basques began to be more nationalist.449 This 
culminated with the Basque government’s proposed new relationship with the 
Spanish state in 2003 which called for far greater autonomy than they had ever asked 
                                                
448  Telephone interview with Giacobbi, 2004. 
 





previously.450 The relationship between the Spanish government and the Basques had 
become so strained that it was described by the Basque author and historian Ignacio 
Sũarez-Zuloaga as ‘poisoned’.451 
The PP party’s hard line with the Basques was portrayed as their own ‘war on 
terrorism’. The PP and the ETA had formed a somewhat symbiotic relationship as the 
PP used the activities of the ETA as justification for their anti-Basque policies. Due to 
the violence of the ETA the public throughout Spain supported the measures. The 
ETA in return used the government’s policies as justification for their continued 
activities.452 This is why after the tragic terrorist attacks on the Madrid rail system in 
March, 2004 the government was so insistent that it must be the Basques and the ETA 
specifically that were to blame.453 The Spanish government’s fight against the ETA 
was popular but its larger war on terrorism and its alliance with the US government 
was not. When it became apparent that the attack was the work of Islamic terrorists 
rather than the ETA the backlash by the Spanish people led to the defeat of the PP by 
the Socialists in the national elections. 
                                                
450  See Eusko Jaurlaritza Gobierno Vasco (2003) Proposal for the Political Statute of 
the Community of the Basque Country October 25, 2003 on the Basque government 
website http://www.euskadi.net/infogv/estatuto_vasco_i.htm.   
 
451  Telephone interview with Ignacio Sũarez-Zuloaga, Basque Author, February 18 
2004. 
 
452   This concept was described by both Dr. Eduardo Ruiz Vieytez, Director of the 
Basque Human Rights Institute,  February 3 2004, Bilbao and Maria Amor Martin 
Estebanez, Advisor to the Spanish delegation to the OSCE, February 24 2004, 
Vienna. 
 
453   Keith B. Richburg (2004) “Spain Campaigned to Pin Blame on ETA” 
Washington Post 16 March 2004, p.A1.  
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Out of the tragedy of the Madrid bombings comes some level of hope for 
Spain with regard to the Basque conflict. First, the public reaction of the Basques in 
the immediate aftermath of the attack was one of anger directed towards the ETA and 
it was clear that the public would not tolerate an ETA attack of such magnitude. 
Second, the ETA had been looking for an opportunity to declare a cease fire in the 
months leading up to the attack454 and it appears that they may now choose to 
unilaterally declare a cease fire. Finally, with the defeat of the PP comes the hope that 
a Socialist government will be better able to negotiate with all the segments of 
Basque society. The poisoned relationship has been removed, so there should be a 
feeling of optimism.455 This is not to say that with a Socialist government the 
violence will cease immediately. As former Batasuna Member of Parliament Esther 
Agirre notes, the Socialists voted with the PP to ban her party.456 The ETA may try to 
continue their influence over Basque-Spanish negotiations or risk fading into 
oblivion. Despite these potential roadblocks the possibility of a negotiated settlement 
and an end to the violence associated with the ETA is as high now as it has been since 
the death of Franco. It will require the continuing shift of Basque culture away from 
the violence of the Franco period and a shift of the culture of the Spanish government 
to be more open to negotiations and potentially international assistance. The terrorist 
attack in March 2004 may act as the catalyst for a new relationship between the 
                                                
454  Gorka Espiau 2004. 
 
455  Maria Amor Martin Estebanez 2004.  
 
456  Esther Agirre, Former Member of Parliament- Batasuna, February 5 2004, Bilbao. 
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Basques and the rest of Spain in that it may force both sides to move from their well-
established positions and try to negotiate in good faith. 
The future for the Russians in Estonia and Latvia is less clear. In March, 2004 
the two countries passed their penultimate hurdle to ‘joining Europe’ by becoming 
members of NATO. The final step occurs in May 2004 when they will both be 
admitted to the European Union. By reaching accession Estonia and Latvia have met 
all of the requirements set out by the EU, including those concerning the treatment of 
minorities. Clearly from a legal and constitutional point of view the Russians are in a 
much better position in Estonia and Latvia now compared to even five years earlier 
but what is less certain is what happens to them after May 2004. As discussed 
previously the majority of politicians in both countries believe that with accession 
there is no longer a need for outside recommendations (or even intervention). Most 
feel that institutions that have been critical in improving the rights of the Russian 
speaking community are no longer needed. The OSCE High Commissioner is the 
prime example of an institution that would no longer be needed or welcomed in either 
country.457 This causes anxiety among the Russian speakers as they see their most 
powerful advocate losing their voice in the region.458 Currently, the European Union 
is not equipped to handle any future disagreements concerning minorities. It is the 
belief of some Russian speakers that it will be forced to create new institutions 
                                                
457  As discussed in Chapter 5, this point was most strongly argued by Paul-Eerik 
Rummo, Estonian Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs, March 8 2004, Tallinn 
and Valdis Birkavs, Former Prime Minister of Latvia, March 15 2004, Riga. 
 
458  For example, Vadim Poleshchuk, Legal Advisor- Legal Information Centre for 
Human Rights, March 9 2004, Tallinn. 
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specifically on this issue since not all of the issues in the Baltic have been adequately 
resolved.459 
Of the two countries Estonia appears to be closer to successfully integrating 
their Russian minority. The country has an extensive integration plan which calls for 
the majority of Russian speakers who want to be integrated and gain their citizenship 
to do so by 2007.460 However, there is a difference between integrating to a level high 
enough to pass state exams and mentally integrating into a society as Aarne Veedla 
notes that at this point still only 30% of Russians speak Estonian. He believes that it 
will take another 50 years for the integration process to be fully successful.461 If it is 
the goal of the Estonian government to integrate all interested Russians by 2007 and it 
could take until 2050 before the process is finally complete this leaves a long period 
of time where a large segment of the Russians in Estonia to remain outside the society 
and this is where the danger lies for the country. While some Russians will integrate, 
there will be large numbers who never do and it may be only when all of these people 
are dead can the society be truly integrated. During this period animosity could grow, 
particularly if the Russian community remains locked into the lower paying jobs in 
the country and continue to be denied some political rights. Therefore while Estonia 
                                                
459  This, for example, is the opinion of Boris Tsilevich Former Latvian Member of 
Parliament and Russian Activist, March 16 2004, Riga. 
 
460  Interview with Paul-Eerik Rummo, 2004.  
 
461  Aarne Veedla, Counselor to the Minister- Office of the Minister for Population 
and Ethnic Affairs, March 9 2004, Tallinn. 
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may have weathered the storm when the probability of ethnic violence was high, they 
are by no means completely free of that possibility. 
Latvia is a more potentially dangerous situation. There are several pressing 
issues in the country that must be resolved before the majority of Russians will be 
able to successfully integrate. The Latvian government has taken a harder line with 
regard to the Russian minority compared to Estonia and this has resulted in a more 
disgruntled population. The main issue that needs to be resolved is allowing non-
citizens to vote in local elections.462 John Packer notes the rest of the world is moving 
towards allowing non-citizens to vote in local elections while Latvia is one of the few 
holdouts. For Packer this indicates a lack of trust by the Latvian government towards 
the Russian non-citizens and if there is no trust on behalf of the government what 
incentive is there for the Russians to try to integrate?463 This could widen the divide 
between the non-citizen Russians and Latvia, particularly when non-citizens from 
other EU countries will be able to vote in local elections but the Russians will not.  
The Russian-speakers in Latvia have shown a willingness to engage in 
minimum collective action around the issue of education reform in larger numbers 
than other issues in the past and they have managed to gain some concessions from 
the government due to these protests and campaigns.464 Tsilevich also contends that 
                                                
462  As discussed previously this is already the case in Estonia. 
 
463  John Packer, Director, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 
February 19 2004, The Hague. 
 
464   Illze Brand Kehris, Director of the Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic 
Studies, March 15 2004, Riga.  
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the issue of educational reforms is the one issue that could lead to very high tensions 
between the two sides.465 If the Latvian government continues its hard line approach 
on issues that appear to have relatively simply solutions then there is the possibility of 
violence (even though this study has shown the factors that have prevented it in the 
past and make it less likely presently). As Packer notes in regards to Latvia: “it won’t 
take a lot of violence to change how people act”.466 The first few years as a part of the 
European Union will be crucial in determining the future relationship of both Estonia 
and Latvia and the Russian minority, particularly those who remain non-citizens.       
Future Work 
 In many ways this study has led to more questions than actual concrete 
answers. This study has addressed the importance of the role of the international 
community, economics, culture and the institutionalization of that culture in 
explaining the groups’ decision making there are other factors that could be and 
should be examined. 
 One such issue is whether or not being indigenous to a region increases the 
possibility of violence. While many have been there several generations, the Russian 
communities in Estonia and Latvia moved from other areas of the Soviet Union, 
while the Basques and the Corsicans are native to their regions. It is possible that the 
sense of homeland is an important explanation for why some groups choose to 
                                                
465  Interview with Boris Tsilevich, 2004. 
 
466  Interview with John Packer, 2004. 
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employ violence.467 In order to address this topic would have greatly lengthened this 
study and was therefore outside of its scope. This would also be a very difficult factor 
to effectively analyze. Despite the difficulties in examining the issue further it may be 
an important explanatory variable and should be studied in the future. 
 A second issue that needs to be addressed is if the findings of this study carry 
over to other regions outside of Europe. The history of Europe is unique and therefore 
some of the findings in this study may not prove to be as important elsewhere 
throughout the world. However, the importance of the international community in 
particular may be of increased importance within Europe. The level of involvement in 
the internal relationship between the states of Eastern Europe and their minority 
groups by institutions such as the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 
and the European Union are unprecedented. This has influenced not only the minority 
groups directly affected (such as the Russians in Estonia and Latvia) but also those 
ethnic groups within Europe who did not receive the same level of intervention (the 
Basques and Corsicans). While economic issues were only partially able to explain 
the groups’ activities, in other regions around the world they may also play a more 
significant role. To test these findings therefore, future work should examine minority 
groups in Africa or Asia and test the same hypotheses. It could also be possible to 
stay within Europe and test the hypotheses further as well. The cases chosen for this 
study were selected because they appear to lie outside the normal pattern of minority 
group/state relations. Based on the findings of the study other cases can be re-
                                                
467  This theory is seen most predominantly in the work of Anthony D. Smith as 
described in Chapter 2. 
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examined as well. While other theories may have explained why the majority of 
groups act how they do, the importance of the issues discussed above may have been 
overlooked. 
 The final example of further work that results from this study is the need for a 
more in-depth understanding of group culture and its ability to predict violence. This 
study attempted to understand the cultures of the various groups through elite 
interviews and secondary research. The results appear compelling as the descriptions 
of the groups’ cultures by elites corresponded with what others had derived. While 
people have a natural tendency to look more favorably on their own culture which can 
result in somewhat biased answers to questions regarding their culture, this does not 
mean that their opinions are without value. At worst their answers illustrate how the 
groups’ culture is portrayed by elites and this shapes the relationship between the two 
sides. At best, their answers provide a clear insight into the background of a group 
which outsiders could not derive on their own. Further analysis should be done 
however to incorporate other methods to ensure the best possible understanding of 
how a group’s culture is developed. This could involve ‘thicker’ description and 
observation or possibly quantitative analysis based on survey results.468 All of these 
methods would enhance the understanding of culture but due to time and financial 
restrictions they were far outside the scope of this study. Due to the finding in this 
study that culture and the institutionalization of that culture is a leading explanation 
                                                
468  Past attempts at quantitative coding of culture has proven difficult, as seen in the 
Minorities at Risk Project. Tracking changes to culture has proven even more 
difficult. 
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for the groups’ choices this is therefore an issue that should be studied further with a 
variety of methods so that it can be further understood.  
Final Remarks  
There are other larger ethnic groups in Europe than the Basques in Spain. There are 
more violent conflicts than the Corsicans. For many Estonia and Latvia are small, 
unimportant countries on the northeast tip of Europe. While all of this may be true it 
does not discount the importance of the findings of this study. The patterns identified 
in the pages above indicate that accurate assessments of ethnic group behavior can be 
made if the right factors are considered. Corsica and the Basque country are as far 
away from Estonia and Latvia as possible while remaining in Europe and yet patterns 
of behavior were identified common to all. For example, the international community 
appears to have an enormous role in preventing ethnic conflict throughout Europe. It 
has always been assumed that there was a powerful role for the international 
community but these cases show the impact of both intervention and a lack of 
intervention. This study has shown that groups that are not receiving international 
attention are aware that others are and this is influencing their behavior.  
     This study also showed the importance of understanding the culture of a 
group as all four appear to have group-wide traits. These traits make violence either 
more or less acceptable and for groups where violence is more accepted, it may take 
less provocation for them to resort to violence. For groups whose culture shies away 
from violence it will take substantially more for them to resort to militant actions. It is 
acknowledged that a culture foreign to one’s own generally and that cultures view of 
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violence specifically can be very difficult to accurately observe and analyze but this 
study indicates that it is worth the effort. It requires an understanding of the group’s 
history in order to identify if and when a culture could change. It requires 
understanding the biases of those who have been asked to describe their own culture 
in regards to violence. It also requires trust in other scholars who have come to their 
own conclusions on a group’s culture. Taken together it is possible to come to a 
reasonable understanding of the culture and how violence is viewed within it. There 
may come a day when culture may be easier to analyze. With vast resources and 
careful polling and statistical analysis it may be possible to turn a group’s culture into 
numerical values. Until that day however, this study has shown that any knowledge of 
culture is better than nothing and it is imperative that it must be considered in any 
analysis of a group’s decision making. Culture is the filter through which all groups 
operate. This culture is influenced by outside forces and can change and become 
institutionalized. Resorting to or avoiding violence goes through the filter as do all 
other factors. By accounting for the role of culture and how the group views that 
culture allows scholars to begin to understand the thought process that leads a group, 
or individuals in that group, to a specific point. Knowledge of a group’s culture can 
not only help explain how they got to that decision, it can also help predict where 
they will go from there. This takes a great deal of time and patience, but the results 
appear to be well worth the effort. While small, these four groups have shown us a 
great deal into what can cause ethnic violence, and more importantly, what can 
prevent it. Better risk assessment is possible based on the findings of this study. What 
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has been learned through these groups can now be used and tested elsewhere in the 
hope that ethnic conflict and the pain and suffering that goes with it can be avoided in 
the future.    
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Appendix- Sample Interview Questions 
 
Interview with Paul-Eerik Rummo, Estonian Minister for Population and Ethnic 
Affairs, March 8, 2004 Tallinn 




1) How successful in your opinion has the integration of the Russian minority 
been? 
 
2) What role did the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities play in 
this process? 
 
3) Please talk about the difficult choices between adhering to the European 
Union accession requirements and protecting Estonian society. 
 
4) What will the relationship be between Estonia and the High Commissioner be 
once Estonia gains EU membership? 
 
5) What is the relationship between the government and the Russian minority 
currently? 
 
6) What concerns you more, the Russian dominated city of Narva or the large 
number of Russians living in Tallinn? 
 
7) How important is continued economic success to the relationship between 
Estonians and Russian Estonians? 
 
8) Was the possibility of violence ever a real concern? 
 
9) What role does culture play in the level of co-operation and integration? 
 
10) How was the integration process handled differently in Estonia compared to 
Latvia? 
 
Subsequent questioned asked as a result of previous answers 
 
1) How will EU membership change integration strategies? 
 
2) Why have Russian-based political parties done so poorly in recent elections? 
 




4) How will the free movement of migrants within the European Union impact 
Estonia society? 
 
5) How often do you discuss ethnic issues with your Latvian counter-part? 
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